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Abstract 
 
At a time when the institutional and intellectual futures of the social sciences 
are under threat, there has been growing concern among researchers and policy 
makers around the question of how to foster and enhance the relevance of their 
knowledge-practices. This thesis problematises such demands by elaborating a 
concept of ‘relevance’ that renders it not the product of a subjective act of 
interpretation, but an event that is part and parcel of the immanent processes by 
which the facts that compose situations come (in)to matter. By expanding on 
the work of William Connolly, Gilles Deleuze, John Dewey, Donna Haraway, 
William James, Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers and Alfred North Whitehead, 
among others, I follow the implications of the concept of relevance through a 
speculative exploration of modes of knowledge-making in contemporary social 
science. As I show, such an exploration requires a transformation of the ethos 
with which social scientific inquiries are identified. If the former could be 
characterised as an ‘ethics of estrangement’ whereby to inquire is to estrange 
oneself from an apparent reality in order to gain access to a realm of social 
causes and reasons, an ethos oriented by the concept of relevance must reject 
that bifurcation of reality and cultivate, instead, a deep empiricism that is both 
singularly attentive to the coming into matter of the facts that compose a 
situation, and inventive of propositions that may contribute to the possible 
transformation of those situations that demand inquiry. It is this latter ethos, 
one which I call an ‘adventure’, that my thesis develops.  
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Introduction:  
The Care of Knowledge 
 
Wandering in The Night 
 
 In 1971 Argentinian writer Julio Cortázar, internationally renowned for 
his magnum opus  Hopscotch (1966), as well as for his fantastic short stories, 
wrote a piece titled ‘Prosa del observatorio’ –translated by Anne Mclean as 
From the Observatory (2011)– a piece which, according to conventional literary 
genres, would seem to be unclassifiable. Despite the fact that the writer is 
certainly well-known for a form of literature where not only realism and 
fantasy would combine to the point of becoming indistinguishable, but which 
also transgressed the rules of composition of literary cannons, many of the 
reviewers of From the Observatory agree in regarding this piece as Cortázar’s 
‘most unconventional work’ (Cortázar 2011). A dream-like visual prose poem-
cum-letter-cum-essay that today might be associated with a speculative 
fabulation on science, life, and the world (Haraway 2012a), I want to read 
Cortázar’s From the Observatory as a plea that speaks to the future, indeed, to a 
possible future which, while perhaps unlikely, remains a vital source for 
cultivating a different mode of experiencing the world.  
 By moving between a forceful response to an article on the life cycle of 
the eels published in Le Monde in April 14th 1971, and the spectral, visual 
experience of the wonderful structures of the Maharajah Jai Singh’s eighteenth-
century astronomical observatories in Jaipur and Delhi, the poem articulates a 
proposition for a different mode of cultivating that very peculiar kind of 
experience of the world that we normally call ‘knowing’. A mode that, 
throughout the coming pages, I will attempt to make resonate with some of the 
challenges with which the contemporary social sciences are confronted today. 
 The expressive force of the poem is crucially propelled by an experience 
of perplexity. And such a perplexity is double. First, it concerns the lively, 
moving and disconcertingly epic life cycle of eels: 
 
eels born in the Atlantic depths that begin, because we 
have to begin to follow them, to grow, translucent larvae 
floating between two waters, crystalline amphitheater of 
jellyfish and plankton, mouths that slide in an 
9 
interminable suction, bodies linked in the now multi-form 
serpent that some night, no one can know when, will rise 
up leviathan, emerge as an inoffensive and terrifying 
kraken, to initiate the migration along the ocean floor […] 
[After living] for so many years at the edge of blades of 
water [the eels] return to submerge themselves in the 
gloom of the depths for hundred meters down, lay their 
eggs hidden by half a kilometre of slow silent thickness, 
and dissolve in death by the millions of millions, 
molecules of plankton that the first larvae already sip in 
the palpitation of incorruptible life. (Cortázar 2011: 19-20) 
 
In attending to their adventures, Cortázar wonders about those eels that spend 
their lives ‘at the edge of blades of water’ traveling upstream while in the 
process they ‘grow and change color … the muddy mimetic yellow [giving] 
way bit by bit to mercury’; those eels that, according to ‘an obscure piece of 
wisdom from remote bestiaries’, at some point in their life they ‘leave the water 
and invade the vegetable patches and orchard groves (those are the kinds of 
words they use in the bestiaries) to hunt for snails and worms, to eat the garden 
peas as it says in the Espasa Encyclopedia, which knows so much about eels’ 
(2011: 40); and it wonders, perplexed, about why after such a saga, the eels 
‘commit suicide in their millions in the sluice gates and nets so the rest can pass 
and arrive’ (2011: 29). 
 Perhaps what is most striking to Cortázar, however, is what becomes of 
the tragic adventure of the eels as they encounter the knowledge-practices of 
science, that ‘lovely’ science whose ‘sweet’ words ‘follow the course of the 
elvers and tell us their saga‘ and whose astronomers from the observatory in 
Jaipur once ‘wielded a vocabulary just as lovely and sweet to conjure the 
unnameable and pour it onto soothing parchments, inheritance for the species, 
school lesson, barbiturate for essential insomniacs’ (2011: 29). What he finds 
puzzling, as do others –myself included– is the manner in which the quest for 
knowledge –and particularly, for those forms of knowledge we have come to 
associate with modern science– transforms their adventure into a set of 
‘theories of names and phases’ that ‘embalm eels in a nomenclature, in genetics, 
in a neuroendocrine process, from yellow to silver, from ponds to estuaries’ and 
attempts to hold the cosmos still by ‘gather[ing] into one mental fist the reins of 
that multitude of twinkling and hostile horses’. For Cortázar, the consequence 
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is inevitable: ‘the stars flee Jai Singh’s eyes just as the eels do the words of 
science’ (2011: 42).  
 To be sure, while the scope of Cortázar’s plea exceeds the specific 
procedures and requirements of neuroendocrinology and astronomy to 
encompass science as a whole, including the social sciences, it is not a mere 
rejection either of scientific practice or knowledge (2011: 49). He does not claim 
that the lively journey of the eels or the cosmos should intrinsically escape 
scientific inquiry, nor does he necessarily anticipate that his own poetical 
experiment might be better able to come to grips with the dynamic, open nature 
of reality as such:  
 
dear Madame, what would we do without you, Lady 
Science, I’m speaking seriously, very seriously, but besides 
there is the open, the redheaded night, the units of excess, 
the clowning, tightrope walking, somnambulist quality of 
the average citizen, the fact that no one will convince him 
that his precise limits are those of the happiest city or the 
most pleasant countryside; school does what it does, and 
the army, the priests, but what I call eel or milky way 
persists in a species memory, in a genetic program 
Professor Fointaine has no idea of, and so the revolution 
in its moment, attacking the objectively abject or enemy, 
the delirious swipe to bring down a rotten city, so the first 
stages of the reencounter with the whole man. (2011: 62) 
 
What Cortázar’s plea is trying to resist, I suggest, is a specific kind of science, 
one that, in exclusively attempting ‘to measure, compute, understand, belong, 
enter, die less poor, to oppose this studded incomprehensibility hand to hand’ 
(2011: 41), would not step out into the open thereby failing to come to terms 
with what matters to those it addresses. As he clearly affirms in addressing his 
two figurative epitomes for scientific rationality: 
 
So, Professor Fontaine, it’s not diffuse pantheism we’re 
talking about, nor dissolution in mystery: the stars are 
measurable, the ramps of Jaipur still bear traces of 
mathematical chisels, cages of abstraction and 
understanding. What I reject while you gill me up with 
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information on the course of the leptocephali is the sordid 
paradox of an impoverishment correlated to the 
multiplication of libraries, microfilms and paperback 
editions, enlightenment á la Jivaro, Mademoiselle 
Callamand. Let Lady Science stroll through her garden, 
sing and embroider, fair is her figure and necessary her 
remote-controlled distaff and her electronic lute, we are 
not the Boeotians of our century, the brontosaurus is well 
and truly dead. But then one goes out to wander in the 
night, as so many of Lady Science’s servants undoubtedly 
do too, and if one lives for real, if night and our breathing 
and thought link those meshes that so many definitions 
separate, it can happen that we might enter parks in Jaipur 
or Delhi, or in the heart of Saint-Germain-des-Prés we 
might brush against another possible profile of man; 
laughable or terrible things can happen to us, we might 
access cycles that begin in the doorway of a café and end 
up on a gallows in the main square of Baghdad, or 
stepping on an eel in the rue du Dragon, or spotting from 
afar like in a tango that woman who filled our life with 
broken mirrors and structuralist nostalgia (she never 
finished doing her hair, and we never finished our 
doctoral thesis) (2011: 56-57). 
 
In this way, the plea that opens up a space for such unclassifiable text bears the 
mark of a challenge– a challenge for scientific inquiries not to demand 
compliance of what they seek to understand, and instead, to learn to come to 
terms with it. Again, learning to come to terms with it does not imply ceasing to 
ask questions and dissolving our inquiries into utter mysticism. Rather, it 
involves speculating on the possibility of inventing new and different modes of 
asking questions – ‘we must’, he urges us, ‘feather and launch the arrow of the 
question another way, from another departure point, toward something else’ 
(2011: 43. emphasis added).  
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Speculative Reconstructions in Contemporary Social Science, or 
What Is Ethics? 
  
 The reason I have begun with a reading of From the Observatory is 
because I believe the poem animates, in its own inimitable style, a series of 
urgent questions with which the contemporary social sciences are confronted 
today– a series of questions that constitute the very core of this thesis.  How 
might the knowledges produced by the social sciences come to terms with this 
globalised and complex, indeed, this ‘blooming, buzzing’ world, as William 
James (1957: 488) once described it? What new modes of feathering and 
launching questions might we have to invent, from where and in what 
directions would we launch them, if we are concerned with producing forms of 
knowledge that will contribute not merely to the multiplication of paperbacks 
but to the future of those who, in Cortázar’s words, ‘live for real’? 
 Of course, insofar as the invention of the modern social sciences in the 
nineteenth century can be said to be related to the emergence of practical 
problems of governance of expanding and increasingly complex populations, 
such questions may be thought to be anything but new (Sahlins, 2000; Tresch, 
2005; Wagner, 2000; Wallerstein, 2001; Wallerstein et al., 1996). However, the 
modernist mode of posing those questions, the subsequent history of the social 
sciences throughout the twentieth- and into the twenty-first century, as well as 
the global socio-material transformations of the world during this period, 
testify to the need, indeed, the demand, to simultaneously reclaim those 
questions and reconstruct the manner in which they are cultivated and 
launched.  
 In a sense, then, the attempt this thesis will make could be associated to a 
transformed version of John Dewey’s (2004) project of ‘reconstruction’. 
Although it was published initially almost two years after the First World War, 
a revised edition of his Reconstruction in Philosophy was reissued twenty five 
years later –that is, three years after the Second World War– including a new 
introduction written by Dewey ‘in the firm belief’ 
 
that the events of the intervening years have created a 
situation in which the need for reconstruction is vastly 
more urgent than when the book was composed; and, 
more specifically, in the conviction that the present 
13 
situation indicates with greatly increased clearness where 
the needed reconstruction must center, the locus from 
which detailed new developments must proceed (Dewey 
2004: iii). 
 
Dewey’s aim in his project of reconstructing philosophy after the First and the 
Second World War was marked by what he saw as the demand upon 
philosophy and the problems with which it was concerned to become ‘relevant’ 
to the continuous changes in human life which at times constitute veritable 
events in the world’s history. Concerned with what he perceived as a profound 
disjunction between the premises of philosophical inquiry and the unstable 
consequences of the ingression of scientific inventions into the realm of human 
affairs throughout the first half of the twentieth century (a point also notably 
made around the same period by Gaston Bachelard [1984]), Dewey sought to 
redress this disconnection by producing a reconstruction of the manner in 
which philosophical inquiry is conducted.  
 Philosophy, Dewey argued, cannot continue confining itself to dealing 
only with that which is ‘taken to be fixed, immutable, and therefore out of time 
[…], that is, eternal’. In contrast, it had to become capable of dealing with the 
urgent demands of the world with which it was then confronted. Demands 
that, in science, in technology and in politics, forced one to ‘abandon the 
assumption of fixity and to recognize that what for it is actually “universal” is 
process’ (Dewey 2004: vii-viii. emphasis in original). So what is a reconstruction? 
 As Dewey (2004: xvii) forcefully claimed, ‘reconstruction can be nothing 
less than the work of developing, of forming, of producing (in the literal sense 
of that word), the intellectual instrumentalities which will progressively direct 
inquiry’. Both in 1920 and in 1948, Dewey’s aim was the production of 
intellectual instrumentalities for the ‘construction of a moral human science‘ 
which would allow a reorientation of human affairs and provide ‘other 
conditions of a fuller life than man has enjoyed‘ (xxii). The inquiry that the 
production of such intellectual instruments would progressively direct was, for 
him, an inquiry concerned with the ‘deeply and inclusively human– that is to 
say, moral– facts of the present scene and situation’ (xviii).  
 In this sense, the kinds of criticisms that Cortázar levels against ‘Lady 
Science’, namely, the proliferations of technical names, of methods and 
instruments at the expense of an ‘impoverished’ experience of the world, one 
that prevents us from coming to terms with what matters for those who ‘live for 
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real’, intimately resonate with Dewey’s plea for reconstruction.  To be sure, they 
also seemingly resonate with the backdrop of hindrances and perils against 
which C. Wright Mills’s The Sociological Imagination (2000) attempted to 
articulate a liberating promise– the danger of indulging in totalising yet 
impenetrable and thus, inert, ‘grand theories’, on the one hand, and that of an 
inhibition prompted by confusing methodology with the substantive issues at 
stake –what Mills terms ‘abstracted empiricism’– on the other. 
 Today, Mills’s ‘promise of social science’, his call for a form of social 
science that is primarily concerned with addressing substantive public concerns 
beyond the fetishisation of the Concept and beyond forms of abstracted 
empiricism, is one which has regained importance in current debates around 
the so-called ‘crisis’ of contemporary social science. Such a crisis, I shall argue in 
Chapter One, can be read as a series of demands for such sciences to both justify 
and enhance the ‘relevance’ of their practices at a time when their institutional 
and material survival within the university seems to be under threat of 
dissolution. 
 In this conjuncture, I am of the view a project of reconstruction similar to 
the one envisaged and proposed by Dewey might constitute a productive 
means of engaging the some of challenges faced by the contemporary social 
sciences. As I will show in what follows, however, the conditions that we face 
today differ in important ways from those that constituted the point of 
departure of the Deweyian project. And they do so in a number of respects.  
 The first is that, while in the early twentieth-century Dewey saw the 
construction of   social and human sciences as a promising mode of 
reconstructing philosophy, the developments in the mainstream of such 
sciences throughout the last century suggest that, today, they might themselves 
be the ones in need of reconstruction. These developments show, moreover, 
that the ‘deep and inclusively human facts’ that he regarded as the aim of such 
enterprise have been interpreted to be –rather disappointingly– only 
‘exclusively’ human. Thus, for instance, the relationship between the human 
and the world, or the Anthropos and the Oïkos, that such sciences have forged 
becomes, in an age of global crises of both economy and ecology, an important 
concern that the production of new intellectual instrumentalities must help 
address (Palsson et al. 2013). 
 The second difference between a classic Deweyian exercise in 
‘reconstruction’ and the one that might be associated with this project concerns 
the kind of work that such intellectual instrumentalities are meant to perform. 
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In other words, it concerns the kind of instrument that such an exercise may 
produce. Indeed, for Dewey intellectual instrumentalities are conceived, at least 
partially, as the invention of solutions to a preexisting problem of relevance that 
affected the dominant mode of philosophical inquiry at the turn of the 
twentieth century. A problem of relevance characterised by philosophy’s 
incapacity to come to terms with the transient nature of events that demanded 
urgent inquiry. In order overcome this problem, Dewey proposed that 
philosophy had to abandon its fascination with the eternal and come to terms 
with process.  
 Insofar as the present conjuncture that concerns the contemporary social 
sciences has to a large extent already been framed as a series of demands for 
relevance by both governmental institutions, funding bodies, and some social 
researchers (see Chapter One), however, a reconstruction of their modes of 
inquiry cannot simply become yet another demand for relevance, nor simply an 
instrument for producing solutions to prior demands. By contrast, we must 
begin by taking the concept of relevance seriously and entertain the problematic 
question of what it is that is demanded when such demands are articulated in 
practice. In fact, as I will show, although a demand for taking the question of 
relevance seriously may be welcome and timely, the manner in which such 
demands are usually framed, as well as their implicit conceptions of what the 
nature of something called ‘relevance’ is and what it requires, seems to me to 
testify more to the problem that this reconstruction must address than to its 
possible solution. As Dewey (2004: iii) would say, then, the concept of relevance 
must become the new ‘locus from which detailed new developments must 
proceed.’ 
   Most current demands for relevance implicitly or explicitly associate the 
term, and the problem it is said to pose, with more and better ways of making 
scientific practices and products, accountable, communicable, and public. 
Although I believe questions of public engagement do require attention, I will 
argue that reducing the question of relevance to how the knowledge-practices 
of the social sciences might make their findings more accessible, engaging, or 
interesting to a public leaves untouched a crucial and difficult question. 
Namely, the question of how knowledge-practices may come to terms with the 
situated ways in which experiences of various kinds and natures come (in)to 
matter. It is this latter concern that will be the object of this thesis. In order to do 
this, I suggest, we need to conceive of relevance not as what belongs to a 
subjective value ascribed either by a subject to the facts or to the findings of 
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social science, but as an event that belongs to the world. To express that 
‘something matters‘, that it is relevant, is to acknowledge that there is value 
beyond ourselves. The relevance of things, then, cannot be reduced to a 
judgement that is passed on to them, but must be seen as inhering in the situated 
specificity of the many existences that compose the world (See Chapter One). 
  In other words, if it be capable of guiding a reconstruction, ‘relevance’ 
cannot be simply conceived as a solution to a pre-existing problem. Rather, it 
needs to be explored as a constraint on thought and practice that is at once 
problematic and problematising. In this way, the questions that the notion of 
relevance poses will force us to problematise the manners in which the 
contemporary social sciences come to terms with the many heterogeneous facts 
and values that compose the worlds such sciences address. Simultaneously, it 
will prompt us to speculate, to devise propositions, for how such a coming-to-
terms might be transformed.  
 Nevertheless, to say that ‘relevance’ is not itself a solution to a pre-
existing problem must not be taken to mean that it opposes any solution. 
Rather, its problematic and problematising character forces us to take seriously 
that, as Mariam Fraser (2010: 78) suggests, ‘there is no true solution to a 
problem (although there are true problems). […] The best –and this is indeed 
the best, in value terms– that a solution can do is to develop a problem’. Briefly 
put, then, the aim of this project is to engage with ‘relevance’ as a problematic 
question capable of affecting the ways in which some forms of social inquiry are 
habitually conducted, and to extract from these problematisations real 
possibilities that may be cultivated with a view towards future, alternative 
modes of inquiry. 
 The precise meaning and implications of the above will become clearer, I 
hope, as this thesis proceeds. For now, however, it is worth noting that 
although the instruments that this kind of reconstruction might produce can be 
called ‘intellectual’ in that their articulation will be achieved by means of a 
conceptual, theoretical exploration of problems and possibilities concerning the 
modes of thought and practice of certain forms of inquiry, the change sought is 
not for that reason to be reduced to the ‘merely’ intellectual or theoretical 
dimensions that might underpin, contest, or help justify, social scientific 
inquiries.   
 By contrast, what such a reconstruction aims at is a cultivation of a 
different set of ethical sensibilities with which practices of knowledge-making 
may be identified– a mutation of the ethos that animates their modes of 
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knowing, their habits of thinking and feeling1. By ethical sensibilities I of course 
do not mean to say that we are here dealing with codes of good conduct. In fact, 
the general institutional guidelines that are commonly referred to as ‘research 
ethics’ will not here be my primary matter of concern, although what we mean 
by ‘ethics’ in the context of thinking about and of producing knowledge in the 
contemporary social sciences will, in the course of this exploration, acquire a 
slightly different meaning. Rather, by ethical sensibilities I mean the 
orientations, the intellectual and practical deportments that both animate 
certain practices and that inextricably entangle modes of thinking, modes of 
doing, and modes of inhabiting the world.  
 To clarify, what I mean is a non-normative understanding of ethics that 
may be associated with the works of philosophers like Pierre Hadot (1995) and 
Michel Foucault (1984a, 1990, 1997a), and which more recently has been taken 
up, in different ways, by other scholars in social, cultural and political theory 
and the history of science (e.g. Barad 2007, Bennett 2001, Connolly 1995, 2011, 
2013, Daston & Galison 2010; Haraway 2008, Hunter 2006, among others). An 
understanding that aims not at providing a universal, general answer to the 
anonymous questions of ‘what is the good?’ or ‘what is evil?’, but which rather 
invites attention to, and care for, an entire ‘mode of existing in the world’ 
(Hadot 1995: 265). Ethics, both here as in the works cited above, concerns in a 
broad sense the immanent, practical and situated question of ‘how is one to 
live?’. A question to which no productive response can be given that does not 
emerge from a transformative exercise –Dewey would have called it a 
‘reconstruction’– aimed at cultivating certain modes of relating and certain 
modes of care one takes of oneself and of others when involved in practices of 
thinking, knowing and feeling. As William Connolly (1995:  127) has suggested 
in his The Ethos of Pluralization:  
 
The ethical point is to struggle against the temptation to 
allow an existing code of authority or justice to dominate 
the field of ethics entirely; the ethical idea is to maintain 
critical tension between a congealed code of authority and 
                                                
1  Throughout this thesis, the notion of habit is not intended to connote a certain 
conservativeness. Rather, it is employed in the more neutral sense put forth by Dewey (1922: 
66), as ‘an ability, an art, formed through past experience’. Conservativeness is not intrinsic to 
habit but depends entirely on the quality of the habit in question: ‘whether an ability is limited 
to repetition of past acts adopted to past conditions or is available for new emergencies depends 
wholly upon what kind of habits exists.’ This is why the work to be developed here is not a 
fight against habits but an attempt to cultivate different ones. 
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justice and a more porous fund of critical responsiveness 
that might be drawn upon to modify it in the light of 
contemporary injuries it engenders and positive 
possibilities it ignores. 
 
Emerging out of the scholarly study of Hellenistic and Roman thought, 
Foucault’s understanding of the ethical question of ‘how is one to live?’ was 
primarily concerned with the way in which such exercises involve a work of 
cultivation whose aim was, first and foremost, a transformation of the self upon 
the self. Foucault’s possible over-emphasis on the culture of the self involves 
the danger, however, of turning ethics into a therapeutical exercise (see Hadot 
1995, Myers 2013, O’Leary 2002). My sense is that such a danger can 
nevertheless be avoided by rejecting a clear-cut separation between self and 
world such that to induce a transformation of one’s own way of existing in the 
world must also involve a transformation, however modest, of the world’s own 
manner of existence.  
  I will come back to this issue after this speculative reconstruction via the 
question of relevance has been undertaken (see Afterword). But I also want to 
suggest here that insofar as self and world are not to be fundamentally split 
apart, the question of ‘how is one to live?’ cannot be dissociated –especially not 
whenever scientific practices are concerned– from the perhaps narrower 
question of ‘how is one to know?’. The care of the self, as Foucault would refer 
to this ethical work upon oneself, involves then a care of the world and this, in 
turn, requires a care of knowledge2. In fact, it will be this latter concern –whose 
possible responses demand as much practical cultivation as those to the 
interrogation about how to live– that I believe the question of relevance has the 
potential of activating. My contention, to be developed throughout this thesis, is 
that restoring relevance to the world –instead of confining it to the mind– 
provides crucial resources for cultivating the possibility of a different care of 
knowledge in the contemporary social sciences. 
                                                
2 This should be not confused with the Western trope of ‘know thyself’, which both Hadot and 
Foucault have so dextrously discussed in terms of a care of the self. I should also point out that 
by posing the question of ‘how is one to know?’ I am not suggesting that knowledge or 
cognition is our primary or in any sense privileged mode of relating to the world. Far from it. I 
am simply highlighting it because it is, after all, a question that very much concerns the 
sciences, whatever one takes this latter term to mean or include. More accurate however would 
be to say that the question ‘how is one to live?’ must involve the question ‘how is one to 
experience?’ and that what we call knowledge is a particular form that experience may take.  
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 In the following chapters I shall return to the question of ethics on more 
than one occasion in relation to the specific problematics that each chapter 
addresses. Nevertheless, foregrounding it here seems worth it. First, because 
this question could be seen to be silently animating many of the more 
conceptual, technical, methodological, and practical discussions that will 
follow. Second, because insofar as this project inhabits an interstice between 
what is usually referred to as ‘theory‘, on the one hand, and ‘practice‘, on the 
other, such an ethical concern allows for a specification to be made in relation to 
how each of those seemingly –and only seemingly– separate dimensions will be 
encountered, and how they will be connected.   
 
Contemporary Social Sciences and The Ethics of Inquiry: 
Devising an Exercise in Thought 
  
 As Dewey’s (2004: xxii) own endeavour makes patently present, a 
reconstruction is an especially arduous, demanding task that requires ‘the 
widest possible scholarship as to the connections of past systems with the 
cultural conditions that set their problems and a knowledge of present-day 
science which is other than that of “popular” expositions’. Despite the apparent 
elitism in his use of the term ‘popular’, I read this as a demand to think with the 
very sciences that a reconstruction may seek to affect, to understand their 
habitual modes of inquiry and to extract from their interstices resources that 
may serve as tools for guiding their transition onto a future that be more than a 
mere extension of their historical present.  
 That such a reconstruction be speculative, that is, oriented towards the 
cultivation of a different future to the one that might have obtained without the 
intervention of thought, must not be taken as a sign that it operates by an 
unconstrained practice of conjecture or guesswork (See Chapter Six). To the 
extent that it involves the taking of a leap, the risking of a thought that may 
lead us to a novel experience, it also requires that the ground from which one 
may jump be taken seriously (Stengers 2009a).  So how to take seriously a 
speculative reconstruction whose ground bears the name of ‘contemporary 
social science’? Is not the latter simply too extensive, complex, heterogeneous, 
even disparate, to serve as a possible ground? 
 To be sure, the term ‘social science’ tends to include a multiplicity of 
disciplines, epistemologies, theories, languages, methodologies, objects and 
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aims, and there is no general consensus as to what the criteria for inclusion or 
exclusion may be. As John Brewer (2013: 20-21) has recently suggested, most 
public bodies –such as the UK’s Academy of the Social Sciences, the US Social 
Science Research Council, or the International Social Science Council (ISSC)– 
tend to omit definitions of the term even in high-profile reports on the present 
statuses and futures of such sciences. The 2013 World Social Science Report 
(International Social Science Council 2013: 44), for instance, states in a footnote 
that ‘throughout this Report, and in line with the ISSC’s scientific membership 
base, reference to the “social sciences” should be understood as including the 
social, behavioural and economic sciences’, but it does not define what any of 
the latter include or are. The website of the UK’s Economic and Social Research 
Council (2014) does offer an extensive list of potential disciplines and post-
disciplinary undertakings, ranging from Sociology, Psychology and Social 
Anthropology to Linguistics, Law, Management, Economics and Social History, 
among others. However, the fact that in their website they also include a video 
with ‘viewpoints’ on the question of ‘What is social science?’ seems to testify to 
the fact that no single grouping, however inclusive, will do.  
 Similarly, in what is perhaps the first edited collection that seeks to apply 
the methods and traditions of analysis of Science and Technology Studies to the 
practices of knowledge-making in the social sciences, Charles Camic, Neil Gross 
and Michèle Lamont (2011: 3) opt to focus not directly on the social sciences but 
on what they call ‘social knowledge’– the ‘descriptive information and 
analytical statements about the actions, behaviors, subjective states and 
capacities of human beings and/or about the properties and processes of the 
aggregate or collective units […] where these human agents are situated.’ An 
admittedly ‘expansive’ definition, it includes studies not only on some of the 
academic disciplines mentioned above –for whom the demands for relevance 
have become particularly salient– but also, for example, on practices of 
evaluation in peer-review panels as well as on the practices of financial 
analysts.  
 Moreover, if we put the question not only at the level of disciplines but 
at the level of the epistemologies, theories, languages and methods that both 
compose and cut across those disciplines, the chances of a non-arbitrary 
definition become even slighter. And although at first sight it might appear that 
despite the aforementioned disparities the objects of inquiry may indeed be 
shared, including “society” and “humans” as privileged choices, some social 
scientists have not only contested that these shall constitute the appropriate 
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objects of social science, but have also disputed the very fact that something 
called ‘society’ or ‘humanity’ may be conceived as having any distinct and 
stable existence (e.g. Haraway 2008, Latour 2005, Rose 1996).  
 In an effort to find a solution to this problem, many of the 
historiographical and theoretical works that take ‘the social sciences’ as their 
ground for thought begin precisely by delimiting their frontiers as much as 
possible. In those instances, the criteria employed for drawing the borders of 
the social sciences are commonly those of geography and periodicity. Thus, the 
rise of ‘social theory’ in France between 1750 and 1850 (Heilbron 1995), the co-
development of the social sciences and the capitalist world-system from the 
nineteenth century onwards (Wallerstein 2001) and the emergence and role of 
the social sciences within an epochal understanding of ‘modernity’ (Wagner 
2001), are some of the most famous and, to my mind, most sophisticated studies 
that take such criteria for delimiting their grounds.  
 These criteria do have methodological and heuristic value in providing a 
fairly succinct border for delimiting a ground from which to exercise, in 
thought, a jump into a possible future. Unless presented very carefully, 
however, they may also have the pernicious effect of naturalising traditions 
whose frontiers and lines of continuity are otherwise singularised 
retrospectively by the very practices of history-writing that mobilise them 
(Nietzsche 1997, Foucault 1980). In other words, they may be seen as 
presupposing that geography and periodicity –rather than, say, intellectual 
traditions not bound by geography, or other non-chronological forms of 
cultural memory (see Schlanger 1994)– constitute, by definition, what matters in 
any historiographical and/or theoretical inquiry into the social sciences (but see 
Wallerstein et al. 1996)3.  
 In sum, what such a plethora of possible demarcations seems to suggest 
is that there is no single, correct, natural, exhaustive way of delimiting a 
ground. Rather, such gestures of bordering might be more productively taken 
as abstract propositions. Abstract, because they necessarily omit part of the 
truth; propositions, because they combine actuality and potentiality– they are 
‘tales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities’ (Whitehead 1978: 
                                                
3  As the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission On the Restructuring on the Social Sciences 
(Wallerstein et a. 1996), one considers the processes of circulation of knowledge across national 
boundaries, the proliferation of disciplinary overlaps brought about by pressure for increased 
specialisation, as well as the creation of so-called ‘area studies’ following the Second World War 
–which for their part turned certain geographical locations into multi-disciplinary, multi-
theoretical, multi-method fields of social research– geography and periodicity become premises 
that one can no longer take for granted. 
22 
256). Tales which make certain problems, exercises in thought, and certain 
possible transformations available for development. My own delimitation has 
no ambition of being anything more than this. To the extent that the current 
study is concerned with producing instruments that may induce not only a shift 
in thought but employ thinking as a means to cultivate a different ethos, or a 
different care of knowledge, I here propose to understand the ‘contemporary 
social sciences‘ not primarily along disciplinary, epistemological, objectual, 
geographical, or chronological lines, but in ethical terms. That is, as an 
historically situated attitude, an intellectual deportment that informs certain 
modes of coming to terms with how experiences come (in)to matter and that, in 
what follows, I shall tentatively refer to as an ‘ethics of estrangement’ (for a 
similar way to characterise the practice of ‘theory’, see Hunter 2006). I am thus 
using the term ‘contemporary social science‘4 deliberately, and not simply as a 
synonym for, say, ‘the present of social science’.  
 By contrast, I take the seemingly unproblematic notion of the 
‘contemporary’ to be traversed by a productive tension that emerges from the 
two senses it conjoins. A tension that I have no intentions of dispelling, but 
which I will rather attempt to inhabit. As Paul Rabinow (2008), has suggested, 
one acceptation of the contemporary designates that which is distinctively 
modern, where ‘modern‘ connotes not an epoch but an historically cultivated 
ethos; not a chronological period but the form of an intellectual and ethical 
attitude to oneself and to the world. The conception of the world such an 
attitude may be associated with could perhaps be characterised by what 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (2004) famously termed the ‘bifurcation of 
nature’. Although we will have many opportunities to discuss this notion and 
its implications for the contemporary social science in more detail in the next 
chapter and throughout the thesis, briefly put, the bifurcation of nature consists 
in dividing reality in two– a causal, objective, value-free, realm of fact, on the 
one hand, and an value-laden, subjective, experiential realm of appearances, on 
the other.  
 In this way, the bifurcation of nature involves a conception whereby 
direct experiences disclose only that which is apparent, whereas the ‘relevant’ 
factors in the process of knowing the world must always lie, and be sought, 
                                                
4 To ease the reading, in the chapters that follow I shall use ‘contemporary social science’ and 
other forms such as ‘social science’, ‘modern social science’, and ‘social inquiry’ interchangeably 
unless otherwise stated. Nevertheless, it is on the definition of the first formulation that the 
others depend. 
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somewhere else. I believe such a conception admits a translation into ethical 
terms, involving a particularly modern care of knowledge which I will call an 
ethics of estrangement– a mode of inquiry consisting in becoming estranged from 
the realm of appearances made available by direct experience in order to gain 
access to a realm of facts and causes5.  
 As I shall show, resisting the bifurcation of nature by restoring relevance 
to the world may have the consequence of allowing us to cultivate a different 
care of knowledge. One that –instead of presupposing that what matters in a 
given situation lies hidden behind a realm of appearance that a knowledge-
practice would seek to uncover– rejects the very ontological bifurcation 
between the two realms. It proposes, in turn, that all the relevant facts and the 
only relevant facts that a practice of knowledge-making has to come to terms 
with are the facts of experience. Thus, this alternative mode of knowing is one 
which adopts a resolutely empiricist outlook. It does so, however, by reclaiming 
a deep version of empiricism developed by philosophers like William James 
and Alfred North Whitehead. A radical empiricism which expands ‘experience’ 
to include not just distinct facts or things but also the experienced relations 
between them; not only human or subjective experiences, but also other-than-
human experiences; not only perceptive experience, but also the experience of 
thought, concepts and ideas. It entertains experiences all the way down. As 
Whitehead (1967a: 256) put it in his Adventures of Ideas:  
 
Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience 
sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, 
experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, 
experience self-conscious and experience self-forgetful, 
experience intellectual and experience physical, 
experience religious and experience sceptical, experience 
anxious and experience care-free, experience anticipatory 
                                                
5 I will explore the specificities of such exercises in more detail in the coming chapters. Only by 
way of illustration, however, we may think about the positivist fascination with ‘scientific 
method‘ as providing value-free access to the real, objective, social facts; the interpretativist and 
symbolic traditions that sought to account for social phenomena by accessing a non-apparent 
realm of ‘meaning’ informing them; the marxist tradition that sought to explain social and 
cultural phenomena by recourse to an underlying set of economic forces, the structuralisms that 
searched for unconscious, universal and transhistorical patterns organising human culture and 
society; the social constructivist stances that placed ‘social construction‘ as the real ‘cause‘ of 
what might otherwise appear as natural phenomena; the poststructuralisms which, although 
rejecting the possibility of accessing a realm of factual reality beyond value, still seek  –as 
historian Ian Hunter (2006. See also Chapter Six) has suggested– to strip away experience from 
its self-evidence. 
24 
and experience grieving, experience dominated by 
emotion and experience under-self-restraint, experience in 
the light and experience in the dark, experience normal 
and experience abnormal. 
 
But there is more. To the extent that, in its second acceptation, the 
‘contemporary‘ also designates a space characterised by the co-presence of 
heterogeneous elements, regions, and practices of thought and feeling that 
populate it with relative mutual independence, speaking of ‘contemporary 
social science’ has the advantage of preventing us from equating a modern 
ethos with a self-enclosed, totalising system. Thus, it also allows us to resist the 
temptation to present an ‘either/or’ option that denies its own lines of 
inheritance as well as possibilities emerging from unexpected connections. As 
Whitehead (1967a: 195) has noted, it is out of this constitutive heterogeneity of 
the contemporary that the possibility of freedom and thus, of a different future, 
arises.  It is also out of such heterogeneity that a speculative reconstruction 
grounded in the real possibilities is practicable– for speculation begins by 
thinking with unique situations, which make possibilities present by having 
already succeeded in actualising them somewhere else, in other forms, under 
different names.  
 Moreover, the co-presence of contemporaries also has the advantage of 
forcing the instruments produced by a reconstruction to become more refined. 
In this sense, and precisely as a response to what I have called the modern 
ethics of estrangement, novel forms of empiricism have already begun to 
proliferate in the social scientific literature of recent years (see Adkins & Lury 
2009). The exercise of cultivating a different care of knowledge in the 
contemporary social science will thus require that we draw, whenever 
pertinent, specific contrasts between this and other forms of empiricism already 
available. 
  For the moment, however, a general contrast may help orient the more 
specific ones that will follow. This is that, unlike some other forms of 
empiricism in the social sciences –particularly those that could be associated 
with, or follow from, the tradition of ethnomethodology (the classic is of course 
Garfinkel 1984, but also Latour 1988, among many others. For a recent overview 
of debates among new empiricisms see Munk and Abrahamsson 2012)– the 
empiricism underpinning this project is not of the kind that takes the task of 
knowing to simply be that of disclosing, discovering or describing the world as 
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if all experiences were immediately present and available for representation 
(see Chapter Six).  
 Although it does postulate the priority of experience, and it proposes 
that everything that exists is relevant, that it matters in some degree and manner, 
the possibility of knowing is associated with the challenge of inquiring into how 
–again, in what degree and what manner– multiple and heterogeneous 
experiences come (in)to matter in specific situations. In other words, the 
question ‘how is one to know?’ is not epistemological in nature but rather 
practical, pertaining to the reconstruction of a mode of inquiry. And inquiries 
begin in problematic situations, whose relevant definitions become unknowns 
in the direction of which the inquiry shall be oriented (on the logic of inquiry 
see Dewey 1954, 2004, 2008a).   
 As I hope to show, the ethics of inquiry to be developed here does not 
seek –unlike much critical work in social theory and unlike other recent 
empiricist projects– to force the contemporary social sciences to abandon their 
ideals. By contrast, it invites them to experience their possible mutation in a 
world that in many ways no longer resembles the one in which they were born. 
In this way, among the propositions that will emerge from such an exploration 
are an attentive constructivism that is constrained by an inventive sense of 
objectivity, fact and experience; an account of the efficacy of knowledge that 
does not forget the active roles of the many milieus with which the former 
connects; and a concern for a more-than-human world of events that does not 
disavow our attachments to human experience nor the possibility of emergent 
and always precarious forms of order. The task to be developed in what 
follows, thus, is to interrogate those conceptual, methodological, and practical 
requirements that have to be problematised, and to produce those that have to 
be cultivated, for such an ethics of inquiry to become possible. 
  Such a task cannot be produced in a vacuum. By contrast, it requires a 
practice of thinking with heterogeneous companions. As I have already 
suggested, some of those forms of companionship will be provided by 
empirical studies that show, rather than explain, forms of cultivating a different 
care of knowledge. Other companions constitute a group of thinkers –
including, but by no means limited to, William Connolly, Gilles Deleuze, John 
Dewey, Donna Haraway, William James, Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers and 
Alfred North Whitehead– that will contribute seminal insights and help name 
sensibilities that this study shall, in turn, affirmatively and selectively draw 
upon while both expanding and reworking (on affirmative reading see Grosz 
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2005). Taking the cultivation of the possibility of a different care of knowledge 
as its aim, however, it must be noted that, while theoretical and conceptual, this 
project is not primarily exegetical. That is, the reading to be developed is not 
one that seeks to elucidate the correct, alternative, or ‘newest’ meaning of these 
or other authors’s complex works in light of established interpretations, except 
when such alternatives may in fact open up both consistent ways of reading 
them and productive ways of developing the problems that demand to be 
developed.  
 At the other extreme, this reading is also not to be reduced to the 
perhaps overused metaphor of theory as a ‘toolbox’ once put forth by Deleuze 
in conversation with Foucault (Foucault 1980). To be sure, I fully agree with 
Deleuze (in Foucault 1980: 208) when he says that a theory ‘must be useful. It 
must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the 
theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is 
worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We do not revise theories, but 
construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others.’  But I do not take 
this to mean, as I fear some of those who claim to use ‘theory’ often do, that the 
toolbox is entirely flexible to whatever tool one might need; or that the tool 
itself is useful so long as it allows one to say or do what one had planned in 
advance, so long as it allows one to ‘apply’ it to some particular case. My sense, 
by contrast, is that to the extent that theories may provide tools for thought and 
practice, they still always pose the challenge of how to learn to inherit them in 
relation to the problems at stake. As Gilbert Simondon (2005: 53. my own 
translation) warns us about the use of tools:  
 
[t]o know how to use a tool is not just about having 
acquired the practice required to perform the necessary 
gestures; it is about knowing how to recognise, by way of 
the signs that arrive to man through the tool, the implicit 
form of the matter under elaboration, at the precise spot 
where the tool operates. 
 
To my mind this is true both when ‘the matter’ refers to the demands that an 
empirical situation might make, and when it signals a matter of thought and 
concerns the obligations that thought places upon thinking when struggling to 
coming to terms with, and to develop, a problem. Moreover, in actual fact, and 
certainly in what follows, ‘the matter’ refers to both at once.  In the context of 
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this work, then, reading is not simply what makes a certain mode of thinking 
possible but it is itself an exercise not just in thought but in taking care of how 
we think. 
 Finally, the task to be undertaken here cannot be produced in one blow. 
It will require piecemeal, progressive transitions making apparent those 
obstacles that need to be overcome, and those steps that demand to be taken, 
such that certain possibilities may become perceptible. Thus, our task shall be 
carried out throughout a number of interconnected steps and phases. 
 
Coming Steps 
 
 The reconstruction to follow is composed of a total of six steps or 
chapters. Each will build on the preceding ones while adopting a distinct focus 
and set of questions that, by problematising current debates in the 
contemporary social sciences, may allow us to progressively interrogate specific 
problems and compose the intellectual instruments and ethical sensibilities 
required to cultivate the possibility of a different care of knowledge. The first 
problem to be interrogated and rethought is, to be sure, the problem of how to 
address the concept of relevance such that it may open up a reconstruction of 
the care of knowledge in the contemporary social sciences.  
 In order to do this, in Chapter One, I shall address some aspects of the 
so-called crisis of the contemporary social sciences by attending to the implicit 
ways in which ‘relevance’ seems to be conceived in some of those who either 
demand it and/or seek to articulate a response to such demands. In particular, I 
shall focus on one of such demands and responses that has been able to attract 
interest and debate beyond the discipline where it first emerged. Namely, the 
recent debates around the public life of sociology and social sciences more 
generally (e.g. Burawoy, 2005a). I will argue that although a demand for 
taking the question of relevance seriously might be welcome and timely, the 
way in which the question is often understood –namely, as a question of how a 
knower or a public recognises the relevance of social scientific findings– 
prevents the concept of relevance from becoming a potential lure for cultivating 
a different care of knowledge, for it reproduces the very bifurcation of nature 
that I have associated with the modern ethics of estrangement. By contrast, I 
shall argue that taking the question of relevance seriously forces us to come to 
terms with the possibility that the former inheres not in an act of subjective 
28 
recognition, but in the situated natures of facts. Relevance, in this sense, belongs 
to the order of an event and it is expressed in the experience that facts matter.  
 This shift in our understanding of ‘relevance’ will open up the possibility 
of cultivating a different ethics of inquiry, an inventive mode of knowing that 
takes the risk of negotiating the question of how, in what degrees and manners, 
things come (in)to matter in specific situations. It is such a mode of inquiry that 
I will associate with a different ethics, one I shall call an ‘adventure’. In this 
way, the rest of the chapter will begin the task of producing the intellectual 
instruments required, and will outline some of the more general 
epistemological, ontological, ethical, ecological and political implications that 
follow from this and that succeeding chapters will explore in more detail.  
 In Chapter Two I will seek to clarify the specific understanding of 
invention required by an adventure of relevance. As I shall show, insofar as the 
question of relevance prompts us to affirm that there is value beyond ourselves, 
it involves the affirmation of a relative outside in relation to which knowledge-
practices must put their questions at risk. An account of ‘invention‘ attuned to 
the question of relevance must thus foreground the fact that such adventures 
are characterised by the taking of risks– inquiries, in other words, are inventive 
of their own process but they do not create the objects or situations to which 
their questions are posed. Thus, I shall argue that to think about the risks of 
invention requires that we reclaim a concept we have learned to treat with 
suspicion, namely, objectivity. The challenge will be to develop a concept of 
objectivity that does not preclude but entails invention, and simultaneously, a 
concept of invention –that is, a form of constructivism– that would not make 
‘objectivity’ absurd but crucial. I will attempt to develop such intellectual 
instruments by revisiting some aspects of recent critiques to the concept of 
‘objectivity’ by authors in Science and Technology Studies and the 
contemporary social sciences more generally. I shall argue that while certain 
aspects of the conventional understandings of objectivity must indeed be 
criticised and resisted, the question of relevance forces us to alter what we 
might take objectivity to mean rather than to do away with it altogether. 
 Chapters Three and Four will follow adventures of relevance in more 
practical terms. First, by looking at how empirical research encounters may 
come to wonder about how things, in specific situations, come (in)to matter; 
and second, by considering questions pertaining to how to think about and 
through the effects that inventions may have upon the worlds with which they 
connect. As I have suggested above, the task of a speculative reconstruction is 
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to be performed not simply on but with practices. Thus Chapter Three will 
explore the real possibilities of practical invention, by thinking with actual, 
empirical research encounters in the contemporary social sciences that exhibit 
signs of already having taken the risks of inventing propositions that matter for 
those to whom a problematic situation may be concerned. It will risk thinking 
with encounters in disciplines such as Social Psychology, Cultural 
Anthropology, and Sociology; with methods such as experimentation, 
ethnography, and archival and text-based research; with objects of inquiry 
including humans, soybeans, words and their entanglements. As I will show, 
such explorations will not only help us illustrate some of the more general 
arguments previously made but will also, and more importantly, specify an 
understanding of relationality pertinent to negotiating the question of 
relevance. In so doing it will help us envisage new problems and possibilities 
emerging from concrete adventures. 
 In Chapter Four I will come back to the relationship between social 
inquiries and their relative outsides. This time, however, the exploration will 
focus on how to think about the ecological relationships between an 
accomplished invention and the worlds to which it might come to connect. In 
other words, this chapter will address the question of the possible difference 
knowledge may make, and the difficulties emerging in attempting to theorise 
the effects of invention. To the extent that demands for relevance tend to reduce 
the latter to a suspicion pertaining to whether or not the contemporary social 
sciences are capable of making a difference beyond the academy, addressing 
the question of the efficacy of inventions is crucial. At first sight, it might seem 
that those traditions that have embraced a logic of ‘performativity’ may be 
better equipped to give an account of the effects that knowledge makes. By 
exploring the claims and assumptions underpinning such a logic in the 
contemporary social sciences, however, I shall argue that many of their 
proponents overstate the claims to efficacy by oversimplifying the relationships 
between inventions and the milieus with which they connect. In contrast, I will 
attempt to complexify such relationships by paying attention to the intricate, 
dynamic, and circulating forms of causality that may obtain in processes of 
connection and will illustrate this by interrogating the complexities of one 
historical connection. 
 Building on the lessons and intellectual instruments emerging from the 
preceding chapters, Chapter Five will take up the challenge of risking a general 
characterisation of adventures as a care of knowledge. In order to do that, we 
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will need to elucidate the ontological nature of ‘relevance’ as an event, as well as 
the demanding and complex temporal and ethical requirements that events 
may pose on forms of social inquiry pragmatically oriented by and towards 
them. As I will show, events constitute the very pulse of reality, and, as such, 
the relationship between inquiry and event cannot be one of attempting to 
explain the coming about of the latter by reducing it to pre-existent conditions of 
possibility, for events involve both ordinary and exceptional transformations of 
the possible. By contrast, I will propose that a mode of social inquiry that is 
oriented by and towards events needs to come to terms with the latter’s double 
temporality, and by the same token, with its double ethical demand– the 
demand to invent ways of inheriting the past while becoming exposed to 
possibilities concerning the future. It is this conjunction between what I shall 
call an ‘ethics of inheritance’ and an ‘ethics of exposure’ that articulates, both 
ethically and temporally, the care of knowledge that I have associated with 
adventures.  
 In Chapter Six I will explore the possible place and role that intellectual 
exercises in thinking, such as the one performed throughout this thesis, may 
have within the radical empiricist framework that adventures adopt. In other 
words, I will raise a series of issues and propositions concerning the question of 
‘theory’: if for empiricism experience is primary and practices are crucial to it, 
why do ‘theory’? why does theory matter anyway? I will argue that such 
questions are particularly pressing today, as the activity of theory in the 
contemporary social sciences undergoes its own period of crisis –or worse, as 
theory is often taken to be already dead– and as some of the new empiricisms 
that have emerged within the contemporary social sciences have taken a 
resolutely anti-theoretical, or anti-intellectualist, stance. By drawing and 
expanding on Ian Hunter’s (2006, 2007) ethical characterisation of ‘Theory’ as 
involving an ethics of suspicion concerning experience and empirical 
knowledge, and by problematising the anti-intellectualist spirits of some of the 
new empiricisms, I shall in contrast attempt to propose an alternative, 
empiricist and future-oriented mode of theorising that, after Whitehead, 
Stengers, Dewey, and others, I will associate with the practice of ‘speculation’. 
This chapter will thus seek to specify what speculation is, what its relations to 
experience are, what its requirements might be, and what it might be capable of 
offering. In so doing, it will make a plea for the development and proliferation 
of forms of speculative reason in the reconstruction of contemporary practices of 
social inquiry and in the articulation of novel modes of inquiry to come. 
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 In exploring these questions throughout the coming chapters, my hope is 
that the plea for possible futures that I have associated with Cortázar’s poem 
might not only resonate but help us cultivate a different care of knowledge, a 
different care of the world, and a different care of the self. Thus, in the 
afterword to the thesis I shall return to the entanglements between these three 
dimensions and discuss the possibility of proposing a name, of introducing a 
scientific persona, to which an adventure of relevance may give rise.  
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Chapter One: 
The Question of Relevance 
 
Introduction: The Demands for Relevance 
 
 At a time when a series of entangled economic, political, ecological and 
social transformations threaten the institutional and intellectual futures of the 
contemporary social sciences, there has been growing concern among social 
researchers around the question of how to foster, articulate and promote the 
relevance of their practices and modes of knowledge production. In such 
debates, the demand for relevance often emerges as a desired response to a 
problematic situation that is perceived as a state of crisis related to ‘societal 
challenges’ posed by varied processes including –but not limited to– the social, 
political, economic, ecological and technological effects of a globalising world  
(Vinilus Declaration 2013).  
 To be sure, the diagnosis of ‘crisis’ ascribed to the contemporary social 
sciences is not in itself unproblematic, either historically6 or descriptively (see 
Baert & Shipman, 2012). Nevertheless, the present historical conjuncture 
confronts the social sciences with a challenge that has brought their researchers 
into a discussion around the life of knowledge in an age where modern 
universities, once progressive and expanding loci for cultures of public, 
research and critical thought (Wagner et al. 1991, Wallerstein 1999), have 
become, under neoliberal models of governance and audit, contracted spaces 
whose activities must find justification in their services to the boosting of 
national income and employment capacities, the development of techno-
scientific innovation, the informing of public policy, and the engagement with 
wider non-academic publics. In this context, the contemporary social sciences 
are often required to justify and enhance the ‘relevance’ of the knowledge they 
                                                
6 It would not be ludicrous to argue that crises are constitutive features of the history of the 
social sciences. In this sense, despite the generalised interest that Thomas Kuhn’s (2012) The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions attracted amongst critical social scientists (see Ian Hacking’s 
introduction to the 2012 edition of Structure), not many social scientists seem to have taken into 
account the fact that Kuhn’s argument about the dynamics of crisis and change in scientific 
communities were, in his view, restricted to what he described as ‘paradigmatic sciences’ (e.g. 
physics): scientific communities that organise temporally and collectively around a guiding 
paradigm which eventually encounter a series of anomalies that bring about a crisis and a 
revolution. Insofar as the history of the social sciences is characterised by the problematic 
coexistence of a variety of competing ‘paradigms‘ with no strict order of succession, it could be 
argued that a sense of ‘crisis’ is constitutive of their history, producing no final resolutions but a 
continuous problematisation and revisiting of their guiding principles. 
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produce (Baert & Shipman 2012, Brewer 2013, Clawson et al. 2007, Readings 
1996, Strathern 2000). 
 Taken together, such demands for relevance are rather ambiguous, if not 
contradictory, both in their assessments and in their proposals. On the one 
hand, demands for relevance emerge in the context of a proposed reformation 
of the institutional and intellectual organisation of scientific activity that might 
foster more interdisciplinarity and greater accountability for scientific and 
technological innovation by becoming ‘embedded’ throughout research 
programmes, thereby better contributing to informing policy and innovation 
(e.g. Felt 2014, Levidow & Neubauer 2014, Gibbons et al. 1994, Mayer et al. 
2013, Nowotny et al. 2001, Rappert 1999). Thus, in the 2013 Vinilus Declaration 
on the 2020 Horizons of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Europe it was 
stated that 
 
Making use of the wide range of knowledge, capabilities, 
skills and experiences readily available in SSH [Social 
Sciences and Humanities] will enable innovation to 
become embedded in society and is necessary to realise 
the policy aims predefined in the ‘Societal Challenges’. 
(Vinilus Declaration 2013) 
 
On the other hand, calls for a more relevant social science emerge from a 
number of heterogeneous positions that see the latter as already complicit in 
forms of neoliberal governance and hence detached from wider moral and 
political public concerns (e.g. Burawoy, 2005a, Evans 2005). In any case, 
questions as to the extent to which the contemporary social sciences may be 
said to be ‘relevant’ pervade virtually every discipline in the contemporary 
social sciences (for some recent examples in anthropology see Ingold 2010, 
Rabinow 2003; in sociology see Burawoy 2005a, Savage and Burrows 2007, in 
social psychology see Brown & Stenner 2009, Teo 2012; in postcolonial studies 
and historiography see Chakrabarty 2008, 2012; in economics see Colander et al. 
2009, Shiller & Shiller 2011; in political science, see Trent 2011, and subsequent 
responses). 
 Despite the aforementioned demands, however, it is somewhat puzzling 
that almost none of them ensues from any in-depth exploration of what 
‘relevance’ entails, what place it occupies in the worlds that the social sciences 
encounter, which modes of inquiry it might require, and what kinds of habits of 
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thought and feeling its understanding might help cultivate. ‘Relevance’ has 
become so ubiquitous and multifarious a demand, it has become such a 
‘tyranny’ –as political scientist Matthew Flinders (2013) has recently put it– that 
it has failed to raise any substantial, theoretical reflection on what it itself might 
involve. Enforced by some and dismissed by others, the notion of ‘relevance’ 
has become something of an empty placeholder that heralds an ideal solution to 
general, anonymous, and pre-existent problems. A solution, moreover, whose 
conditions of success are said to be definable in advance, thus turning 
‘relevance’ into an abstract criterion of demarcation (Fraser 2009). 
  Prompted by such a sense of puzzlement and wonder, I here will 
attempt to take the question of ‘relevance‘ seriously– to explore and experiment 
with it not as if it were a solution to a pre-existent problem, but as itself a 
problematic and problematising constraint that rather than contribute to 
instrumentalising the practices of the contemporary social sciences, might 
provoke a more difficult, but potentially more fruitful, exercise in 
reconstruction. As I will show, to take the notion of relevance seriously  –
beyond its tyrannic demands– will require that we restore ‘relevance’ to the 
world –not merely a new criterion for demarcation– and to follow the 
requirements that ensue from its conception as a speculative and practical 
problem. In this chapter, I will begin such an exploration by paying close 
attention to one of the recent demands for relevance which has prompted 
engaged discussions and attracted attention within and beyond the limits of its 
specific discipline. It constitutes a call for relevance that situates it beyond a 
mere instrumentalisation of social scientific practices while connecting it, 
instead, to the revitalisation of a ‘moral’ and political promise. The demand in 
question is, thus, the one articulated in the recent debates around the public life 
of sociology (Burawoy, 2005a).  
 Michael Burawoy’s (2005a) widely debated (see Burawoy 2005b and 
subsequent debate; the special volume edited by Holmwood & Scott 2007; and 
the edited books by Clawson et al. 2007 and Jeffries 2011; amongst others) 
presidential address at the American Sociological Association, titled ‘For Public 
Sociology’, was primarily an attempt to reclaim C. Wright Mills’s (2000) 
‘promise of social science’. For Mills, the promise of social science was that of 
bridging biography and history, and transforming private issues into public 
concerns. Thus, Burawoy urged sociologists to regenerate ‘sociology’s moral 
fiber’ (2005a: 5) by proposing an organic mode of doing sociology that would 
become ‘relevant’ to wider yet ‘visible, thick, active, local and often counter-
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public’ concerns. The task was that of ‘bring[ing] sociology into a conversation 
with publics, understood as people who are themselves involved in 
conversation’ (2005a: 7). As Burawoy (2005a: 8) stresses it in echoing Mills’s 
promise:  
 
[b]etween the organic public sociologist and a public is a 
dialogue, a process of mutual education. The recognition 
of public sociology must extend to the organic kind which 
often remains invisible, private, and is often considered to 
be apart from our professional lives. The project of public 
sociologies is to make visible the invisible, to make the 
private public, to validate these organic connections as 
part of our sociological life. 
 
There is surely much that is laudable about Burawoy’s call. First, it was 
successful in opening up a space of problematisation and discussion around the 
need to take seriously the relations that the social sciences establish with the 
publics they attempt to address. And second, it prompted the emergence of 
diverse articulations of how those relations might be cared for and addressed 
(for some alternative projects that nevertheless could be said to share 
Burawoy’s concerns see Back 2007, Back 2012, Back & Puwar 2013, Becker 2007, 
Burnett et al. 2010, Savage & Burrows 2007). 
 Nevertheless, as many commentators have noted, Burawoy’s proposal 
presents a number of limitations that prevent ‘relevance’ from becoming the 
locus from which a reconstruction might be developed. In what follows, I will 
explore some aspects within the debate around so-called ‘Public Sociology’ to 
understand the way in which the demand for relevance is articulated, and to 
attempt to extract from its own limitations a different sense of what a 
reconstruction centred around the question of relevance might require. Namely, 
I will show that by approaching it as a subjective act of interpretation, as a 
value that is added to facts, Burawoy’s call for public sociology reduces the 
question of relevance to a problem of how social scientific findings are 
communicated to publics thereby leaving untouched a different question– 
namely, the question how the knowledge-practices of the contemporary social 
sciences may come to terms with the situated ways in which experiences of 
various kinds and natures come (in)to matter. 
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 Thus, in this chapter I will focus mainly on two interconnected aspects of 
the call for public sociology which I believe will allow us to approach the 
question of relevance differently. First, I will problematise Burawoy’s 
separation of the scientific attention to facts from the public life of social 
science, inherent in his account of the division of sociological labour. Second, I 
will address the problems associated with an underlying assumption present in 
the debate around public sociology. The assumption, that is, of a modern 
cosmology which proves problematic in relation to the socio-material 
transformations of the contemporary world and limits too narrowly the horizon 
within which the question of relevance might be posed. In contrast, by drawing 
on authors such as William James, Alfred North Whitehead, Michel Serres and 
Isabelle Stengers, among others, I will argue that in order to address the 
question of relevance so that it might open up the possibility of cultivating a 
different care of knowledge, we need to conceptualise relevance as an event in 
the world, and approach it as an immanent constraint that is inseparably 
entangled with the heterogeneous, human and other-than-human facts that 
compose the situations that the contemporary social sciences address.  
  
Matters of Fact, Facts That Matter: Contemporary Social Science 
and The Adventure of Relevance 
 
 In his presidential address, Burawoy (2005a: 5. emphasis added) 
responded to the demands for relevance in relation to sociology and social 
sciences by fostering a mode of sociological practice that he called ‘public 
sociology’. For him, public sociology is a ‘complement, and not the negation of 
professional sociology’. ‘Professional Sociology’, he argues, ‘consists first and 
foremost of multiple intersecting research programs, each with their 
assumptions, exemplars, defining questions, conceptual apparatuses, and 
evolving theories.’ It is this ‘puzzle-solving’ mode of sociology that ‘supplies 
[public sociology with] true and tested methods, accumulated bodies of 
knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks’ (2005a: 10).  
 While he regards ‘professional’ sociology as indispensable for the 
realisation of the public role of sociology, and at some point even concedes that 
in the practice of many sociologists both kinds of activity may be interlinked, 
Burawoy rejects the possibility of turning ‘all sociology into public sociology’ 
(2005a: 9). In accepting the fate of the over-specialisation and internal division 
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of social science disciplines, he argues that the two kinds of sociology actually 
enact different modes of knowing –‘instrumental’ vs. ‘reflexive’– and thus, that 
‘we have to move forward and work from where we really are, from the 
division of sociological labor’ (2005a: 9). As would be expected after such 
categorical distinctions, many commentators have taken issue with the division 
of sociological labour that Burawoy puts forth. What is striking, however, is 
that criticisms have been concerned almost exclusively with what we might call 
the ‘institutional’ or ‘organisational’ consequences of the proposal 7 – the 
reproduction of existing hierarchies among sub-disciplines (Hays 2007), the 
rather immodest changes required in appointment strategies in academic 
departments (Stacey 2007), the ‘politicisation’ of the professional branch of the 
discipline (e.g. Massey 2007, Smith-Lovin 2007, Stinchcombe 2007), and so on. 
 But the implications of Burawoy’s division of labour are arguably much 
more far-reaching. In separating ‘public’ from ‘professional’ sociology, that is, a 
mode of social science that is involved in a conversation with publics yet 
remains fundamentally, indeed, epistemically distinct from the rigorous, 
methodic and truth-driven mode of social science, Burawoy’s proposal 
effectively reduces the question of the relevance of contemporary social 
scientific practices to a matter of communication and what is usually called 
‘public engagement’. The argument might read like this: first, something called 
‘professional sociology’ produces true, objective, scientific knowledge and then 
‘public sociology’ must find ways of engaging publics to make such knowledge 
relevant, by being communicated or brought into dialogue, and ‘we do have a 
lot to learn about engaging them [i.e. publics]’ (Burawoy, 2005a: 8). 
 In dissociating attention to facts from attention to publics, Burawoy’s call 
for a ‘public sociology’ –whose business would be that of developing strategies 
for communicating the otherwise true and objective findings of professional 
sociology to multiple publics– turns the question of relevance into a subjective 
or intersubjective phenomenon whose mode of success depends only on an act 
of recognition or interpretation by a public. In this way, while Burawoy’s 
division of labour seems to be a means of preserving the production of forms of 
‘true’ and ‘objective’ knowledge, to presuppose that producing knowledge and 
making it relevant to those with which such knowledge may be concerned 
constitute two distinct activities is to leave unanswered the question of what 
                                                
7 For an exception in this regard see Wallerstein (2007). Also more indirectly Back (2007), Fraser 
(2009) 
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relevance is, where it comes from, and what its implications might be for the 
ways in which practices of knowledge-making in the contemporary social 
sciences are imagined, organised and carried out. In other words, it 
presupposes that the question of relevance concerns only the ways in which 
knowledge is communicated, but not the manner in which it is produced. By 
the same token, it seems to assume that either the perplexing worlds of facts 
that the social sciences must come to terms with do not by themselves matter, 
or more likely, that by means of their true and tested methods, accumulated 
bodies of knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks, social 
scientists can anticipate and singlehandedly justify which facts matter and how 
they might come to matter in any given situation8.  
 This subjective understanding of relevance may find precedence in the 
phenomenological theory that Alfred Schutz (1970) began to develop in the 
sixties and never quite finished. Indeed, Schutz saw relevance as a subjective 
process whereby an individual consciousness encounters an unfamiliar object 
within an otherwise familiar surrounding and deploys mental efforts to 
interpret it thereby ‘assigning’ relevance to certain objects. This interpretation, 
in turn, transforms the subject’s phenomenal field and his or her future 
behaviour. While such a theory might have some psychological value as an 
exploration of how cognitive and volitional human subjects interpret and relate 
to their milieu9, it forgets, however, that for any such response to take place, 
there must be a situation posing a question. As Whitehead (2004: 28) put it, 
‘[n]o perplexity concerning the object of knowledge can be solved by saying 
that there is a mind knowing it.’ If that is indeed the case then we might ask, 
both to Schutz and to Burawoy, what is it about the objects of inquiry themselves 
that makes them relevant? 
 Thus, if we resist reducing relevance to a subjective response and include 
in it the questions posed by the world, as I will attempt to do in what follows, 
the problem changes quite drastically. For it no longer belongs simply to that of 
effectively communicating findings to publics10, but first and foremost to the 
                                                
8 There is of course much in Burawoy’s argument that resembles conventional approaches to 
what is commonly known as the field of ‘Public Understanding of Science’ (PUS), even though 
he does not seem to speak to PUS explicitly. For a critical and inventive approach to PUS that 
overcomes many of the usual limitations of conventional formulations see Irwin and Michael 
2003, Michael 2002. 
9 Another famous theory of ‘relevance’ as a basic feature of human cognition and as a crucial 
dimension of communication is that developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1995). 
10 This is of course not to claim the opposite, namely, that questions of public engagement are 
irrelevant. It is simply to suggest that perhaps it is not in the process of communication of 
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question of how to come to terms with the event of what, in given situations, 
comes (in)to matter. It is this latter question that, because it forces us to 
problematise the division of scientific labour that Burawoy takes for granted, 
might be capable of opening up a speculative exercise in reconstruction. In this 
way, if as sociologist John Scott (2005) –following Burawoy’s proposal– has 
argued, the achievement of relevance is usually complicated by the fact that 
publics ‘have their own answers’ (2005: 407) and seem unwilling to listen to 
what social scientists may have to say, have the latter not been posing the 
wrong kinds of questions? If people engaged in conversation already possess 
their own senses of how things matter, should we not ask why the social 
sciences have been unable to come to terms with what may matter to others?  
Rather than ascribing to the social sciences ‘an obligation to ensure that publics 
listen’ (Scott 2005: 407), and the implicit right to determine what is relevant and 
what needs to be communicated and listened to, might the former not be 
obligated instead to attend to the senses of relevance of those they address? 
Indeed, might it not be that their own knowledge-practices, their modes of 
asking questions, and not just their communication strategies, fail to bring 
concerned publics into being (Dewey, 1989, see also Marres 2005, 2012)?  
 In order to explore this issue, I suggest that what is required is an 
exploration of ‘relevance’ as an event that belongs not just to an act of 
recognition that could reside in an individual or collective mind, but to the 
world. Namely, I want to entertain the proposition that relevance is not a value 
that the social sciences, or their publics, ‘add’ to the knowledges the former 
produce, but that it already inheres, as an event and as a problem to be 
developed, in the situations into which they inquire. In this way, the perplexing 
questions that the world poses cannot be explained away by recourse to a 
psychological theory of responses, for the very experience of relevance involves 
a sense that there is value beyond ourselves, that something that is not 
ourselves, matters. Thus, to develop such a proposition we must begin from the 
seemingly obvious but potentially powerful realisation that the facts11 of the 
world which practices of social inquiry must come to terms with, matter– that 
facts and relevance are always reciprocally entangled such that there is value to 
facticity and facticity to value.  
                                                                                                                                          
findings that the question of ‘relevance’ is to be explored. For an interesting approach to 
thinking through publics see Marres (2012).  
11 The notion of ‘fact’ here is used in a realist and radically empiricist sense, namely, everything 
that is included in experience (see James 2011). 
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 To suggest that facts matter seems almost self-evident, yet it constitutes a 
proposition that, I fear, our modern habits of distrusting direct experience make 
particularly difficult to grasp. We should therefore tread carefully. What does it 
mean to say that ‘facts matter’? In this sense, the double acceptation of the 
English verb ‘to matter’ might prove illuminating. On one pole, facts matter as 
they materialise, come into and remain temporarily in existence. On the other, 
they become relevant to some degree and in some manner. The key is to read 
this double sense of mattering simultaneously. To matter is to come into 
existence, and to come into existence is to become relevant. 
 In other words, it is by virtue of the event of coming into existence in 
some determinate way, that the facts that compose a situation matter.  Indeed, 
to the extent that a fact comes into existence, the event of its coming in(to) 
matter is always specific and situated and it is that situated specificity which 
makes the fact both what it is –even if only momentarily– and opens a question 
as to the varying degrees and manners in which it matters to a situation. 
Minimally, then, everything that has acquired a determinate existence (this 
human, this table, this keyboard, this idea, this feeling) has some relevance by 
virtue of having come in(to) matter, and the event of its coming in(to) matter is 
never entirely unrelated to the situation in which it partakes.  Indeed, as 
philosopher Tristan Garcia (2014) has recently argued, only a generic, 
indeterminate ‘anything’ does not matter– ‘anything’ is ‘no-matter-what’. 
Namely, it does not matter what it is. 
 Thus, facts exist to the extent that they come (in)to matter in specific 
situations, and they matter insofar as they come into existence. In this way, 
relevance might be said to belong to what Whitehead (1968) described as the 
primary experience –it should be noted, not necessarily a ‘psychological’, 
‘subjective’ or even ‘human’ experience– of the actual world. Namely, a value 
experience whose expression is none other than ‘Have a care, here is something 
that matters’ (1968: 116). As he argues (1968: 111) 
 
Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value 
intensity. Also no unit can separate itself from the others, 
and from the whole. And yet each unit exists in its own 
right. It upholds a value intensity for itself, and this 
involves sharing value intensity with the universe. 
Everything that exists has two sides, namely, its 
individual self and its signification in the universe.  
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In this way, a fact comes (in)to matter for itself, for other facts with which it 
composes a situation, and for the world of facts to which it becomes added. It is 
with this event of a coming (in)to matter, and to the problem it poses to those 
with whom it is concerned, that I want to associate the question of relevance.  
 Approached in such a manner, the concept of relevance involves a series 
of complex but important implications. The first implication is that, as I 
suggested, relevance is not something that is added to facts by reason of true and 
tested methods, or by a process of interpretation or recognition performed by a 
subject. By contrast, relevance is an event of the world– it inheres in its many 
existents.  Second, if everything that exists matters in some degree and in some 
manner, then, conversely, everything that matters must have some manner and 
degree of existence, even if this mode is not entirely ‘material’ or, to put it more 
bluntly, physical.  Matter matters, but depending on the situation, so do 
feelings, relations, ideas, ghosts, beliefs, words, numbers, etc. Thus, we should 
not reduce the proposition ‘facts matter’ to a materialist eliminativism that 
would deny the relevance of everything that is not endowed with physical 
properties.  
 Third, because facts are always situated and specific, their relevance 
must also be associated to a specific situation in which they partake and to 
which they might be said to belong. In other words, ‘there is no such thing a 
bare value. There is always a specific value, which is the created unit of feeling 
arising out of the specific mode of concretion of the diverse elements’ 
(Whitehead 1926: 90)–  there are no pure, general, universal, values or criteria 
for relevance. The relevance of facts is only specific, immanent to the situations 
in which and for which facts come (in)to matter in different degrees and 
manners. In this way, the concept of relevance cannot become a general 
criterion that could demarcate what matters from what does not, and it cannot 
be reduced to how findings are communicated. When approached in this way, I 
believe the question of relevance becomes a constraint that invites a different 
mode of inquiry. An inquiry into how, in what degree and in what manner, things 
come (in)to matter within specific situations. It is from this question, with its 
requirements, problems and possibilities, that I shall seek to produce 
instruments and sensibilities capable of opening up a different care of 
knowledge in the contemporary social sciences. 
 To suggest that facts matter is to resist the longstanding bifurcation 
between fact and value, an aspect of a many-headed monster that Whitehead 
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(2004) famously named ‘the bifurcation of nature’ and which I associated to the 
ethics of estrangement that characterises the contemporary social sciences. As I 
intimated in the introduction to the thesis, the bifurcation of nature consists in 
separating the world into two realms of reality. One side of this bifurcation 
would, Whitehead (2004: 30) suggests, be ‘the nature apprehended in 
awareness’. The other, ‘the nature which is the cause of awareness’: 
 
The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness 
holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the 
birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, 
and the feel of the velvet. The nature which is the cause of 
awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and 
electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the 
awareness of apparent nature. 
 
It is this bifurcation that makes Burawoy’s division of scientific labour possible 
and that allows relevance to be dissociated from the very facts with which the 
social sciences must learn to come to terms with, and added only later as a 
‘value‘ that ultimately awaits public recognition.  So-called ‘professional’ 
sociology, thus, deals with bare facts, with the nature that is the cause of 
awareness. The task of public sociology, in his account, seems to be one of 
communicating those bare facts to publics so that they may acquire relevance in 
the process of being apprehended in awareness.   
 Cultivating an ethics of estrangement, much of the contemporary social 
sciences –as I have defined them– understand their task to be that of estranging 
themselves from the ‘nature apprehended in awareness’, which is to say, from 
the apparent character of direct experience, in order to access the ‘nature which 
is the cause of awareness’. Although –as we shall see– not all versions of this 
ethos agree on what aspects belong to which side of reality, that Burawoy and 
Scott place the truth and objectivity of professional sociology as testifying to the 
causal side of reality should not come as a surprise. Since the inauguration of 
modern science, the bifurcation of nature has been key to define the ‘value-
neutrality’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘truth’ of scientific knowledge (for a history of this 
bifurcation and some of its critiques see Proctor 1991. See also Fraser 2006).   
 To suggest that facts matter, then, is a way of resisting this bifurcation, 
and an attempt to cultivate a different care of knowledge. It is however 
certainly neither the first nor the only form of resistance to it; probably not the 
43 
last one either. Biologist and complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman (2008), for 
instance, has argued against a reductionist physicalism that would reduce 
everything to the ‘particles in motion’ of physics by suggesting that the 
biosphere is pregnant with agency, meaning and value. For him, however, 
those particles in motion are indeed mere ‘happenings’, bare facts, while it is 
the creative emergence of ‘life’ in the universe that introduces agency, value, 
meaning, and thus, relevance, into the world: ‘the agency that arises with life 
brings value, meaning and action into the universe.’ (2008: 72) If facts matter, 
however, the very facts that physics comes to terms with must matter too– they 
must themselves be pregnant with relevance, even if they cannot be said to be 
‘alive’ in a biological sense.  
 Another prominent attempt at resisting the distinction between fact and 
value has been, for example, Bruno Latour’s (2004a, 2004b, 2005) call to move 
from the anonymous and supposedly pure ‘matters of fact‘ of modern 
epistemology, to always controversial and hybrid ‘matters of concern’ or 
‘things’, as he calls them after Heidegger. Latour’s call was an attempt to 
simultaneously draw social scientists’ attention to the liveliness of objects and 
to draw scientists’ attention to their sociality, thereby multiplying and 
distributing the many heterogeneous agencies that labour towards the making 
of things:  
 
what is presented here is an entirely different attitude 
than the critical one, not a flight into the conditions of 
possibility of a given matter of fact, not the addition of 
something more human that the inhumane matters of fact 
would have missed, but, rather, a multifarious inquiry 
launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, 
metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many 
participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to 
maintain its existence. (2004a: 246. emphasis in original) 
 
As this passage reveals, such a call was also in part an overt attempt to ‘finally’ 
be able to present his work in a way that would not be read as a critique of 
science –a critique that would follow the same ethics of estrangement that he 
claimed to be resisting– but rather as a means of conveying respect for it. I am 
not here concerned with the question of whether this attempt may or not be 
said to be successful. While I am appreciative of Latour’s project and of his 
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notion of “matters of concern” as a way of anchoring a different kind of social 
study of science, his project differs considerably from mine and, consequently, 
so does his way of resisting the modern distinction between facts and values. 
 Indeed, by speculatively inquiring into the question of relevance in 
contemporary social science I am not calling anthropologists, philosophers, 
metaphysicians, historians, sociologists, political scientists or psychologists to 
abandon their projects and delve in to the making of ‘things’. In my account, the 
event of facts that matter does not invite an inquiry into the many participants 
that may or may not converge in their making, but becomes a constraint that 
practices of social inquiry have to learn to inherit. Thus, what concerns me is 
the exploration of what might be required, both in intellectual, ethical, political 
and practical terms, for social scientific practices to take up ‘relevance’ as an 
inquiry into of the patterns, situated forms of organisation, or modes of 
togetherness, that relate human, other-than-human, material, ideal, concrete 
and abstract modes of relevance in ways that matter for those with which a 
problematic situation might be concerned (on patterns see Stenner 2012). What I 
am interested in is not so much a different job description for contemporary 
practices of social inquiry, but the possibility of a different mode of social 
inquiry that would seek to negotiate the question ‘how is it, here, that things 
matter?’, without imposing on the ‘things’ either a specific nature or a number 
in advance, and without singlehandedly delimiting the horizon that defines 
where ‘here’ ends.  
 As I hope to show in the chapters that follow, the key to this question is 
that any possible answer be negotiated in practice. Whenever a social scientist 
encounters a problematic situation as an object of inquiry, it is not simply her 
practice that makes that situation ‘matter’. Rather, the situation is already 
constituted by an ecology of dynamic and fragile patterns of relevance, of 
modes of mattering for oneself and for others, to which her questions, her 
assumptions, theories and methods, in sum, her mode of knowledge-
production become added. Such an addition, to be sure, is never innocent, that 
is, it has effects– it affects the ecology of such patterns in different ways. I will 
get back to this later in the thesis. For now, the point is that ‘negotiation‘ means 
neither that it is her questions or methods themselves that, as it were, produce 
that ecology of relevance out of thin air, nor that their goal is that of discovering 
the relevant way of defining the problem that characterises a situation as if such 
a way could be said to fully preexist her questions. As I will argue, inquiry is 
always a matter of ‘invention‘– a notion which, in my reading, takes the risk of 
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conjoining discovery and creativity (on invention see Chapter Two). And 
invention designates a relational practice. In this sense, Isabelle Stengers (1997: 
6) expresses the nature of a negotiation of relevance with notable clarity in the 
case of experimental sciences when she argues: 
 
What is noteworthy about ‘relevance’ is that it designates 
a relational problem. One speaks of a relevant question 
when it stops thought from turning in circles and 
concentrates the attention on the singularity of an object or 
situation. Although relevance is central to the effective 
practices of the experimental sciences, in their public 
version it often boils down to objective truth or arbitrary 
decision: to objective truth when the question is justified 
by the object in itself, and to arbitrary decision when it 
refers to the use of an instrument or experimental 
apparatus whose choice is not otherwise commented on. 
In the first case, the response appears to be “dictated” by 
reality. In the second, it appears to be imposed by the all-
powerful categories of which the investigative instrument 
is bearer. Relevance designates, on the contrary, a subject 
that is neither absent nor all-powerful. 
 
I will return to the question of subject-object relations in the contemporary 
social sciences in subsequent chapters (see Chaper Two), but for the moment it 
is crucial to notice that the relational nature of ‘relevance’, which entangles it 
inextricably with the ways in which objects of inquiry come (in)to matter in 
specific situations, suggests that the possibility of producing a form of 
knowledge that could be said to be ‘relevant’ is never guaranteed. No 
discipline, theory or established body of knowledge can attempt to 
singlehandedly anticipate or justify what may matter to those to whom the 
question may be posed. Relevance is an achievement, and as such it belongs to 
the order of an event, of an effect that may obtain but which can neither be 
promised nor be reduced to a cause (On the notion of ‘event’ see Chapter Five).  
 Relevance thus should be understood as a problem that affects not just 
the modes in which the products of knowledge are communicated and enter 
into public circulation but also the very situated processes of negotiation that 
make every answer dependent upon the question that calls for it, and every 
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solution to a problem dependent on, or deserving of (Deleuze 1994), the manner 
in which the problem is defined. For every definition of a problem guiding 
inquiry, and every question that may point to an unknown which a scientific 
practice of knowledge-making may seek to address, also produces a pattern of 
contrasts that productively constrains the range of possible answers that might 
matter to it. Nothing guarantees, however, that the pattern of contrasts that the 
initial question generates, the range of possible responses that it makes 
available as relevant to it, will address the one to whom the question is posed in 
a manner that resonates with how things in that situation matter.  
 In other words, the manner and degree in which things matter to a 
question may not necessarily resonate with the ways in which they matter to 
the situation to which the question is posed. If relevance is to become capable of 
affecting the manner of directing practical inquiries in the contemporary social 
sciences, of ‘feather[ing] and launch[ing] the arrow of the question another way, from 
another departure point, toward something else’ (Cortázar 2011: 43. emphasis 
added), then the term cannot designate, ex post, or worse, ex ante, the value that 
a knowledge-product has in relation to the public to which it may be 
communicated. Concerning the very ways in which knowledge is cared for and 
cultivated, relevance needs to be thought as an active constraint upon practice– 
a constraint that forces inquiry to put the pattern of contrast that a question 
generates, that is, the assumptions that underpin it, at risk.  
 As I will show, this risk relates the invention of a proposition to an 
achievement and an event. Namely, the achievement of creating an encounter 
with objects of inquiry in such a way that the definition of a problem that 
characterises a situation may be successfully negotiated. Insofar as the 
relevance of the objects and relations that characterise a situation are key to 
such a process, the possibility of achieving the invention of a proposition 
requires, as I will argue in the next chapter, that we do not rush too quickly into 
dismissing the power of a notion like ‘objectivity’ as outdated, positivist or all-
too-modern, for it might allow us to think through these questions in 
productive ways. Rather than dismissing it out of hand, I will argue that we 
need to metamorphose its meaning by seeking a different way of 
understanding the relations between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ that sustain 
contemporary social research. 
  Conceived in this way, thus, the possibility of a ‘relevant’ social science 
cannot be understood as the production of a series of bare truths that would 
then support, and help legitimise, the voice of social scientists in the public 
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sphere. Neither can it become, to be sure, a method for making publics willing to 
listen (cf. Scott 2005).  For the invention of a proposition by a practice of 
knowledge-making constitutes an achievement that legitimises no one, and 
guarantees nothing. The question of relevance and the question of the effects 
that certain inventions may have upon the world –or what I shall call the 
question of ‘connections’– are related but irreducible.  
 I will address the question of connections in Chapter Four. For the 
moment, however, it is worth noting that a first challenge posed by the question 
of relevance is that any response to the situated question of ‘how is it, here, that 
things matter’ is an unknown towards which an inquiry may be oriented. In 
other words, part of the challenge of attending to the demands posed by the 
situated specificity of an object or a situation involves not being able to fully 
know in advance who or what is going to respond to the call, in what way the 
pattern of contrasts that the initial question generates might be challenged, and 
in relation to which other objects, patterns and situations the direction of 
inquiry might have to turn. It is this relational process, which might obtain only 
when the questions are put at risk by an object or situation so that its 
assumptions might be challenged and a sense of wonder about its specificity 
might emerge, that rearranges the relationships between subjects and objects, 
knowers and knowns, and connects them all to a milieu to which such 
questions and responses relate and might be said to matter. 
 I believe this set of requirements helps us envisage the image of a 
different care of knowledge, one that I shall aim to develop throughout the 
coming chapters. For unlike the ethics of estrangement, which designates a 
researcher that addresses an object or a situation that –traditionally– ‘he’ 
already knows how to relate to, taking relevance seriously entails an openness 
to embark on an adventure. Despite its more recent romantic connotations, an 
adventure, in the etymological sense, comes from the Latin adventurus, which 
signals an exposure to that which is about to happen, that is, an investment in 
the possibility of an event, where the latter becomes associated with a sense of a 
difference that matters (see Chapter Five).  
 An adventure places whoever embarks on it in a middle space, between 
a problematic situation that demands to be inherited and the possibility of 
working towards its transformation. As such, the researcher becomes situated 
in a place which is neither the position of the mere ignorant who does not know 
but has not yet wondered, nor that of the arrogant who claims to know yet is 
only ignorant of ‘his’ own ignorance. By contrast, the middle space opened up 
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by the adventure of relevance is thus a liminal experience of wonder in relation 
to the problems posed by an object or situation– the experience of wondering 
how to inherit a problem, ‘wondering how practically to relate to it, how to 
pose relevant questions about it’ (Stengers 2011a: 374. See also Bynum 2001, 
Daston & Park 2003, Szakolczai 2009). Simultaneously, the experience of 
wonder is animated by a willingness to be exposed to the possibility that 
something might be learned, that this puzzling encounter with a problematic 
situation may yield something new. As we will see below, it is moreover an 
adventure in the sense conveyed by Cortázar’s (2011: 57) plea, for if we embark 
on it, ‘it can happen that we might enter parks in Jaipur or Delhi, or in the heart 
of Saint-Germain-des-Prés we might brush against another possible profile of 
man; laughable or terrible things can happen to us’. 
 Remaining open to the adventure of relevance, as Cortázar’s plea invites 
us to do, makes perceptible another limitation of the debate around the public 
life of contemporary social science as it is currently framed. Namely, for all the 
claims around the novelty of the crisis with which the social sciences are said to 
be confronted, a crisis variously characterised as being brought about by 
‘globalisation’, ‘global economic crises’, and the pervading, digital technologies 
of surveillance of ‘knowing capitalism’ (e.g. Back 2012, Brewer 2013, Burawoy 
2005a, 2005b, Savage & Burrows 2007, Thrift 2005), much of the debate relies 
upon a conception inherited from the modern birth of the social sciences in 
nineteenth century, whereby both the objects and publics of social science –
understood variously as ‘civil society’, ‘the market’, ‘the State’, etc.– dwell in a 
cultural world inhabited and made solely by humans, a worldless world where 
nature is but a passive and indifferent container of the events of human history. 
As I suggested above, however, the question ‘how is it, here, that things 
matter?’, needs to remain as open as possible regarding the nature and number 
of the ‘things’ that compose the situation as well as the extension of the ‘here’ 
that might define its limits. 
  Moreover, I will argue in the next section that if that worldless world 
ever existed or could be reasonably sustained in theory, it is certainly not the 
one we inhabit today. In other words, both the nature of the components and 
the specific location of a situation have become increasingly difficult to define 
and  –if they ever could– they can no longer be presupposed. By revisiting 
recent debates around the proposition of the ‘Anthropocene’, which has 
attracted the interests of, and established connections among, earth scientists 
and humanities‘ scholars, I will argue that, today, the challenge of cultivating 
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an adventure relevance does not just concern a question of articulating multiple 
social or cultural ‘values’, but is simultaneously a challenge of becoming 
worldly, that is, of inhabiting a world the very fabric of which is profoundly 
shaped by the connection between the human and the more-than-human 
patterns of relevance that compose it. 
  
A Shifting Cosmogram: Process and Ecologies of Relevance in a 
Buzzing World 
 
 As I mentioned in the previous section, the factors assumed to be 
responsible for inducing the current –institutional and/or intellectual– crisis of 
the social sciences have been various. While most researchers agree that the 
structural transformations of the academy brought about by the shift toward 
neoliberal forms of management of universities –now exacerbated by the global 
economic crisis– represent major factors, they also other fronts that present 
themselves as challenged to be dealt with. Among them, examples include –but 
are not limited to– the proliferation of digital information technologies (e.g., 
Back & Puwar 2013, Savage & Burrows 2007); the social, cultural and political 
transformations brought about by developments in quantum physics (Barad 
2007), the physics of irreversibility and complex systems (e.g. Prigogine & 
Stengers 1984, Wallerstein et al. 1996, Cudworth 2010) and the life sciences (e.g., 
Rose 2013); the re-entering of ‘religion’ in the Western public sphere (e.g. 
McLennan 2007, Butler et al. 2011); and, perhaps as an overarching theme, the 
provincialisation of knowledge in an age of globalisation (e.g., Burawoy 2005a, 
Sassen 2006, Santos 2008, Tsing 2005, Wallerstein 1999).   
 All such debates are of course of utmost importance for considering the 
extent to which the world that contemporary social sciences address differs 
from the one that gave birth to their fathering models, theories, methods and 
modes of knowledge-production. As Whitehead (1967a: 92) phrased it toward 
the end of his ‘survey’ of the guiding ideas in the history of Western civilisation 
–and long before ‘globalisation’ became the common-place notion that it is 
today–: 
  
The conclusion to be drawn from this survey is a 
momentous one. Our sociological theories, our political 
philosophy, our practical maxims of business, our political 
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economy, and our doctrines of education, are derived 
from an unbroken tradition of great thinkers and of 
practical examples, from the age of Plato in the fifth 
century before Christ to the end of the last century. The 
whole of this tradition is warped by the vicious 
assumption that each generation will substantially live 
amid the conditions governing the lives of its fathers and 
will transmit those conditions to mould with equal force 
the lives of its children. We are living in the first period of 
human history for which this assumption is false. 
 
Indeed, it could be argued that in the eighty years since Whitehead drew this 
conclusion, we have not ceased witnessing the effects of such an assumption 
guiding practice. And while, today, the modern tradition we have inherited 
may have started to show signs of breakage, the current demands for relevance 
placed upon the contemporary social sciences suggest that many links to that 
tradition still persist. Among them, one pervades social scientific practices and 
debates with particular force. It is another head of the monster of the 
‘bifurcation of nature’. Namely, the modern cosmology which imagines the 
world as composed by two discrete and separate realms, that of a passive 
Nature constituted exclusively by non-human entities which are animated by 
mechanical forces, and that of Culture, which consists of the realm of human 
affairs, of differences, interests and passions (see Whitehead 2004, Latour 1993a, 
2004b).  
 Situated within such a cosmology, thus, the horizon of the patterns of 
relevance that compose a problematic is confined to a realm of human affairs, 
practices and interests entirely divested of nature. As Michel Serres (1995a: 3; 
see also Bennett 2010, Colebrook 2014, Connolly 2011, Latour 1993a, Serres 
2012) has put it in his The Natural Contract:  
 
In these spectacles, which we hope are now a thing of the 
past, the adversaries most often fight to the death in an 
abstract space, where they struggle alone, without a marsh 
or river. Take away the world around the battles, keep 
only conflicts or debates, thick with humanity and 
purified of things, and you obtain stage theatre, most of 
our narratives and philosophies, history, and all of social 
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science: the interesting spectacle they call cultural. Does 
anyone ever say where the master and slave fight it out? 
Our culture abhors the world. 
 
By adopting such a modern cosmology which bifurcates the world in two 
distinct realms, recent calls for contemporary social science to become relevant 
not only tend to distinguish practices of knowledge-production from activities 
of public engagement but, by and large, they implicitly presuppose that social 
scientific problems are fundamentally human and cultural, and thus worldless. 
The political issues that seem to concern the public life of social scientific 
practices both in Burawoy’s famous call, as well as in most of his respondents, 
consist exclusively in questions of what, following Dipesh Chakrabarty (2012), 
we could call the problem of coexistence of the many human ‘anthropological 
differences’: questions of class, race, gender, history, culture, and so on. But 
how are we to understand the possible locations and limits of the ecologies of 
relevance addressed by the contemporary social sciences in an age where the 
modern cosmology does not seem to hold any longer, an age where ‘humanity’ 
as such, with all its ‘culture’ and its many ‘differences’, has itself become a 
major ‘natural’ force that is transforming the material fabric of the world?  
 This is precisely the kind of proposition that, first elaborated by ecologist 
Eugene F. Stroemer and later popularised by the Nobel Laureate in chemistry 
Paul Crutzen (see Crutzen & Stoermer 2000), has been the focus of heated 
debates in the earth sciences –particularly in geology–, and that has also 
attracted the attention of a number of scholars within the humanities and the 
social sciences (see for instance Zalasiewcz et al. 2008, 2010, Ellsworth & Kruse 
2013, Chakrabarty 2009, 2012, Colebrook 2014, Connolly 2013, Mackenzie 2014, 
Turpin 2013, amongst others. See also the event organised in January 2013 by 
the Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin, Germany). 
 Such a proposition suggests that, as a consequence of the many 
technological and global societal shifts that have followed the Industrial 
Revolution –or alternatively, the development of capitalism in the long 
sixteenth century, a different starting point that would relate the 
‘Anthropocene’ to the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore 2014)– the world may be said to 
have progressively entered a new geological epoch, one primarily characterised 
by the material transformation of its geological foundations brought about by 
the unprecedented increase in human population, massive expansion in the use 
of fossil fuels, the exponential rise in CO2, etc. (Zalasiewicz et al. 2008). Such 
52 
transformations, which have endowed human practices –but not just human 
practices– with a tectonic force, have brought about what they call the age of 
the Anthropocene: 
 
the Anthropocene represents a new phase in the history of 
both humankind and of the Earth, when natural forces 
and human forces became intertwined, so that the fate of 
one determines the fate of the other. (Zalasiewcz et al. 
2010: 2231) 
 
There are, to be sure, many interpretations and implications that follow from 
the Anthropocene proposition and the debate it has elicited, and it is not my 
aim here to discuss or even present them exhaustively (for volumes collecting 
diverse positions see Ellseworth & Kruse 2013, Turpin 2013). My concern is 
merely with some of its possible implications in relation to the ways in which 
the problematic situations inquired by the contemporary social sciences might 
be conceived.   
 At first sight, the immediate implications of the Anthropocene for the 
contemporary social sciences would seem to concern, at most, the kinds of 
sciences and specialisms that we have come to qualify by the term 
‘environmental’. In this sense, a critic may argue, the contemporary social 
sciences cannot be said to have ignored the question of the material world of 
nature, as each of them, from psychologists to anthropologists, have created 
their own specialised fields around the question of ‘the environment’. Nor have 
the recent demands for relevance ignored ‘the environment’. Indeed, at least 
four of the seven societal challenges postulated by the European Commission, 
and to which the contemporary social sciences are asked to become relevant to, 
include questions belonging to it12.  But my sense is that even thought those 
specialisms may surely make important contributions to understanding 
questions related to global warming and climate change, the implications the 
Anthropocene proposition by far exceed –as Chakrabarty (2009) has shown in 
relation to historiography– the creation of such specialised disciplines. Indeed, 
the creation of an environmental psychology, sociology or anthropology, seems 
                                                
12 Namely, ‘Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine and maritime and inland 
water research, and the Bioeconomy’, ‘Secure, clean and efficient energy’, ‘Smart, green and 
integrated transport’ and ‘Climate action, environment, resource efficiency and raw materials’ 
(European Commission 2014) 
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to presuppose that the challenge put forth by such a proposition can become yet 
another ‘field’ of social scientific knowledge, alongside those of a more 
longstanding history. 
 But if we take the Anthropocene not simply as a piece of ‘true’ geological 
knowledge that would belong to the earth sciences and to which the social 
sciences might add a ‘social explanation’, but rather, as I intend to do here, as a 
speculative proposition that might be akin to others such as ‘Gaia’ (Latour 
2010a, Stengers 2009a), ‘Biogea’ (Serres 2012), or ‘The Mesh’ (Morton 2010)13, we 
cannot entertain it by unproblematically extending the scope of social research 
upon it. Indeed, if the Anthropocene can teach us anything, if it is capable of 
affecting an ethics of social inquiry, it does so by forcing us to take seriously 
what up until now belonged both to our immediate experience and to the 
arguments of certain metaphysically-minded scholars– namely, that the 
modern cosmology that founds the social sciences is in need of serious 
reconsideration.  
 If the human practices that the social sciences conceived of as their sole 
object of study –including their own knowledge-practices– contribute to 
reconfiguring the material fabric of the world, then neither do such practices 
take place in a worldless space of human representations, nor is the natural 
world the mute, inert, stable and ahistorical realm of reality that they deemed 
the exclusive concern of –natural– ‘scientists’. On the contrary, ‘[m]ankind is 
that factor in Nature which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of 
nature.’ (Whitehead, 1967a: 78) In this sense, one of the implications of the new 
kind of cosmology proposed by the Anthropocene is that, insofar as human and 
natural forces have become intertwined –supposing for a moment that they 
were ever apart–, there can be no such thing as ‘the environment’. As Serres 
(1995a: 33) argues:  
 
So forget the word environment, commonly used in this 
context. It assumes that we humans are at the center of a 
system of nature. This idea recalls a bygone era, when the 
Earth [...], placed in the center of the world, reflected our 
narcissism, the humanism that makes of us the exact 
midpoint or excellent culmination of all things. No.[...] we 
must indeed place things in the center and us in the 
                                                
13 Without, to be sure, forgetting their differences. 
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periphery, or better still, things all around and us with 
them like parasites. 
 
Things all around and us with them, like parasites; a buzzing, turbulent world 
constituted by ecologies of relevance and concatenations among both humans 
and other-than-humans, each of which affects and is affected by the doings of 
the other.; a connectionist, relational world which  
 
is one just so far as its parts hang together by any definite 
connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion 
fails to obtain. And finally it is growing more and more 
unified by those systems of connexion at least which 
human [and more-than-human] energy keeps framing as 
time goes on. (James 2011: 75)   
 
This might indeed be the new cosmology that the Anthropocene appears to 
propose. Yet, the possible transformation induced by such a proposition is not 
just the replacing of one cosmology for another. Its thoroughly historical 
character, the fact that human and other-than-human forces have become 
intertwined, implicating the fate of the one in that of the other, interestingly 
suggests that the Anthropocene does not just propose a shift in cosmology, but 
what we could call a shifting cosmogram (Tresch 2005, 2007)14. What it makes 
perceptible is a world of a processual nature whereby the ecologies of 
heterogeneous beings and relations –of patterns of relevance– that at any point 
compose it are themselves being transformed by those novel existences which 
come in(to) matter, as well as by those they expel out of matter through the 
destruction of local milieus. How does this affect what I have here associated 
with the question of relevance? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 As John Tresch (2007: 93) argues, ‘the recognition of the partiality and fallibility of any 
cosmogram –the gap between its vision of unity and the refractory entities it assembles– sets 
this approach apart from representational theories of knowledge, from the idealism of 
traditional history of ideas or the bounded determinism implied by internalized “worldviews”, 
“cosmologies”, or “cultures”. Because they present a totality yet remain firmly within the local 
and the empirical, cosmograms raise the possibility of an open holism.’ 
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Patterns, Relationality and Radical Empiricism 
  
 To be sure, knowledge-practices, including those of the contemporary 
social sciences, cannot be exempt from participation in the process of the world. 
As Donna Haraway (1997: 137. see also Puig de la Bellacasa 2012) has succinctly 
put it, ‘nothing comes without its world’. No human practice can escape the 
consequences of their doings, and consequences are always more-than-human. 
The theories, questions, methods and results, in sum, the modes of knowing of 
the contemporary social sciences both engage ecologies and transform them by 
producing ‘new relations that are added to a situation already produced by a 
multiplicity of relations’ (Stengers 2010: 33). Knowledge in this sense stops 
being a matter of epistemology, of more or less accurate or true representations 
of an independent world of facts, and becomes an ecological achievement 
whereby different parts of the world become connected in such a way that some 
of its terms become the knower, and others become the known (James 2003: 
3). In this way, then, questions of inquiry must be approached not in cognitive 
or epistemological terms, but in terms of practical encounters that, in 
connecting heterogeneous forces and beings that are already multiply connected, 
bring something (or someone) new into existence, a novelty which may in turn 
affect the milieus to which it connects.  
 I will explore this understanding of knowledge-practices at greater 
length in the next chapter and indeed throughout the thesis, but we first need to 
address a number of general implications of thinking the possibility of a social 
science in the age of the Anthropocene. Indeed, how might the contemporary 
social sciences come to address this buzzing world whereby all the modern 
demarcations that found their practices and conventional objects of study have 
been meshed up in relations with entities and practices that they thought 
belong to an entirely different realm? How are they to take up the adventure of 
relevance, of entertaining the question of ‘how is it, here, that things matter?’, 
when their modern ethics of inquiry hardly prepare them for the 
heterogeneous, naturalcultural encounters that the question is likely to 
generate? How might they invent a manner of encountering the world that 
matters? 
 There are at least two general implications of this issue that affect the 
politics of knowledge-production in the contemporary social sciences and thus, 
also, their possible modes of dealing with the question of relevance. The first, 
suggested above, is that the matters of fact that compose the situations the 
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social sciences may address cannot be reduced, as many classic empiricist 
philosophies and positivist social sciences have assumed, to pre-existent, fully 
formed, isolated entities. To come (in)to matter, which is also to say, to come 
into and endure in existence, is simultaneously to partake in various forms of 
togetherness with other existences –human and other-than-human– that 
compose a situation. Those modes of togetherness, that is, those relational 
patterns of relevance that both bring facts together and contribute to their own 
composition are very much real. Indeed, they are as real as, as well as 
constitutive of, the heterogeneity of entities, human and non-human, that make 
up the very fabric of the world. As I suggested in the introduction to the thesis, 
then, the form of empiricism pertinent to an adventure of relevance belongs to 
what James (2003: 22. emphasis in original) has termed ‘radical empiricism’:  
 
Empiricism […] lays the explanatory stress upon the part, 
the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a 
collection and the universal as an abstraction. […] For 
[radical empiricism], the relations that connect experiences 
must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of  
relation experienced must be accounted as “real” as anything 
else in the system. 
 
What this implies, then, is that the mode of mattering of an entity, human or 
not, is dependent upon a set of relations, practices and other entities to which it 
relates. This is why existence, and hence, relevance, is always specific and 
situated. In this sense, many scholars in the humanities and the social sciences 
have already begun to foreground the relationalities, flows and processes 
through which socio-material realities are cultivated and transformed, and have 
thus also attempted to understand how knowledge-practices are themselves 
made possible by specific kinds of relationships among humans and other-than-
humans (see Barad 2007, Latour 1988, 2005, Law 2004, Law & Hassard 1999, 
Haraway 2008, Massumi 2002, Mol 2002, Hawyard 2010, among others).  
 As I hope James’s quote above makes explicit, however, conceiving of 
the world and their entities as relational and thus conceiving of relations as real, 
does not imply  –as some of these attempts in the humanities and the social 
sciences seem to suggest– throwing the baby out with the bathwater and 
affirming that relations are the only existents and that everything that appears to 
be an entity is actually an assemblage of relations yet to be disclosed –as is 
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suggested, for example, by the concept of the ‘black-box’ in early Actor-
Network Theory (e.g. Latour 1988), and also by the notion of “intra-action” in 
the work of Karen Barad (2007)15. Relationality cannot be a means of ignoring 
the specificities of the many modes of mattering that compose the actual world 
for such reading turns radical empiricism into another means of cultivating an 
ethics of estrangement –’we experience a world of things and relations, but 
actually…’.  
 Indeed, when relationality becomes reductive, when relations are the 
only existents, then we are left with a paradoxical situation– things lose their 
relational capacity, because relations relate only to themselves16. If, as suggested 
above, things matter by virtue of their coming into existence and not just 
because they constitute knots of relations –which is not to say that they do not 
constitute such knots– then relationality is to be approached technically, that is, 
as a proposition that ‘has no reach except if it functions in a manner which is 
local, situated, and linked to constraints‘ (Debaise 2012: 1). In other words, we 
need to keep in mind that  
 
just as the relations modify the natures of the relata, so the 
relata modify the nature of the relation. The relationship is 
not a universal. It is a concrete fact with the same 
concreteness as the relata. (Whitehead 1967a: 157) 
   
Thus, whereas the existence of both humans and atoms is affected and 
sustained by the relationships they maintain, and they both matter, they surely 
do not, in all situations, matter in the same manner, even though one entity may 
be certainly present in the other (Whitehead 1978: 50), indeed, even if one can 
be thought of as folding over the other (Deleuze 2006). Different beings in 
                                                
15 While Barad is probably the most sophisticated contemporary proponent of such forms of 
relationalism, arguing that ‘relata do not precede the relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena 
emerge through specific intra-actions’ (2007: 140. See my critique of this proposition in 
Savransky [forthcoming a]), perhaps the quintessential example of the paradox posed by such 
an understanding can be found in Morton’s The Ecological Thought (2010: 94. emphasis added): 
‘[t]he ecological thought realizes that all beings are interconnected… the ecological thought 
realizes that the boundaries between, and the identities of, beings are affected by this 
interconnection… The ecological thought finds itself next to other beings, neither me nor not-me. 
These beings exist, but they don’t really exist.’ It does beg the question of what is it then, that his 
‘ecological thought’ finds itself next to. I will come back to this in Chapter Three. 
16 This problem constitutes only the most recent manifestation of a longstanding philosophical 
dispute in ontology and metaphysics, known as the debate between external and internal 
relations. Unfortunately, this debate has too long a history to be considered here in any 
comprehensive manner. Thus, I will only briefly mention its contemporary effects upon some 
recent ‘relational’ approaches to the social sciences and the humanities (See also Chapter Three).  
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different situations come (in)to matter in different ways and to different 
degrees. It is this question of, “how is it, here, that things matter?” that opens 
up the possibility of an ethics of social inquiry that operates not by opening 
black-boxes but by seeking to come to terms with the varying degrees and 
modes of relevance that compose the world.  
 Relatedly, to the extent that things matter in different ways, they can be 
thought as endowed with diverse modes of existence (see Chapter Two). The 
situated specificity of their mode of existence may in turn affect the kinds of 
relations in which they enter and how other things matter to them (on the mode 
of existence of experimental objects see Stengers 2010, on 
chemical/pharmaceutical objects see Barry 2005, on technical objects see 
Simondon 2012; see also Latour  2011). As Stengers (2010: 23) argues:  
 
the distinctions [among modes of existence] begin with 
physics itself and their number increases whenever we try 
to understand the impassioned interest in new artefacts 
capable of being referred to as “living” or even “thinking”. 
 
 Thus, we cannot solve the problem of relevance by arguing that the 
social sciences need only focus upon the way things are assembled, which is to 
say, upon the relations among things (Latour 2005). Rather, as both James and 
Whitehead remind us, the challenge of taking both relations and things 
seriously amounts to conceiving of the world as being composed both by 
heterogeneous relations and beings, relations capable of affecting the nature of 
beings and bringing new ones into existence, and beings capable of affecting the 
modes of relating, of immanently generating obligations and stubbornly 
affirming the manners in which a situation matters to them.  
 Thus, what I shall develop in this thesis is not, cannot be, a general 
theory of knowledge, a new epistemology for the contemporary social sciences 
that would attempt to provide a general model for the posing of relevant 
questions.  If, as I argued above, relevance becomes a constraint that forces 
whoever takes it seriously to wonder about how things matter in a given 
situation while it is itself added to that situation, then an ecological exploration 
of knowledge-making requires an ethical and practical interrogation based on 
encounters and connections: ‘the connection between what has come into 
existence [by the encounter] and the many differences it can make to the many 
other existences with which it is connected’ (Stengers 2008: 48). 
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 Insofar as the knowledge-practices of the contemporary social sciences 
are themselves relations that are added to an ecology of beings and relations, I 
believe that the challenge of negotiating ecologies of relevance involves 
inventing ways of wondering about how those encounters matter– it requires 
that attention be paid to how a practice may affect a situation, and how the 
latter may affect a practice. Addressing the question of relevance in practice 
requires an interrogation about what obligations, what sense of relevance, the 
ones an inquiry encounters may pose to the way in which the encounter 
situates them, and what patterns of contrasts matter to them in the invention of 
propositions that may address the problematic situation with which they are 
concerned (see Chapter Three).  
 It should be noted that the term ‘obligation’ here is not to be understood 
in the moral, transcendental sense with which the term has commonly become 
associated after Kant. As I argued in the introduction, the task of cultivating a 
different care of knowledge cannot be carried out by appealing to universal 
moral claims or duties. By contrast, an obligation arises immanently from the 
claim ‘it matters!’. What it foregrounds, what it makes resonate, is the 
heterogeneity of modes of existence that compose actuality and, therefore, the 
specific stubborn claims and demands that each of the disparate patterns of 
relevance that compose a situation make. An obligation is therefore nothing 
other than that which an inquiry into the question of ‘how is it, here, that things 
matter?’ must learn to come to terms with. In James’ words (1956: 194), 
 
we see not only that without a claim actually made by 
some concrete person [or thing] there can be no obligation, 
but that there is some obligation wherever there is a claim. 
Claim and obligation are, in fact, coextensive terms; they 
cover each other exactly. Our ordinary attitude of 
regarding ourselves as subject to an overarching system of 
moral relations, true ‘in themselves’, is therefore either an 
out-and-out superstition, or else it must be treated as a 
merely provisional abstraction from that real Thinker in 
whose actual demand upon us to think as he does our 
obligation must be ultimately based. 
 
Thus, as I will explore in the rest of the thesis, the adventure of relevance does 
not endow an inquiry with the right to demand compliance of those to whom 
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its questions are posed. If it seeks to learn something, an inquiry must first learn 
to deal with how, in a situation that it inherits and in which it partakes, things 
matter, and to take those senses of relevance as a constraint upon its own 
inventive activity.  
  This relates to the second implication of cultivating the possibility of a 
social science in the age of the Anthropocene. An implication which concerns 
the kind of politics in which a social science might engage today. If the modern 
social sciences, founded upon such bifurcated cosmology, might have regarded 
the question of what we have called human or anthropological ‘difference’ and 
coexistence to be the privileged political arena in relation to which their 
knowledge-practices could contribute, the new cosmogram put forth by the 
proposition of the Anthropocene suggests that any conception of politics that 
categorically excludes the more-than-human world from its concerns is itself 
already founded upon a modernist, humanistic exclusion. As Serres (1995a: 43-
4) puts it in his inimitably provocative style:    
 
The word politics must now be considered inaccurate, 
because it refers only to the polis, the city-state, the spaces 
of publicity, the administrative organization of groups. 
Yet those who live in cities, once known as bourgeois, 
know nothing of the world. 
 
Accordingly, a social science that limits its potential publics to diverse human 
groups and their institutions is not only in danger of becoming worldless, and 
thus, banal, but also, indeed, poisonous, to the heterogeneous relational ecology 
that brings such human groups with their interests, passions, hopes and dreams 
into co-existence with a more-than-human world.  
 I believe Cortázar’s plea for a science that would allow us to go into the 
open, where the dramatic life-cycle of the eels meets the cosmic complexity of 
the ‘redheaded night’, takes here particular urgency. For what it suggests is that 
the question of coexistence has to be expanded in order to address the 
becoming together of a variety of interconnected beings endowed with different 
modes of existence and diverse modes of mattering. This is, in other words, 
what Isabelle Stengers (2011b: 356) has named ‘cosmopolitics’. As she argues: 
 
The prefix ‘cosmos-’ indicates the impossibility of 
appropriating or representing ‘what is human in man’ and 
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should not be confused with what we call the universal. 
The universal is a question within the tradition that has 
invented it as a requirement and also as a way of 
disqualifying those who do not refer to it. The cosmos has 
nothing to do with this universal or with the universe as 
an object of science. But neither should the ‘cosmos’ of 
cosmopolitical be confused with a speculative definition of 
the cosmos, capable of establishing a ‘cosmopolitics.’ The 
prefix makes present, helps resonate, the unknown 
affecting our questions that our political tradition is at 
significant risk of disqualifying […]. It creates the question 
of possible nonhierarchical modes of coexistence among 
the ensemble of inventions of nonequivalence, among the 
diverging values and obligations through which the 
entangled existences that compose it are affirmed. 
As I hope to show in greater detail in the coming chapters, the possibility of a 
social science that takes the question of relevance seriously is neither a 
proposed turn to ‘environmentalism’ nor to a holistic, reenchanted approach 
that would produce a science in love with nature. Neither does it involve that 
the interest in the passions, imaginations, hopes, fears and dreams that are said 
to constitute the specificity of human and other higher-level organisations of 
experience be relinquished in the name of ‘complexity‘ and ‘distributed agency’ 
(see for instance Latour 2005, 2010a, Law & Hassard 1999). Notwithstanding the 
importance of not categorically excluding the more-than-human to interrogate 
the Anthropos, I agree with William Connolly (2013: 49-50) when he argues that 
‘to act as if there is no species identification flowing into our pores through the 
vicissitudes of life is to falsify much of experience’. To our species identification I 
would add those attachments that Chakrabarty (2012) refers to as 
‘anthropological differences’.  
 Indeed, all those differences matter to us in many situations, and when 
present they too can create obligations in any attempt to learn how things come 
(in)to matter. My point is that to wonder about how things matter forces us to 
neither exclude all those differences nor to take for granted their capacities to 
lure knowing, thinking and feeling situations in productive ways. The degrees 
and manners in which all those differences may matter is not what explains a 
situation, and should not be thought ‘behind’ it. They are, by contrast, part of 
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the many differential patterns of relevance that require the situated negotiation 
that I call invention. 
 In my view, what the cosmopolitical question creates as a challenge but 
also as a possibility for the contemporary social sciences is not a suggestion that 
now politics should only be posthuman, but an ethico-political 
reconceptualisation of the interconnectedness of ‘Anthropos’ and ‘Oikos’ 
(Palsson et al. 2013) by inventing new modes of feathering and launching the 
arrow of the questions, of constructing problems and producing knowledges 
that take the adventure of relevance seriously. Thus, it forces inquiries to attend 
to the heterogeneous and specific modes of mattering of those who might 
compose the situation in the direction of which the arrow is launched.  
  Cosmopolitics, I believe, is about the difficulty of, and not the recipe for, 
crafting a form of ‘problematic togetherness of the many concrete, 
heterogeneous, and enduring shapes of value that compose actuality, thus 
including beings as disparate as “neutrinos” (a part of the physicist’s reality) 
and ancestors (a part of the reality of those whose traditions have taught them 
to communicate with the dead).’ (Stengers 2002: 248).  It does not offer a 
solution to the problem of human politics, but makes both the human and the 
political less available to capture by the promise of an all-too-easy solution. In 
my view, the notion of cosmopolitics proposes what is neither an individualistic 
nor a holistic enterprise, but one that, following James, we might call 
‘connectionist’– composed of piecemeal transitions, partial efficacies, and and 
reciprocal responses (see Chapter Four. see also James 1996, 2009 and Connolly 
2011). 
 
Conclusion: Casting Off 
 
 In this chapter I have suggested that the crisis which contemporary 
social sciences are confronted with is one which could be understood as a crisis 
of relevance. I have argued that while demands for relevance proliferate and 
have become ubiquitous across contemporary debates around the present and 
futures of the social sciences, the notion itself has failed to give rise to a more 
sophisticated interrogation into what something called ‘relevance’ might be, 
and what its requirements, constraints, and implications for a possible social 
science might be.   
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 Through a critical reading of one the many demands for relevance that 
ensues from recent debates around the public life of social scientific knowledge, 
I have problematised the assumption that what makes something relevant is to 
be understood as an added value to the otherwise ‘true’ and ‘objective‘ findings 
of social inquiry. I have argued that any definition of relevance that 
conceptualises it in terms of a subjective value that is added to an object ignores 
that the very value experience with which the notion of relevance is associated 
involves the affirmation that there is value beyond ourselves– that the facts that 
compose actuality matter. In so doing, it reduces relevance to a matter of public 
engagement, instead making available an inquiry into the question of how the 
knowledge-practices of the contemporary social sciences may succeed or fail in 
addressing how things come (in)to matter.  
 By drawing on the work of Whitehead, James and Stengers, among 
others, I have sought to extract from the seemingly obvious realisation that 
‘facts matter’ a series of implications, constraints and questions that may 
emerge from it. Indeed, the first task of affirming that facts matter involves 
conceiving of relevance as something that belongs not only to a subject but to 
the world. It inheres not in someone’s head, as it were, but in the situated and 
specific achievements that constitute the determinate existence of things. This 
proposition, in turn, prompts a mode of thinking that resists any strict 
bifurcation between fact and value, and invites us to attend, simultaneously, to 
the specific facticities of value and to the specific values of facticity. Mattering 
is, then, as much a process of materialisation as it is one of valuation.  
 To the extent that actuality and value are intimately intertwined in the 
situated specificity of things, then a practical question becomes available for 
social inquiry to experiment with and be oriented by. Namely, the question of 
“how –in what degree and in what manner– do things in a given situation 
matter?” The transformation that such a question might be capable of inducing 
in relation to the contemporary habits of thinking, practising, and feeling of the 
contemporary social sciences is potentially very far-reaching. In this chapter I 
have only begun to sketch some of the more general implications of such a 
proposition with the purpose of situating my inquiry in the speculative space 
that the question of relevance has opened up. Taking the latter seriously, I have 
argued, turns every inquiry, even this one, into an adventure.   
 But this adventure is just casting off, and what it beckons requires that 
we address difficult questions with care. Indeed, throughout the coming 
chapters I will follow this adventure by developing the implications of the 
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initial propositions raised here with the hope of exploring the requirements and 
possibilities that the question of relevance might open up for a different care of 
knowledge in the contemporary social sciences. The next step will be to 
speculate about the risks that inventions may involve. In order to do this, I will 
suggest that we need to rethink the role of a notion that we have come to forget 
how to take seriously, and which the question of relevance prompts us to 
reconsider. Namely, the notion of ‘objectivity’ and what we have come to know 
as the ‘subject-object relation’ in the making of knowledge: how might 
objectivity, in our speculative exploration of relevance, come (in)to matter? 
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Chapter Two: 
The Risks of Invention 
 
Introduction: In Order to Know, We Must Invent for Ourselves  
 
 In the opening lines of a recently published book titled Images in Spite of 
All, art historian Georges Didi-Huberman (2012: 3. emphasis in original) writes:  
 
[i]n order to know, we must imagine for ourselves. We 
must attempt to imagine the hell that Auschwitz was in 
the summer of 1944. Let us not invoke the unimaginable. 
Let us not shelter ourselves by saying that we cannot, that 
we could not by any means, imagine it to the very end. We 
are obliged to that oppressive imaginable. It is a response 
that we must offer, as a debt to the words and images that 
certain prisoners snatched, for us, from the harrowing 
Real of their experience. 
 
 This proposition might at first seem paradoxical, or indeed, 
contradictory.  If those words and images are the objects that require inquiry, 
that demand to be addressed and made known, what and why is it that we 
need to imagine for ourselves? Should we not just look? Is the act of imagination 
itself not the very temptation we would need to avoid if we are to remain 
truthful to those horrifying images– if we are to know them ‘objectively’? 
Conversely, is it not because we cannot possibly free our attempts at knowing 
from our own imaginative presuppositions that we are bound to fail at meeting 
our obligations? And if the latter is true, are we really obligated? how? and by 
what?  
 These sets of questions might conjure up two traditional understandings 
of what it means to engage in practices of inquiry and knowledge-production in 
relation to the situations those images and words bear witness to and of which 
they are a part. For the reader who might be puzzled, perhaps even annoyed, 
by Didi-Huberman’s invitation to imagine, the proposition might seem like an 
extravagant and outrageous disregard for the harrowing Real of the experiences 
to which the images and words testify. For the other, who might regard 
‘imagination’, assumptions, and presuppositions as an inescapable, mediating 
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feature of any knowledge-practice, the language of obligation might perhaps 
come across as an unwarranted, moralising injunction. In a self-congratulatory 
act of intellectual and epistemic consistency and rigour, both readers might feel 
tempted to close the book, thereby rejecting the perplexity induced by Didi-
Huberman’s opening. 
 I fear the proposition put forth in Chapter One of this thesis might run 
into similar risks. Indeed, the apparent paradox in the paragraph above 
resonates intimately with what I have attempted to convey through the 
speculative lure to a mode of social inquiry that be traversed by what I have 
called ‘the adventure of relevance’. On the one hand, I have argued that 
relevance is not something that we subjectively add to things but that it inheres 
in the very situated specificity of things. Consequently, the challenge of 
wondering about how, in what degree and manner, things matter in a situation 
constitutes, I have suggested, an immanent obligation that social scientific 
practices must learn to become responsive to.  On the other hand, I have 
suggested that to the extent that such a practice of wondering becomes with the 
situation, to the extent that it partakes in it, the question of relevance does not 
fully predate the very encounter that makes an inquiry possible. Becoming 
responsive to an obligation to the situated patterns of relevance that compose a 
situation involves a risky process whereby questions and problems are 
negotiated, the patterns of contrast that underpin them are put at risk, and 
propositions concerning those problems are brought about through invention. 
Paraphrasing Didi-Huberman, my proposition might read– ‘in order to know, 
we must invent for ourselves.’ I fear, then, that what I have suggested will seem 
to some like a contradiction in terms too, one which can only be the product of 
a weakness of thought 
 But to suggest that Didi-Huberman’s proposition and mine might 
prompt the same kind of response from such skeptical readers would be 
slightly disingenuous on my part. For the historical situations out of which the 
senses of each other’s propositions are extracted might potentially incite 
different consequences. What distinguishes them concerns both their milieus of 
inquiry and the differential authority often ascribed to the practices that we 
respectively address.  
 Even though Didi-Huberman presents himself as a historian and is 
dealing with an intensely morally and affectively charged event of Europe’s 
recent past, the reader who might feel annoyed by his call to imagine and may 
thus be tempted to charge him with ‘revisionism’, might nevertheless also 
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pardon him, as it were, for most of his work concerns the realm of the ‘arts’, a 
set of practices that, ‘everyone knows’, ensue from just those capacities of 
human imagination, creativity and passion. In other words, the positivist realist 
who upholds a certain version of ‘objectivity’ that opposes imagination might 
nevertheless concede that some amount of imagination in the arts might not, 
after all, be that reproachable. Conversely, the post-Kantian reader who 
distrusts the very possibility of knowing those images objectively and suspects 
that a certain amount of ‘moralism’ underpins the reference to an obligation to 
those images and words, is still likely to restrain herself from voicing 
skepticism, given the nature of the event in question.  
 By contrast, my proposition emerges from, and seeks to affect, a milieu – 
the modes of inquiry of the contemporary social sciences– for which not only 
the stakes are less high, but insofar as it concerns  –to some extent at least– 
‘science’, it may struggle to find much support in a call for invention. For unlike 
art practices, scientific practices have been historically presented as the only 
ones who have succeeded in becoming emancipated from the contaminating 
burden of human invention, imagination, intentionality and freely engaged 
passion. Their exceptional achievement, it is often proclaimed in defence of 
their superiority regarding other knowledge-practices, has been to devise the 
means to affirm that there is only one relevant interpretation, the ‘objective one’ 
(Stengers 2002: 251; see also Harding 2008). Thus, I might be not so easily 
pardoned17 by the reader who distrusts the proposition regarding the potential 
inventiveness of knowledge practices and who would most surely be ready to 
charge me with ‘social constructivism’, ‘relativism’, ‘postmodernism’, 
‘subjectivism’ and so on. Neither would the Kantian reader pardon what might 
surely strike her as a kind of ‘naive realism’ when I propose that ‘facts matter’. 
 In any case, the apparent incongruity of these positions could, at first 
sight, be motivation enough for readers to abandon the texts. To those who 
have already done so, there is unfortunately nothing else that I can say. To 
those who are still reading, I ask for patience.  How is it that the immanent 
obligation posed to social scientific practices by the specificity of an object18 and 
                                                
17 Although perhaps the fact that I am studying ‘social’ sciences instead of ‘proper’, ‘hard’ 
Science (e.g. physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) might also grant me a pardon from the reader. I 
will come back to the relationship between the two below. 
18 It might be worth reminding the reader at this point that by ‘object’ I do not necessarily mean 
an other-than-human being. Rather, ‘object’ stands here for ‘object of inquiry’, the precise 
nature and number of which may, in principle, include any and all modes of existence possible. 
In practice, the question ‘which object?’ is already part of the situated process of wondering 
about how things matter.  
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the complexity of a situation, an obligation that asks of them that they pay due 
attention to the objects’ own mode of mattering, also forces practices to invent, 
to construct the manner in which they will engage and come to inherit them? In 
other words, what might be required by what I call a process of invention?  
 It is precisely the tension inhabiting this question that I will explore in 
this chapter.  As I will suggest, such a tension confronts us with the difficult 
problem of trying to make possible a concept of objectivity that would not 
preclude but require invention, and simultaneously, a notion of invention –that 
is, a form of constructivism– that would not make ‘objectivity’ absurd but 
crucial.  
  In order to attempt this, and given that, as I will show, the concept of 
objectivity is more than one, we first need to explore how certain versions of 
this concept have contributed to making its coupling with invention absurd. 
Thus, in what follows I will briefly explore a number of critiques of objectivity 
which have arisen in the recent history of the contemporary social sciences. 
Particularly, some critiques emerging in those social, historical and 
philosophical studies that have sought to problematise the very nature of 
scientific practices, and that have come to be known by the loose terms of ‘social 
studies of science’ and ‘science studies’. In so doing, I will address three 
different versions of ‘objectivity’ and their respective criticisms within science 
studies which might help us understand why the coupling of objectivity and 
invention has become absurd. In turn, I shall problematise them in light of my 
proposition concerning the question of relevance and its particular way of 
resisting the distinction between facts and values.  
 To be sure, it is not the purpose of this exploration to write an exhaustive 
history of such a field of studies –or worse, of objectivity tout-court– not only 
because, obviously, the exhaustive history of anything could hardly be written, 
but also because my main concern throughout this work is the exploration of 
problems out of which propositions might emerge (See Chapter Six), rather 
than a description, comparison, and judgement of a series of theoretical and 
methodological proposals for its own sake. 
 For this reason too, it is not my aim to challenge, as a matter of principle, 
the presuppositions underpinning the different approaches that such studies 
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have constructed, to denounce them as false, inadequate or outdated19. Insofar 
as this project can be associated with a transformed version of Dewey’s (2004: 
xxii) project of reconstruction of contemporary social sciences, we must attend 
to his warning: ‘reconstruction is not something to be accomplished by finding 
fault or being querulous’. In other words, I am not interested in playing any 
sort of ‘epistemological chicken’ (Collins & Yearley, 1992). I have learned and 
still learn a great deal from all such studies and it is thanks to them, with and 
not against them, that the current study can be articulated. If I am required to 
oppose anything in this endeavour, then it is the very undertaking of what 
Michel Foucault (1984b; for a recent discussion see Greco 2012) has termed 
‘polemics’. As he stresses it, ‘the person he [the polemicist] confronts is not a 
partner in the search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who 
is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat.‘ (Foucault 1984b: 382).  
 In contrast to this image, what I intend to do in what follows is closer to 
what Gilles Deleuze (1994) has associated with the pragmatics of an art of 
consequences– the construction of a problem that seeks not the negation of an 
other that it might present itself as opposing, but the crafting of an affirmation 
by means of the drawing of creative contrasts, one that may allow for the 
production of a difference that adds new elements to the becoming of an 
ongoing dialogue.  
 Thus, in attending to three contemporary versions of ‘objectivity’ and 
their critiques from science studies, I will argue that while the responses by 
science studies scholars to such a concept are various, their strategies bear –save 
some exceptions– the form of a contestation. Indeed, in such critiques 
objectivity is not only rightly identified as a pillar of modern epistemology, but 
perhaps for the same reason, it tends to become a term of abuse, something to 
get rid of, something to move beyond. Although I cannot do justice to it in the 
context of this chapter, my sense is that such attempts at ‘putting objectivity 
down’ have made rather counterproductive contributions to another well-
known polemic which I would very much like to avoid, namely the so-called 
‘Science Wars’ (see for instance Latour 1999, Stengers 2000, Sokal & Bricmont 
1998; for a collection of essays, press releases and other texts that captures the 
polemic quite interestingly see Brenkman et al. 2000).  
                                                
19 Arguably this has been done already by the main proponents of such studies themselves in – 
for example– what was certainly an interesting, yet perhaps unnecessarily polemic debate 
among each other (see the debate compiled in Pickering 1992). 
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 By contrast, I am more interested in the possibility of transforming what 
we might take objectivity to mean rather than doing away with it altogether. 
Such an interest emerges from the sense that the adventure of relevance, as I 
have attempted to singularise it in Chapter One, requires a concept of objectivity 
as an intellectual and practical instrument that might allow the adventure to 
become actualised in practice. This is because the proposition that ‘facts matter’, 
and that their relevance inheres in them, rather than in us, involves the 
affirmation of an outside in relation to which practices might put their questions 
at risk. An outside, that, while only definable in relative and never in absolute 
terms, matters practically. It is this question of how to think about the 
relationship between scientific practices and their relative and always specific 
outsides that I want to associate with the question of ‘objectivity’. It is also for 
this reason that I will suggest that the subject-object relation that underpins 
modern scientific knowledge needs not be abandoned but transformed. 
Hopefully, then, such a discussion will allow us to inquire into the risks 
associated with the process of invention in social inquiry. 
  
Of God-Tricks and Other Tyrants: The Contemporary Politics of 
Objectivity 
 
 Objectivity is a tricky concept. What seems to make the exploration 
difficult is that debates around objects and objectivity tend to conflate a great 
number of different versions of what it is and, accordingly, what its 
implications –ontological, epistemological, methodological, ethical, political– 
may be (for a nuanced exploration see the edited volume by Megill 1994).  
While ‘objectivity’ has become, ever since the eighteenth century, the ultimate 
epistemic virtue embraced by scientists in their pursuit of knowledge, debates 
around its value and meaning reveal, paradoxically, its heterogeneous nature. 
As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2010: 51) phrased it in their monumental 
study on the history of objectivity in the making of scientific atlases:  
 
[w]hether understood as the view from nowhere or as 
algorithmic rule-following, whether praised as the soul of 
scientific integrity or blamed as soulless detachment from 
all that is human, objectivity is assumed to be abstract, 
timeless, and monolithic. But if it is a pure concept, it is 
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[...] less like a bronze sculpture cast from a single mold 
than like some improvised contraption soldered together 
out of mismatched parts of bicycles, alarm clocks, and 
steam pipes. 
 
In order to extract a productive notion of objectivity, then, the key is to become 
sensitive to the differences characterising some of its versions so that a 
possibility for another form conceiving it might be opened up. In this sense, my 
aim here is not to produce an exhaustive map of the different versions of 
objectivity but rather to engage the politics of knowledge via what Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos (2004) would call a ‘sociology of absences’– to transform 
impossible objects into possible ones, that is, to propose, by attending to some 
of the explicit or implicit resistances to the concept of objectivity in the 
contemporary social sciences, that while some of its versions are indeed to be 
resisted, there are also residual elements that remain themselves vital tools for 
resistance. 
 For those who have been brought up in what are usually associated with 
the ‘critical’ strands of the social sciences, the concept of objectivity seems to 
inevitably carry with it a number of ghosts belonging to a positivist conception 
of social science and its obsession with method and related epistemic virtues. 
Objectivity, as one of the characterising features of positivism in the social 
sciences, has become an epistemic vice that critics claim to have learned, as a 
matter of course, to move ‘beyond’.20  
 Informed by a number of key works in the history and philosophy of 
science (see for instance Feyerabend 2010, Foucault, 1994, Kuhn 2012)21 that the 
social sciences have appropriated as epistemological manifestos for driving the 
dagger through positivism’s heart, the responses by many of the late twentieth-
century social sciences to positivist epistemic commitments have thus entailed a 
conflation of the notion of objectivity tout-court with what could be read as 
three of its versions. First, a version of ‘objectivity’ as a fantasy of 
transcendental, infinite vision, that is, as a practice of self-abnegation that 
would guarantee the universal validity of the scientist’s claims– or what Donna 
Haraway (1991) has famously termed the ‘god trick’. Second, ‘objectivity’ as the 
                                                
20 This is of course not to say that they have effectively moved beyond positivism and its 
understanding of objectivity. For an interesting overview of the ‘life’ of positivism in 
contemporary social science see the edited volume by Steinmetz (2005). 
21 Although the rejection of positivism in the social sciences has, to be sure, more ancient roots, 
including late nineteenth-century thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber. 
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affirmation of an ‘objective reality’ stripped of values, a Really Real that can only 
be grasped through ‘objective methods’– or what Elizabeth Lloyd (2008: 177) 
has termed the ontological tyranny of objectivity. Third, ‘objectivity’ as a mode of 
characterising the epistemological relationship between knower and known, 
whereby the object of inquiry is presumed to be a passive entity awaiting 
capture by an active subject. That is, the depiction of the subject-object relation 
as the right of a ‘free’ subject to know an object she already knows how to relate 
to, a passive object that is reduced to the mere ‘cause’ about which ‘subjects 
discuss and pass judgment on’ (Stengers 2000: 134)– or what we could call ‘still 
objectivity’. Let us explore these versions and their criticisms in turn.22 
 The ‘god trick’ version of objectivity has been a central matter of critique 
and contestation within the contemporary social sciences and science studies, 
especially in the context of feminist and postcolonial studies of science. The 
‘god-trick’ is, as mentioned, the version of objectivity that presents it as the 
Archimedean point of an infinite, universal gaze which, simultaneously 23 
ensues from no-body: ‘the gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies, 
that makes the unmarked category claim power to see and not be seen, to 
represent while escaping representation’ (Haraway 1991: 188).   
 Feminist and postcolonial critiques have thus contested ‘objectivity’ as a 
scientific virtue by denouncing the work of erasure that this version produces 
in relation to the subjectivity of the scientist and to the unacknowledged 
parochial values associated with his claims: a white, male, Western and 
bourgeois subject that is presented –or absented– as entirely unmarked, indeed, 
as the very self-abnegation of subjectivity. According to such critiques, insofar 
as scientific knowledge is produced through the practices of always culturally, 
historically inscribed knowing bodies, their claims cannot be dissociated from 
their conditions of production but need to be examined as products of those 
conditions (the literature is vast and diverse, but see as examples Chakrabarty 
2000, Collins 2000, Fox Keller 1996, Haraway 1991, Harding 1986, 1991, 2008, 
Mignolo 2009, Seth 2004). The universalist, unmarked, disinterested objectivity 
of Western, white, male Science that equates its own particular form of 
reasoning with Reason, as such (Seth 2004), needs to be provincialised and 
                                                
22 I am only separating these versions for the purpose of attaining greater clarity in the 
exploration. However, as will become evident below, all three versions are intimately entangled 
so that critics of one are also often critics (or inadvertent proponents) of the other. 
23  Because, as Daston and Galison (2010) aptly affirm, every version of objectivity presupposes 
a complementary version of scientific subjectivity (see also Daston & Sibum, 2003. See also the 
Afterword). 
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critically interrogated through the intellectual attitude that decolonial theorist 
Walter Mignolo (2009: 160) has called ‘epistemic disobedience’:  
 
who, when, why is constructing knowledges [...]? Why 
did eurocentred [and we should ask, white, masculinist] 
epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-
historical locations and succeed in the idea of universal 
knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? 
 
To be sure, what Mignolo calls ‘epistemic disobedience’ constitutes a particular 
operation of what I have characterised as an ethics of estrangement, whereby 
the critical social scientist or theorist is prompted to estrange herself from the 
apparently universalist claims to objectivity made by scientists in order to gain 
access to the parochial values truly informing those claims.  Now, while many 
of the various criticisms launched toward the god-trick version of objectivity 
and scientific rationality have taken the form of denunciations and rejections of 
both objectivity and scientific knowledge, arguing for a social science 
unencumbered by its fantasy of impartiality, not all the critiques of the god-
trick have taken the form of denunciation.  
 Perhaps one of the most full-fledged alternatives to this version of 
objectivity is the one proposed by Sandra Harding’s (1991) notion of ‘strong 
objectivity’. Harding’s (1991: 144) argument emerges from her critique of  the 
god-trick as requiring ‘the elimination of all social values and interests from the 
research process and the results of research.’ According to her argument, 
insofar as scientific institutions ‘are constituted in and through contemporary 
political and social projects, and always have been’ (1991: 145), their practices 
are already permeated and shaped by the social and political values that 
brought them into being. In this sense, then, the god-trick version of objectivity 
that has the self-abnegation of the scientist’s own subjectivity –including his 
values, interests and modes of interpretation– as a condition cannot possibly be 
upheld as a scientific norm but should be regarded as a deeply problematic 
form of ‘weak objectivity’. As she phrases it:  
 
Weak objectivity, then, is a contradictory notion, and its 
contradictory character is largely responsible for its 
usefulness and its widespread appeal to dominant 
groups. It offers hope that scientists and science 
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institutions, themselves admittedly historically located, 
can produce claims that will be regarded as objectively 
valid without their having to examine critically their 
own historical commitments, from which –intentionally 
or not– they actively construct their scientific research. 
(Harding 1991: 147) 
 
In contrast, what she calls ‘strong objectivity’ entails a form of scientific 
research that includes a critical examination of the values and interests that 
historically constitute a certain scientific community or field; in other words, it 
is about the levelling of subjects and objects through ‘the extension of the notion 
of scientific research to include systematic examination of such powerful 
background beliefs’ (1991: 149).  
 To be sure, there is much to be praised of Harding’s effort to reclaim a 
notion of objectivity that, without enacting the god-trick, might perhaps still 
provide a distinction ‘between how I want the world to be and how, in 
empirical fact, it is.’ (1991: 160). However, whether it does so convincingly is not 
self-evident. Indeed, by associating strong objectivity with the critical 
examination of one’s own background presuppositions, the production of 
relevance, which involves the putting at risk of the pattern of contrasts made 
available by a question, is reduced to an operation by the subject upon herself. 
Strong objectivity is proposed as an operation of self-reflexion about the 
scientist’s unacknowledged beliefs, coming considerably close to more relativist 
arguments around reflexivity (e.g. Ashmore 1989)24. Put differently, although 
Harding criticises the concept of objectivity by resisting a simple bifurcation 
between facts and values, for her values are still subjective, they relate not to 
how things matter, but to how things matter to the scientist. That is, it is the 
scientist that unwittingly brings his own values to bear upon the objects of 
inquiry. In order to produce a strong objective claim, the scientist must estrange 
herself from those claims by accessing the realm of subjective values that 
inform them. Thus, although a reflexive practice of ‘strong objectivity‘ might be 
crucial to avoid imposing the scientist’s own sense of what matters upon a 
situation, insofar as it prolongs the ethics of estrangement it does not provide 
the necessary tools to inquire into how the facts themselves matter but merely 
                                                
24 Although Harding (1991: 162-163) does attempt a distinction that requires the development of 
a form of oppositional politics.  
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accepts that they can only matter to some knower, from some particular 
standpoint. However, if as I suggested in Chapter One, facts matter, then the 
question of how to relate to their own senses of relevance is still unanswered.  
 In this sense, ‘objectivity’ has also been mobilised as a guarantee of 
accessing reality beyond the confounding values of the knowing subject.  It is 
this version that Elizabeth Lloyd has termed ‘the ontological tyranny of 
objectivity’. As she argues, the version according to which it is only through 
‘objective methods’ –oftentimes associated with the Archimedean point of the 
god-trick– that we can legitimately access the Really Real so that it will 
unequivocally dictate the terms of capture and announce the success (or failure) 
of knowledge presupposes a certain ontological commitment to thinking about 
objects of inquiry as ‘that-which-is-independent-from us‘ (Lloyd 2008: 178). In 
other words, it presupposes a particular modern version of realism. Here we re-
encounter one head of the bifurcation of nature illustrated in Chapter One. 
Namely, the modern separation between, on the one hand, bare facts –also 
known as primary qualities–, believed to pertain to the matter-of-factness of 
Nature –the nature that is the cause of awareness– and thus to be entirely 
independent from the knowing subject; on the other, subjective experience– 
those components of the world which were believed to arrive not from Nature, 
but from our senses –the nature apprehended in awareness, also known as 
secondary qualities–, being thus nothing but mere epiphenomena of the real 
objects of Nature (see Whitehead 2004). In this sense, ‘objectivity’ is itself an 
operation of estrangement, conceived as the means of accessing the very 
matter-of-factness of reality beyond an experience that is conceived as 
subjective and epistemologically unreliable.  
 The critiques of the ontological tyranny of objectivity that emerged 
within the social sciences have usually involved neither a resistance to bifurcate 
the world, nor a transformation of such an ethos, but, as we shall see, an 
inversion of its ontological priorities. Of course, insofar as the objects of the 
modern social sciences were conceived of as hardly belonging to Nature as such 
(see Chapter One), such a bifurcation of nature into primary and secondary 
qualities located them in a position of inferiority as compared to the ‘hard’, 
natural sciences that not only preceded them historically but were by this 
definition better equipped to access the true objects of Nature.25 
                                                
25 The strategies to ‘emulate’ the natural sciences and to thus become able to access the ‘Nature’ 
of ‘mankind’ or ‘Society’ were various, some more successful than others (Steinmetz 2005). 
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 As a part of their anti-positivist spirit and in concert with critiques of the 
god-trick version of objectivity, researchers and thinkers in the contemporary 
social sciences also rejected the realism underpinning the ontological tyranny of 
objectivity. Positivists are wrong, the critics argued, not only because of their 
emphasis on the search for universal laws, or because of their ascetic obsession 
with method and passivity in relation to the objects encountered, but also 
because the brute objects they thought constituted the Real that the social 
sciences aimed at discovering were always beyond our grasp, or had never 
been there to begin with. I cannot think of a better example of such a post-
Kantian –or Husserlian, as Ian Hunter (2006. See Chapter Six) has interestingly 
suggested– rejection of the tyranny of objectivity than the famous passage by 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973: 5), so often mobilised as embodying the 
very ethos of social scientific inquiry:  
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man (sic) is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I 
take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be 
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but 
an interpretive one in search for meaning.  
 
Even though positivism in anthropology never managed to get as strong a hold 
of the discipline as it did in other social sciences such as economics, psychology 
and political science, Geertz’s celebration of an ‘interpretive’ social science is by 
no means an isolated gesture. Indeed, by different names –significant 
differences among them notwithstanding–, the last forty years of contemporary 
social science have witnessed the emergence and proliferation of a manifold of 
interpretive, hermeneutic, semiotic, discursive and/or social constructivist 
epistemologies. What perhaps underlies these various efforts is a denunciation 
                                                                                                                                          
Interestingly, the most sophisticated versions are still very much alive today. One relates, of 
course, to the many biological reductionisms of Sociobiology, Eliminative Materialism and 
certain prominent strands of Cognitive Neuroscience. The second, which surely inherits a 
‘structural’ rather than a ‘naturalist’ conception of objectivity (i.e. objectivity as an access to 
nature’s invariants, see Daston & Galison 2010) can be associated with defenders of the ‘truly 
objective’ methods of statistical analysis for supposedly revealing the underlying invariants of 
the social (see Porter 1996). Thirdly, while experimentation in the social sciences does no longer 
enjoy the acceptance and high regard that it had fifty years ago (especially in disciplines like 
social psychology where it became distinctly famous for its conspicuous experiments. See 
Chapter Three), it is still alive in a number of disciplines such as political science and economics 
(e.g. Morton & Williams 2010). 
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of what they take to be an implicit, and above all, ‘naïve‘ realism governing the 
practices of their predecessors.  
 Moreover, while such arguments might have been first advanced under 
the purported modesty of a certain ‘humanist rationality’– as exemplified in 
Geertz’s quote–, that is, as an argument concerning  the specificity of the human 
as an object of inquiry, one that would make ‘objectivity’ the sole concern of the 
natural sciences, social constructivist –for lack of a better term– arguments soon 
gained more ambitious, general epistemological import26. Arguing that insofar 
as knowledge-practices are but a human endeavour, they  challenged the 
separation between science and society– the facts and claims to truth and 
objectivity the former aim at producing owe nothing to ‘reality’ as such, as if it 
could ever be accessed, and everything to the social and cultural processes, 
practices and technologies involved in the making of scientific claims27. As 
Lorraine Daston (2009: 802) succinctly summarises the  social constructivist 
argument: ‘no satisfactory account of why some scientific claims triumphed 
over others could appeal to the truth or superior epistemological solidity of the 
winning claims’.  
 In contrast, the triumph –and failure– of scientific claims to knowledge, 
the ‘discoveries’ they affirm as being part of the reality of the objects under 
investigation could, like any other social undertaking, be explained socially. 
That is, both in terms of the ‘macro‘ factors of historically and culturally 
sedimented commitments, belief systems and orientations, and in terms of 
‘micro‘ social actions, interests, human negotiations, and strategies of selection, 
inscription, translation, representation, argumentation and rhetoric that feed 
into scientific labour (a case in point might relate to the works associated with 
the ‘strong programme’ of Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, e.g. Bloor 1977, 
and more recently Barnes et al. 1996). It is by means of such factors and 
strategies that, it is said, scientists create what they purport to discover. The early 
work of Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981: 3; but see also Gergen 1997, Gilbert & 
                                                
26 Such humanist rationality is of course only purportedly modest. For by arguing that 
‘whatever it is that objectivity means it surely doesn’t concern us, social scientists’, not only 
does one preclude the possibility of other-than-humans contesting the pattern of contrasts that 
social scientific inquiries may create (will the social sciences have to start caring about 
objectivity then?), but it works as a means of dismissing the obligation posed by the existence of 
objects of inquiry tout court, as well as the specificity of the demands that ensue from the 
relation between the mode of existence of the object and the mode of invention of the practice. I 
will come back to this below.    
27 Needless to say, this is a significantly simplified version of the argument that does not do 
justice to the cornucopia of sometimes important differences among their proponents in various 
disciplines. For an in-depth, critical philosophical study of the underpinning logic behind this 
argument and some of its many variants see the wonderful book by Hacking (1999).   
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Mulkay 1984, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Potter 1996, among others) might be read 
as a good illustration of the position: 
 
Rather than view empirical observation as questions put 
to nature in a language she understands, we will take all 
references to the "constitutive" role of science seriously, 
and regard scientific enquiry as a process of production. 
Rather than considering scientific products as somehow 
capturing what is, we will consider them as selectively 
carved out, transformed and constructed from whatever 
is. And rather than examine the external relations between 
science and the "nature" we are told it describes, we will 
look at those internal affairs of scientific enterprise which 
we take to be constructive. 
 
Several implications follow from this. First, the rejection of an account of 
scientific practice that would ‘put questions to nature’ that might ‘capture what 
is’ radically contests, as I have advanced, the modern realism underpinning 
scientific claims. Reality acquires inverted commas: the real, bare facts that 
scientists claim to interrogate become but the product of their own –necessarily, 
social– practices of selection, transformation and construction.  
 Second, because there is no reality but only scare-quoted ‘reality’, 
scientific practice becomes indistinct from any other social practice and is thus 
susceptible of being investigated by social research: the social sciences thus 
become super-sciences (Stengers 2000) capable of extending their scope of 
inquiry to other sciences; indeed, capable of providing explanations for, or 
rather, of explaining away, the explanations that others produce.   
 Third, insofar as objects are ‘constructions’ that ensue from the activities 
of scientists, the ‘ontological tyranny of objectivity’ loses its hold, and not just 
because there is no Really Real to which ‘objective methods’ might guarantee 
access. It loses its hold because insofar as ‘objectivity’ is a constitutive element 
of scientific culture, it no longer regulates its practice as if it related to an 
outside but is itself produced from within and mobilised as a rhetorical device for 
the production of certain truth-effects (Osborne & Rose 1999, Potter 1996).  
 Thus, while contesting the ‘tyranny of objectivity’ is certainly a welcome 
move –for, as I have argued, there is no such thing as bare fact–, what makes 
Knorr-Cetina’s paragraph particularly characteristic of the problems that 
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inhabit social constructivist accounts of scientific practice and objectivity and 
which denotes its corrosive character is the adverb –‘rather’– that qualifies 
every one of her propositions. What the adverb introduces is an opposition 
between the constructive, practical and negotiated character of scientific 
undertakings and their realist, constrained and ‘objective’ nature.  
 This is precisely the kind of opposition that makes the question that 
gives birth to this chapter an apparently contradictory one. According to the 
adverbial politics of social constructivism, if there is an object which obligates 
me then ‘construction’ is out of the question, but if what is at stake in the 
practice of knowing is ‘construction’, then there can be no obligation, and 
indeed, no object. Reality is reduced to a ‘whatever is’ that does not matter and 
thus poses no constraints upon what is carved out, constructed, and 
transformed.  
 The question of relevance is thus here dissociated from the encounter 
with the specificity of objects and the question of how facts come (in)to matter 
and is reduced to the effects of scientific practices themselves: the political, 
ethical and ontological question of the differences brought into being by social 
science itself (for example, Law & Urry, 2004). While this is an important issue 
that I will attend to in the Chapter Four of this thesis, to reduce the adventure of 
relevance to a question of the effects of knowledge-practices alone, as if they 
could be produced out of thin air, as if there was no relative outside to which a 
scientific practice would be obligated, amounts to a kind of politics that is freed 
from constraints, and a mode of thought for which the very question of 
relevance becomes irrelevant. 
 Moreover, by conceiving the relation between the reality of scientific 
practices and their constructive character as an opposition, that is, by arguing 
that ‘rather than attending to an object, science produces it’ and by implying 
that such production can be studied, described, perhaps even explained socially, 
social constructivism is unable to undo the bifurcated ontology that it sought 
out to contest and thereby prolonging the ethics of estrangement of 
contemporary social science. What it does instead is to invert it– ‘rather than 
having the Really Real Natural objects explaining the secondary qualities we 
have associated with –social and cultural– subjective construction’, their 
argument goes, ‘from now on social constructions are going to explain the 
“objects” of “nature”’. 
 The result of the introduction of the little adverb qualifying their 
propositions is thus a ‘sui generis society’ that would ‘produce everything 
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arbitrarily including the cosmic order, biology, chemistry, and the laws of 
physics!’ (Latour, 1993a: 55. emphasis in original). In so doing, hermeneutic and 
social constructivist accounts of knowledge-production end up implicitly 
enforcing –indeed, extending ad absurdum– the third version of ‘objectivity’ that 
might require resistance, namely, a version that presupposes an account of the 
subject-object relation whereby the subject has on her side all the power, 
initiative and creativity, while the object remains still, passive, and in this case, 
‘rather’ inexistent. 
  Thus, if the adventure of relevance requires that we take seriously both 
the obligations posed by the specificity of the objects and the constructive, 
ecological character of scientific practices; if both objects and invention matter, 
our aim now becomes clearer: the task is to transform that opposition into a 
conjunction– from ‘rather’ to ‘and’. 
 
Beyond Still Objectivity? Actor-Network Theory, Subjects and 
Objects 
 
 Despite the fact that his earlier work with Steve Woolgar (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986) could be said to imply the same kind of adverbial politics that I 
have associated with social constructivism, Bruno Latour and others pertaining 
to what has acquired the name of ‘Actor-Network Theory’(ANT) have ever 
since been acutely aware of the impracticability that the dualist ‘rather than’ of 
social constructivism entails (see for instance Callon 1986, Latour 1988, 
1992,1993a, b, 1999, 2005, Law 1992, 2004, Law & Hassard 1999).  
 In contrast, they have proposed a symmetrical approach that refuses the 
Modern –and postmodern–  settlement and is said to put everything on an 
equal footing– neither is humanity the epiphenomenon of a Really Real nature 
nor is the latter and its nonhumans mere receptacles of social categories and 
activities.  Instead, both society and nature are constantly performed, are 
continuously being made and remade, through the heterogeneous, socio-
material associations that both human and nonhuman actants weave among 
themselves in the process of relating and mutually shaping each other (Latour 
2005).  
 The notion of ‘actant’ is crucial in such an exploration because it has been 
assigned the purpose of distributing, de-centring and de-humanising notions of 
‘agency‘ and responsibility thus contesting the still objectivity of modern and, 
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by implication, social constructivist epistemologies (Law 1999). In contrast, for 
Latour, ‘[w]e must not believe in advance that we know whether we are talking 
about subjects or objects, men or gods, animals, atoms, or texts[...]: who speaks, 
and for what?’ (Latour 1993b: 167). Thus, in order to account for the making of 
such practical assemblages of humans and nonhumans, all a priori categories 
must be set aside in favour of the actual, empirical composition of multiple, 
heterogeneous networks. As Latour (1993b: 156) puts it in his ‘Irreductions’: 
‘nothing is more complex, multiple, real, palpable, or interesting than anything 
else’. 
 According to ANT, the same is of course true for the study of scientific 
practices, a field where this approach first gained prominence (e.g. Callon 1986, 
Latour 1988, 1993b). In his Pandora’s Hope (1999: 98-108), Latour describes the 
approach as a manner of attending to the threading (1999: 80) together of 
heterogeneous processes of circulation and transformation by an indeterminate 
number of actants. In this sense, the success of the coming into being and 
endurance of a scientific proposition depends (1) on the ‘mobilisation of the 
world’, namely, the deployment of instruments, equipment, expeditions, 
surveys and methods for placing ‘the field‘ under scrutiny through the 
production of data; (2) on the professional ‘autonomisation’ of the scientist as 
well as the institutionalisation of the science to which she belongs, namely, it 
depends on the series of professional activities that the scientist might be 
involved in order to interest other colleagues; (3) on the construction of 
‘alliances’ with other groups and institutions that might deem worth investing 
and becoming involved in scientific labour while simultaneously placing the 
latter in a sufficiently large and secure context; (4) on the ‘public representation’ 
of those novelties that the scientist brings into being and has to introduce into 
‘another outside world of civilians: reporters, pundits, and the man and woman 
in the street’ (1999: 105) 28.   
 Up until this point, ANT does not differ much from the social 
constructivist versions discussed above. What distinguishes it, though, is the 
introduction of a fifth condition for the coming into existence of a scientific 
proposition. A condition which we need to pay close attention to because it is 
what renders the other four necessary yet not sufficient for accounting for 
scientific practices– the ‘pumping heart’ of such circulatory system is the 
                                                
28 Although for Latour (1999) and indeed for other proponents of ANT (see Law 2004),  there is 
no such thing as the ‘outside world’.  
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coming into contact of the entities of the world with the scientific community, 
or what I will call an encounter (See Chapter Three). Let us briefly explore such a 
condition by attending to Latour’s studies on the work of Pasteur and his 
microbes (1993b; 1999). 
 In such studies it becomes clear that the task for Latour is not the account 
of Louis Pasteur’s discovery of microbes by means of a social explanation 
capable of explaining ‘hygiene in terms of class struggle, the infrastructure, and 
power’. According to him,  ‘[w]e cannot reduce the action of the microbe to a 
sociological explanation, since the action of the microbe redefined not only 
society but also nature and the whole caboodle’ (1993b: 38).  In contrast, the task 
for ANT is to follow the actions of both Pasteur and the non-human actants, the 
microbes, through the different trials of strength that the former designs to 
prove the existence of the latter. Actor Network Theory is, in this sense, a 
contemporary empiricist response to the ethics of estrangement (but see 
Chapter Six). As Latour argues in a later text (1999: 124. emphasis in original):  
 
[i]n the course of the experiment Pasteur and the ferment 
mutually exchange and enhance their properties, Pasteur 
helping the ferment show its mettle, the ferment “helping” 
Pasteur win one of his many medals. If the final trial is 
lost, then [the experiment] was just a text, there was 
nothing behind it to support it, and neither actor nor stage 
manager has won any additional competences. Their 
properties cancel each other out, and colleagues can 
conclude that Pasteur has simply prompted the ferment to 
say what he wished to say. If Pasteur wins we will find 
two (partially) new actors on the bottom line: a new yeast 
and a new Pasteur! 
 
In addition to the first four tasks mentioned earlier, the actor-network theorist 
also needs to account for the exchanges that constitute the mutual ‘help’ among 
actors and actants and that bring into existence a new scientific proposition. 
Indeed, by using the language of mutual exchange, enrolment, mobilisation, 
articulation, circulation, etc., to describe the interactions between the many 
actants involved in a scientific encounter, ANT certainly contests the version 
that I have here termed ‘still objectivity’, according to which a ‘free’ subject is 
endowed with the right to know a passive object she already knows how to 
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relate to. Instead, they depict the process of scientific knowledge-production 
through a series of steps that accord a different character to the folding of 
humans and nonhumans: 
 
first, there would be translation, the means by which we 
articulate different sorts of matter; next, [...], crossover, 
which consists of the exchange of properties among 
humans and nonhumans; third, [...] enrollment, by which 
a nonhuman is seduced, manipulated, or induced into the 
collective; fourth, [...], the mobilisation of nonhumans 
inside the collective, which adds fresh unexpected 
resources, resulting in strange new hybrids; and finally, 
displacement, the direction the collective takes once its 
shape, extent, and composition have been altered by the 
enrollment and mobilization of new actants. If we had 
such a diagram, we would do away with social 
constructivism for good. (Latour 1999: 194) 
 
This does do away with social constructivism. In the process, however, it also 
takes with it the entire subject-object relation29. By reframing the subject-object 
relation as the mutual production of practical assemblages of humans and non-
humans and by describing the scientific encounter through the notion of 
‘enrolment’ –that is, as a seduction, manipulation or induction of nonhumans 
into the world of scientists (and society)– Latour’s account could be read as 
either presenting Pasteur as a Don Juan that manages to seduce the ferment into 
his own sense of what matters, or, more symmetrically,  as presenting both 
Pasteur and the ferment as collaborators with a shared sense of how things 
matter, working towards the same goal.  
 But why shall we assume that it matters to the ferment what will become 
of the yeast, or indeed, what will become of Pasteur? How do they know what 
each other’s –or indeed their own– goals are before negotiating how things 
come (in)to matter? In other words, ANT seems to smooth out the process of 
negotiation between different senses of how things matter, that is, those of the 
scientist and her practice, and those of the relative outside to which the objects 
of inquiry might be said to belong. This smoothing out allows for a 
                                                
29 A consequence they themselves celebrate (see Latour, 1999: 294). 
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characterisation of scientific knowledge-practices as highly laborious indeed, 
but without any reference to the risk –whose ‘burden of success’, if I may 
paraphrase the legal expression, lies with Pasteur’s practice, even if it involves 
both him and the ferment– of inventing a proposition that matters. 
  This is evident not only in their own claim that there is no separation 
between science and politics30, but also in the fact that, since its conception, 
ANT has rapidly extended its scope of investigation to a myriad of other fields 
including the making of technology (e.g. Bijker & Law 1992, Latour 1996, Law 
2002), medicine (Mol 2002), law (Latour 2009), religion (Latour 2010b), and so 
on31.  In this sense, the construction of a technological apparatus may not 
require a distinction between subject and object. For even though it may involve 
negotiations that lead to a new way of distributing humans and nonhumans, 
what is ultimately at stake is the production of an artefact whose responses 
must satisfy the producer’s sense of what matters.  
 However, in the case of scientific practices, and particularly in the case of 
the experimental sciences that ANT has discussed extensively, the construction 
of a scientific proposition cannot be achieved without a negotiation, which 
involves both the scientist and the many objects that compose a situation, of 
how things matter. The precise outcome cannot be anticipated in advance, and 
whenever it is successful, neither can it be reduced to the production of an 
artefact that will fulfil the scientist’s demands, but involves the invention of a 
proposition that might matter to those with which the problem is concerned. As 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1997: 32) expresses it:  
 
[r]esearch produces futures, and it rests on differences of 
outcome. In contrast, technical construction aims at 
assuring presence, and it rests on identity of performance. 
How could it fulfill its purposes otherwise? A technical 
product, as everybody expects, has to fulfill the purpose 
implemented in its construction. It is first and foremost an 
answering machine. In contrast, an epistemic object is first 
and foremost a question-generating machine. 
                                                
30 A claim that Latour (2014) has recently been at pains to revisit. 
31 Its unlimited extension induces another potential danger. Whilst it advocates an ethics and 
politics of heterogeneity and difference, ANT nevertheless ‘behaves’ as a theory of everything, 
capable of effacing Otherness and including every-thing into ‘the progressive composition of a 
common world’ (see especially Latour 2004b; for criticisms in this direction see Fraser 2010, Lee 
& Brown 1994, Lee & Stenner 1999, Savransky 2012, Watson 2011). 
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Thus, in the case of engineering, the unknown concerns the precise technical 
procedure that will lead to the production of a difference that is known and 
expected in advance, and the process of innovation requires a negotiation with 
objects such that the engineer’s problem may find a solution. For the scientist 
and, as we will see, the social scientist associated with the adventure of 
relevance, in contrast, the relevant definition of a problem is the unknown 
around which her practice is articulated. For this reason, a scientific invention 
does not involve a process of seducing the objects of inquiry to agree with the 
scientist’s proposed definition of how things matter, but of putting the latter to 
the test of what matters to those with whom the problem to be invented is 
concerned.  
 The risk of scientific invention is, in this sense, not simply the production 
of compliant artefacts that might make a difference but ‘the invention of the 
power to confer on things the power of conferring on the experimenter the 
power to speak in their name’ (Stengers 2000: 89).  It is this particular kind of 
power, which requires that the object of inquiry not be internalised – or in the 
language of technique, instrumentalised– as a tool for the production of a 
difference that matters to the scientist, that demands that we retain both a certain 
notion of ‘objectivity’, and that we do not do away with a relative separation 
between subjects and objects. 
 In other words, while we can and indeed should distribute agency 
throughout the scientific encounter, the process of invention that is elicited 
through and by the encounter needs to be related to the many divergent senses 
of how things matter that the specificity of the encounter has to fulfil. Thus, the 
question of the relevance associated with the invention of scientific propositions 
does not force us to maintain either the god-trick version of objectivity, the 
tyrannical realism that would seem to underpin it, or the still objectivity 
associated with the modern conception of the subject-object relation. But insofar 
as it does force us to raise questions of obligations and unknowns, the relational 
question opened up by ‘relevance’ does prompt us to designate ‘a subject that is 
neither absent nor all-powerful’ (Stengers 1997: 6) and an object that is neither 
still, inexistent nor tyrannical.  
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The Risks of Invention 
 
 I hope that the discussion above has already hinted at the fact that, in the 
context of this text, the notion of ‘invention’ should not be thought as yet 
another synonym for ‘social construction’ even though what is at stake may 
crucially be identified with a form of constructivism. As it often happens, 
tracing the history of a term sheds some light on the possibility of inheriting a 
term differently than heretofore. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
the term ‘invention’, which comes from the latin verb invenire –to come into– 
conveyed, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ‘action of 
coming upon or finding; the action of finding out; discovery (whether 
accidental or the result of search and effort)’ as well as the sense of ‘fabrication’, 
‘construction’, and so on. It is only in the course of the eighteenth century that 
the disjunction between ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’ came into being as we now 
know it, a distinction the effects of which we have been discussing in previous 
sections of this chapter. 32 
 As I have tried to show, however, the kind of constructivism that the 
question of ‘relevance‘ makes possible reveals the problematic character of such 
a distinction for thinking about scientific practices. Thus, my contention is that 
in this context the notion of ‘invention’ needs to be read in its conjunctive sense, 
as involving both discovery and creative fabrication. For it allows us to imagine 
scientific practices neither as submitting to the tyranny of ‘bare facts’ nor as 
constructing propositions out of a ‘whatever is‘ that does not in fact matter. In 
contrast, with ‘invention’ it becomes possible to think of them as requiring both 
a singular attentiveness to the many versions of how things come (in)to matter 
in a specific situation, and a constrained creativity that might allow the latter to 
find a manner of encountering the situation such that a proposition that matters 
can be cultivated.   
 It is precisely because the invention of a relevant problem must ensue 
from a negotiation of how, in a given situation, things come (in)to matter, that 
its success cannot be formalised in the terms of a general ‘epistemology’ that 
could, from the outset, lay the necessary and sufficient conditions that a 
problem must meet in order to address the question of relevance. Invention 
belongs not to the order of a well-implemented procedure for the posing of 
                                                
32 As Lorraine Daston (2000b: 4) remarks, this is not the only notion related to science that, in the 
course of its modern history,  has acquired such disjunctive properties. On the history of the 
notion of ‘fact’ see Latour (1999; 2010b), on ‘objectivity’ see Daston and Galison (2010) 
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questions, but to an immanent and practical event. That is, to a difference that 
might obtain, that one may indeed work towards, but whose possibility of 
actualisation is by definition beyond one’s control (I will come back to this in 
Chapter Five). In other words, it is because we cannot anticipate in advance 
what the relevant pattern of contrasts of the questions might be; because initial 
questions might fail to resonate with how things come (in)to matter, forcing 
practices to wonder and hesitate;  that ‘invention’ –in this pre- or early modern, 
conjunctive sense– can be said to constitute a risky process.  
 The theme of risk and invention and the need to maintain the distinction 
between subject and object has been discussed in different ways by Isabelle 
Stengers (2000, 2010), Andrew Pickering (1995) and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
(1997) in the context of the experimental sciences. Indeed,  the specific process 
associated with ‘the invention of the power to confer on things the power of 
conferring on the experimenter the power to speak in their name’ (Stengers 
2000: 89) cannot be dissociated from the constraints with which such sciences 
are identified. That is, neither from the particular mode of invention that 
characterises laboratory practices nor from the mode of existence of the objects 
these sciences encounter.  
 As these authors have proposed in various ways, the specific manner in 
which experimental objects such as protons, neutrinos, quarks and so on come 
(in)to matter would make them especially recalcitrant to questions that do not 
resonate with their own modes of mattering. Although experimental practices 
are certainly required to invent a problem that might allow for such objects to 
respond, the latter’s stubborn sense of what matters allows them ‘to turn 
around the (im)precisions of our foresight and understanding’ (Rheinberger 
1997: 23) in a way that, whenever the experiment succeeds, the event of 
invention is such ‘that [it] affirms their [the object’s] independence with respect 
to the time frame of human knowledge’ (Stengers 2010: 21). In this sense, it is 
precisely the highly recalcitrant mode of existence of experimental objects that 
allows for the experimental encounter to be characterised in terms of what 
Andrew Pickering (1995: 22) has named the dance of agency: 
 
[t]he dance of agency, seen asymmetrically from the 
human end, thus takes the form of a dialectic of resistance 
and accommodation, where resistance denotes the failure 
to achieve an intended capture of agency [of an object] in 
practice, and accommodation an active human strategy of 
88 
response to resistance, which can include revisions to 
goals and intentions as well as to the material form of the 
machine in question and to the human frame of gestures 
and social relations that surround it. 
 
Following Pickering, then, in the experimental sciences the event of invention 
could be characterised by the risky process of devising a creative, 
choreographic practice that might invent a manner of attending to the 
obligations generated by the specificity of the object of inquiry. It is in the 
encounter between the experimental practice and the object –an encounter 
which requires both the posing of questions and the carrying out of specific 
adjustments related to the object’s own sense of what matters– that a 
proposition might be invented in such a way that it may testify to the object’s 
existence without reducing it to a deliberate technical construction.  
 As Pickering’s ‘dance of agency’ suggests, knowledge-practices are 
inventive processes for encountering an object that is nevertheless experienced 
in virtue of its antecedence to the encounter. Unlike the social constructivist 
versions I have discussed in previous sections, the inventive process of 
knowledge-making ‘creates itself, but it does not create the objects which it 
receives as factors in its own nature’ (Whitehead, 1967a: 179). For this reason, 
the subject-object relation is indeed maintained, but the risk of invention in the 
experimental sciences is neither predetermined by the tyranny of a bare fact nor 
does it depend upon an all-powerful human knower who, by right, already 
knows how to encounter and relate to a still object upon which the former can 
pass judgement. In contrast, the manner of the relation between subject and 
object is transformed. As Stengers (2000: 134) describes it:  
 
[the subject-object relation] is recognized not as a right, 
but as a vector of risk, an operator of “decentering.” It 
does not attribute to the subject the right to know the 
object, but to the object the power (to be constructed) to 
put the subject to the test. 
 
What this means is that even if scientific propositions are indeed the result of a 
creative process of encountering objects –human or non-human– and thus 
cannot be entirely dissociated from the careful posing of questions, they 
nevertheless are, when successful, propositions of a very particular kind– ones 
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that, because they have invented the manner of attending to the obligations 
generated by the objects they encounter, of engaging in the choreography of 
‘resistance and accommodation’, they can be said to be relevant. In other words, 
whenever relevance is at stake, the challenge is always that of putting the 
questions we create at risk, of making their assumptions and the contrasts they 
make available vulnerable to resistance by an object, so that a relation to it can 
be invented in such a way that it becomes irreducible to a unilateral process of 
construction. 
  While the latter formulation may work as an abstract characterisation of 
the construction of relevant propositions, we should also be mindful of the fact 
that we can never dissociate the risk associated with a scientific practice, that is, 
its particular mode of invention, from the mode of existence of the objects they 
encounter. Thus, this raises the question of the requirements and specific risks 
associated with the possibilities of invention in the social sciences.  
 Let me first clarify that the notion of ‘mode of existence’, as I am using it 
here (for a different use of the term see Latour 2011, 2014), should not be read as 
a way of responding to the question of ‘what makes us human’, but rather to a 
concern for the specific ways in which diverse objects come in(to) matter. In this 
sense, being sensitive to the specific modes of existence of the objects into which 
the social sciences usually inquire does allow us to draw relevant contrasts 
between the singularity of the risks involved in their practices and those that 
concern the experimental sciences. But it proposes a distinction that does not 
rely on a sharp ontological classification of ‘kinds’ (cf. Hacking 1986, 1999).  
Indeed, to rely on such distinctions would amount to returning to a form of 
‘shallow empiricism’ that presupposes the very bifurcated conception of reality 
we have sought out to resist– a worldless empiricism that would regard the 
values, aims, subjectivities, dreams, hopes and fears of human and other 
complex animal forms of life as being excluded from nature (Stenner 2008). 
 In other words, I believe the notion of ‘mode of existence’ proposes 
another conjunctive proposition–  the possibility of affirming qualitative 
differences among entities while maintaining that such differences do not rely 
on discrete ontological categories but on continuous, emergent forms of 
organisation that build upon and ‘shade off into each other’:  
 
[t]here is the animal life with its central direction of a 
society of cells, there is the vegetable life with its 
organized republic of cells, there is the cell life with its 
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organized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale 
inorganic society of molecules with its passive acceptance 
of necessity derived from spatial relations, there is the 
infra-molecular activity which has lost all trace of the 
passivity of inorganic nature on a larger scale. (Whitehead 
1968: 157) 
  
While a full discussion of Whitehead’s (1968) six modes of existence and their 
coordinated complexities exceeds the scope of our current discussion (for a 
more in-depth discussion of this issue see Henning 2005, Savransky 
forthcoming a, Stenner 2008), it is important to keep in mind that, unlike the 
concept of ‘kinds’, the borders that separate different modes of existence are 
fuzzy, and that while we may certainly assume that, generally, the social 
sciences deal with the more complex levels of organisation of experience, such a 
mode is not confined to the limits of the human. 
 As we have just discussed, the particular kind of invention that takes 
place in the laboratory is only possible thanks to the recalcitrant nature of the 
objects that the experimenter encounters. It is their radical indifference to an 
irrelevant pattern of contrasts inhabiting the questions that the researcher poses 
to them, that characterises the achievement of an experimental invention as an 
event– that of allowing the researcher to affirm the existence of what has come 
into being by the encounter without reducing their becoming to the power of 
the scientist to bring it into existence.  
 However, as Félix Guattari (1995), Isabelle Stengers (2000, 2011c) and 
Vinciane Despret (2004a, 2004b, 2008) have crucially noted, the same cannot be 
said for the objects encountered by social scientists. I shall thus attend to the 
seminal remarks made by these authors while attempting to expand and, 
wherever necessary, complexify their initial insights in order to be able to 
generate propositions that may induce a different care of knowledge in the 
contemporary social sciences. 
  By contrast to experimental objects, social scientific objects are usually 
not indifferent to the questions that are posed to them, but are capable of 
becoming affected by them. Indeed, the difficulty here is that for some of the 
objects that the contemporary social sciences encounter, it matters that a 
question is posed to them. For others, moreover, science, as such, matters. In 
other words, whereas for the neutrino the questions posed by the scientist do 
not matter unless they become capable of inventing a problem in a way that 
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does, for more complex organisms, those who inhabit a situation that inherits in 
one way or another the authority associated with modern science, scientific 
questions might themselves become relevant even if their becoming does not 
stem from the invention of a problem that matters to the organism.  
 As I argued in the previous chapter, no answer is independent from the 
question that calls for it because the question generates an immanent pattern of 
contrasts which constrains the range of possible answers that might be 
considered relevant to it. In the case of the social sciences, the danger is that of 
transforming the inherent and productive constraint of a pattern made 
available by a question into an imperative mold –please respond to the 
question!’–, an orthopaedics, as Santos (2009) would call it, that prevents the 
object from contesting the pattern –and the question. In my view, such a 
difficulty should be crucially taken into account in order to understand the 
specific risks that characterise practices of social inquiry, but this taking into 
account needs to be done carefully, because one might be in danger of 
associating this difficulty to an intrinsic feature of the human as such.  
 Thus, to my mind, the difficulty does not arise from the suggestion that 
‘[h]umans, as soon as they are in a scientific lab, agree […] to answer questions 
or produce performances that reproduce the lab dissymmetry’ (Stengers 2011c: 
83). Because not for all humans scientific labs or, scientific questions more 
generally, matter33, just as not all rats are susceptible to being conditioned by 
experiments (Brown 2011). Otherwise, the difficulty might seem rather 
insurmountable, or one might be tempted to solve it, perhaps too easily, by 
discouraging experiments with humans. As we will see in Chapter Three, 
experimentation with humans might be conducive to experiencing this 
difficulty but it needs not be caught up in it as a matter of principle. Moreover, 
experimentation is already a rather marginal practice in most contemporary 
social sciences (with some exceptions). As I will suggest in other chapters of the 
thesis (e.g. Chapter Three and Chapter Five), part of what makes the 
proposition of invention in the contemporary social sciences speculative, rather 
than merely descriptive of what is, is that a lot of contemporary social inquiry is 
carried out through methods and techniques that require no risk whatsoever.  
                                                
33 For all that has been written about Stanley Milgram’s experiment on ‘obedience’, for example, 
hardly anyone –certainly not Milgram himself– has found any interest in the fact that, while 
recruiting random subjects for the experiment, only 12% responded to the thousands of directly 
addressed letters that Milgram’s team sent out (Milgram 2004; for Stengers’s thoughts on 
Milgram’s experiment see Stengers 1997). 
92 
 By contrast, this difficulty contributes to defining the risks of invention 
in social inquiry not because it is always actual but because it inheres as a 
possibility that cannot be dispelled in advance. The possibility, that is, that 
those situated objects of inquiry a practice encounters, and in relation to which 
it might seek to interrogate how things matter, might too readily submit to the 
social scientist’s own sense of what matters, because it matters to the object that 
questions be posed ‘in the name of science’.  It is the possibility of the research 
question overriding the mode of mattering of the situation into which one seeks 
to inquire that renders the event of invention extremely fragile and unstable.  
 What is at stake, ultimately, is the risk of forcing the object to waive the 
claims and demands that might obligate a practice, while prompting it to 
submit to the pattern of contrasts that inhabits the question, regardless of 
whether such contrasts matter to it or not. Vinciane Despret (2008: 131) 
expresses such a danger with great clarity when she argues: 
 
[certain research habits] rest on a procedure that demands 
submission from those who are questioned: submit to 
questions, submit to the inevitable play of interpretations 
that will judge one’s testimony, [...], submit to the theories 
that guide research, submit to the problem that is imposed 
on them and to the manner in which the researcher 
constructs and defines it. The [object] is summoned by a 
problem that he or she often has nothing to do with, or in 
any case has nothing to do with the manner in which the 
problem is defined, just as the researcher isn’t usually 
preoccupied by the manner in which his problem may or 
may not be a problem for whoever it summons. And most 
of the times the [object] mobilised in this way will agree to 
respond to questions without calling into question their 
interest, their appropriateness or even their politeness, as 
evidently, the scientist “knows better”. 
 
As Despret suggests, the challenge lies not in an intrinsic feature of the human 
as being somehow incapable of developing her own sense of what matters, but 
might be better approached as associated with the particular habits and 
sensibilities that certain contemporary modes of social inquiry take. This is 
especially true for those modes of inquiry I have associated with an ethics of 
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estrangement. For to the extent that the exercise involves replacing one order of 
reality for another, it is inherent in their propositions that they be at odds with 
the objects’ own modes of mattering.  
 Thus, if the ‘dance of agency’ may appropriately characterise the risks of 
invention in the sciences of the laboratory, in the social sciences the manner of 
the encounter cannot be dissociated from the difference it makes to the object to 
whom the questions may be posed. Indeed, if we were to unproblematically 
extend the choreographic metaphor, the dance might resemble less a dialectic of 
resistance and accommodation and more one of rights and duties, as in the 
many dance traditions where one leads –usually, the ‘man’– and the other 
‘follows’. My view is that whenever such an extended metaphor can be said to 
be a good descriptor of an actual habit of practice in contemporary social 
research, the results might be rather disastrous. For its effect is not that of 
making the object internal to the technical process of construction, as in the case 
of engineering, but rather that of replacing the object’s own mode of relevance 
with the social scientist’s account of a situation.  
 In an attempt at making perceptible the questions I have been exploring 
throughout this chapter, in the above quotation I have replaced Despret’s 
original term ‘subject’ by the term ‘object’. At the risk of being accused of 
‘dehumanising’ those subjects –who actually need not be human to begin with–  
by some perverse process of objectification, I have done so for a very specific 
reason. Namely, that the problem posed by our conventional research habits 
that Despret describes so well makes felt the residual potential of this notion we 
have learned too rapidly to disqualify as naïve and positivistic. A notion which, 
throughout this chapter, I have tried to reclaim while dissociating it from its 
truly disqualifying versions: ‘objectivity’, other than a god-trick, a tyrant, or the 
name for the stillness of objects, might be mobilised as the achievement of a 
manner of encountering objects which, instead of subjecting them to the power 
of social scientific questions, may invite them to object– to put scientific 
questions at risk by making their own obligations present.     
 Stengers (2011b: 361) claims that this possibility would require a social 
science ‘that would only address those who are fully capable of putting at risk 
anyone who attempts to represent them.’ But how are they to be identified? 
And by whom? Does this possible anticipation not already dissolve the risk of 
invention into another safe procedure towards knowledge? As I will show in 
Chapter Three through an exploration of actual encounters, such an 
anticipation might not be needed. Rather than being a virtue the social sciences 
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are endowed with or a procedure that would identify in advance who is 
capable of resisting them and who is not, objectivity refers to how risks are 
immanently articulated in practice. 
 But we cannot conclude this discussion without adding another 
dimension of complexity to the process of invention in the social sciences. For 
as crucial as the attention to the encounter as an individual occasion is, we must 
resist the temptation to implicitly model our thinking upon a practice that 
might resemble the dual relationship of an interview. Indeed, as numerous 
science studies researchers have been at pains to argue, in the experimental 
sciences complex and arduous technical processes are devised to purify the 
encounter of its natural complexity (e.g. Latour 1993a). Regardless of whether –
or rather, when and how– that process of purification may or may not be 
warranted34, the situations that concern the social sciences are rarely susceptible 
to purification. Heterogeneity, multiplicity, and historicity are not conditions 
one needs to get rid of, but constraints one must learn to inherit, for neither the 
objects of inquiry nor the situations they compose can come (in)to matter 
without them (see also Chapter Five).  
 Indeed, to the extent that situations are composed of disparate, 
individual and collective objects with different interests, modes of mattering, 
and obligations, the risks of invention cannot be dissociated from what Michel 
Serres (1995b: 54) would have termed the ‘noise’ of the world:  
 
Background noise is the first object of metaphysics, the 
noise of the crowd is the first object of anthropology. The 
background noise made by the crowd is the first object of 
history. Before language, before even the word, the noise. 
 
Thus, in addition to putting questions at risk by inviting the many objects of the 
many individual encounters to object to the manner in which such questions are 
                                                
34 Indeed, to my mind the point is not to denounce work of purification as such. The process of 
purification that makes a laboratory experiment possible is, in Whitehead’s (1955: 26) sense, a 
specialised mode of abstraction. And to abstract is not by definition ‘wrong’ or artificial, for 
abstraction expresses ‘nature’s mode of interaction’. The problem with purification as a 
specialised mode of abstraction appears when it exceeds the specific domain for which it may 
be relevant, and becomes an entire world-view, enforced generally. It is there that Whitehead’s 
(1967b) notion of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, that is, the confusion of an abstraction 
with concrete reality, makes itself felt (on this point see also Stengers 2009c). This is why 
Stengers (2000: 91) argues that ‘the experimental event does not constitute a response without 
also posing a problem. […] [It] makes a difference, but it does not say for whom this difference 
will count’. 
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posed to them, the multiple, historical and heterogeneous nature of situations 
poses itself a risk to the achievement of invention insofar as any relevant 
proposition must avoid subsuming the many versions of a problem under the 
purity of a unity, a concept or formulation capable of capturing them in a single 
‘mental fist’ (Cortázar 2011)35.  
  From an epistemological and methodological standpoint, the noise 
involved in such situations both complicates and contributes to the invention of 
problems that matter. On the side of complication, it does force a researcher 
oriented by the question of ‘how is it, here, that things matter?’ to add to the 
risk of inviting objections to the pattern that inhabits a question in an 
encounter, the risk of the multiple definitions of a problem – ‘have I defined the 
problem in a way that allows all the versions put forth by the objects concerned 
with it to coexist without disqualifying each other?‘. 
  What this may entail in practice will hopefully become clearer in the 
course of thinking with concrete encounters and discussing invention 
practically (see Chapter Three), but for the moment it might be worth noting 
that inheriting the heterogeneity and multiplicity of situations as a constraint 
upon invention needs not lead to the cultivation of forms of ‘tolerance’ or a 
simple ‘relativity of opinions’ (Stengers 2011b). In contrast, if I argue that 
addressing multiplicities may contribute to the achievement of relevance is 
because multiple encounters with different objects may also become a possible 
manner of actively producing objectivity in the sense defined above, that is, of 
inviting different versions of a problem to object to each others senses of what 
matters. In this sense, the multiplicity of encounters involved in the 
development of social scientific problems is crucial for resisting the temptation 
of anticipating what matters for those to whom the question is posed. 
Consequently, it may also contribute to the crafting of a ‘problematic 
togetherness’ that Stengers (2002) has associated with the challenge of 
cosmopolitics. 
 Thus, what the question of relevance demands is an active, practical and 
immanent mode of invention that, instead of summoning and indeed, 
subjecting the objects to the questions that are posed to them, may invite them 
to object, to make their obligations present so that the questions may seek to 
address their own sense of what matters. To be sure, the concrete actualisation 
                                                
35 In this sense let me be clear that by ‘the multiple’ I am not referring to the production of 
statistical aggregates, for subsuming multiplicity to unity is precisely their job description (see 
for instance Daston 2008, Tsing 2012). 
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of such a mode of invention has to be addressed in relation to the demands that 
each actual encounter needs to fulfil. For this reason, the next chapter will be an 
attempt to think with encounters and will have the purpose of actualising the 
possibility of such modes of invention by disclosing the fact that they have 
already been undertaken.   
 What the attention to the intellectual and technical requirements of 
invention in the social sciences makes available, however, is the beginning of an 
exploration that runs throughout the chapters that comprise this thesis. 
Namely, an interrogation that seeks not primarily a connection between 
epistemology and methodological guidelines, as if the former would be capable 
of providing the general principles that ought to be implemented, ‘applied’, in 
the actual practices of knowledge-making regardless of the situation. What my 
speculative reconstruction pursues from different angles, what it seeks to 
cultivate, by contrast, is an interrogation into the relationship between modes of 
thought, modes of practice and modes of experience– a question belonging to a 
care of knowledge.  
 
Conclusion: The Task of Cultivation 
 
 In this chapter, I have begun to explore some of the intellectual 
constraints that the adventure of relevance requires for embarking on a form of 
knowledge-practice that might wonder about how things, in a given situation, 
come (in)to matter in specific ways. In this context, the challenge has taken the 
form of turning what at first sight seemed like a contradiction in terms –that is, 
the ‘obligation to invent’– into a productive proposition for thinking carefully 
about the risks entailed in a mode of knowing that I have associated with the 
process of invention. 
  What prompted such a challenge was that the proposition ‘facts matter’ 
requires a relative outside that is pregnant with its own modes of relevance and 
in relation to which practices might put their questions at risk.  In thinking 
through this question, I have argued that the adventure of relevance might 
require that we open up the possibility of reclaiming a concept of ‘objectivity’ 
which would not make invention absurd and vice versa. Thus, I have argued 
that while the three versions of objectivity that recent social studies of science 
and other proponents in the contemporary social sciences have criticised need 
be resisted, their particular forms of resistance should not amount, whenever 
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relevance is at stake, to a rejection of either the notion of objectivity or the 
subject-object relation.  
 In contrast, I have suggested that, on the one hand, the subject-object 
relation needs to be modified so as to abandon the still objectivity that it 
conveyed. Instead, ‘objectivity’ might be reclaimed by conceiving objects of 
inquiry as vectors of risk. Objectivity becomes a mode of encountering objects 
that may invite them to object to and transform the manners in which questions 
are posed to them, so that the pattern of contrast that underpins initial 
questions does not override other possible responses with its own pre-defined 
sense of how things matter (Savransky 2014).  
 In this way, while I have proposed that knowledge-practices are 
fundamentally inventive undertakings, I have argued that the mode of 
invention of each practice cannot be dissociated from the mode of existence of 
the objects it encounters. I have thus attempted to speculate on how to 
approach the question of possible modes of invention that would undertake an 
adventure of relevance in the making of social scientific propositions. I will 
explore this issue again in the next chapter, albeit from a less conceptual and a 
more practical angle, by attempting to think with actual encounters of research 
that turn the speculative adventure of relevance into a real possibility by 
exhibiting signs that they have already embarked on it.  
 For this same reason, however, it would be a mistake to read Chapter 
Three as an ‘application’ of the current discussion, or, conversely, the current 
chapter as the result of an inductive inference performed upon the chapter that 
follows. As I suggested above, my task here is not to devise a general 
epistemology either by deductive or inductive means, but rather to engage in 
an intellectual project that in the introduction to the thesis I have associated 
with the notion of ‘speculative reconstruction’. An intellectual practice whose 
business is that of cultivating possibilities that might be capable of transforming 
not only the way in which we think about the modes of inquiry of the 
contemporary social sciences, but also the ethical sensibilities with which they 
might be identified in light of the question of relevance.   
 By ethical sensibility I mean, again, not an ethical guideline that, in the 
form of a general rule, might dictate the code of ‘good’ practice. I mean rather, 
an ethos, a felt orientation to the world that does not for that reason prescribe 
the terms of appropriate, adequate, or relevant comportment for all occasions, 
but which requires a piecemeal process of cultivation sensitive to the particular 
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perplexities that an encounter might generate, as well as to the possibilities that 
might inhere therein (Connolly 1995).  
 Thus, if Pickering’s (1995) ‘dance of agency’ might be said to describe a 
mode of experimentation that might prevent the relative outside-ness of the 
object of inquiry from becoming part of the experimental apparatus, my sense is 
that what is required for an ethics of social inquiry is perhaps a different sort of 
dance. One ‘in which all the actors become who they are [...], not from scratch, 
not ex nihilo, but full of the patterns of their sometimes-joined, sometimes-
separate heritages both before and lateral to this encounter. All the dancers are 
redone through the patterns they enact.’ (Haraway 2008: 25 emphasis in 
original). It is this particular dance that I have begun to cultivate speculatively 
in the course of the first two chapters, and will continue, from different angles, 
and different lines of intellectual and practical inheritance, to propose in 
chapters to come. The task is thus not to enforce a normative ethics of reality 
that be imposed upon the habits of thought and practice of a future social 
science, but to create some of the instruments for an ethics that be cultivated in 
the process of learning how to think and know a situation such that, to that 
extent, it can constitute an image of inquiry that –as Deleuze (1994: 167) would 
put it– is ultimately an inquiry without image.     
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Chapter Three: 
Thinking With Encounters 
 
Introduction: What Is an Encounter? 
 
 In order to cultivate an ethics of adventure it is crucial that we 
disentangle the term from the more swashbuckling, personalistic accounts that 
have been given to it and that relate it directly, if not causally, with the figure of 
a ‘hero’. By contrast, the kind of adventure I am attempting to develop does not 
emanate from a ’hero’ but from a meeting of heterogeneous bodies, objects, 
movements, questions, and senses of relevance. In other words, one does not 
wilfully decide to become an ‘adventurer’ and neither does one choose in what 
adventure one will embark on. Rather, one is given over to an adventure by 
virtue of an encounter. Indeed, as I will argue, it is out of the composition of a 
myriad of encounters that things come (in)to matter in specific and situated 
ways. It is thus only with encounters that adventures of relevance can be 
approached in a manner that is closer to their concrete and practical 
requirements.  
 Because it is found virtually everywhere, the term ‘encounter’ is –not 
unlike the term ‘relevance’– one which oftentimes bears the danger of 
appearing intuitive and obvious. Thus, if one were to try to trace the term 
‘encounter’ in the contemporary social science literature one would surely come 
across hundreds of articles and books the titles of which bear its presence. A 
closer look is likely to reveal, however, that many –if not most– of them contain 
no discussion of what an encounter is, or rather and more interestingly, what 
the implications of thinking about or with encounters might be. On the other 
hand, it is this intuitiveness of the encounter which may have the capacity, 
whenever the question ‘what is an encounter?’ or ‘what does it mean to enter 
into an encounter and to produce feeling and thinking from it?’ is raised, to 
force thought to change its habitual patterns and to situate us into the middle 
space of adventure. As Deleuze (1994: 139) powerfully affirmed, ‘[s]omething in 
the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but 
of a fundamental encounter’. 
 The notion of the encounter is a demanding one, for it already carries 
with it a particular understanding of relationality. As the term suggests, an en-
counter is, in the most general sense, a meeting of heterogeneous elements. 
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Thus, it designates, first and foremost, a mode of relationality characterised by 
the contingency of a coming into contact of various forms of mattering, which is 
also to say, of modes of relevance. But unlike some ‘internalist’ theories of 
relationality with which we have become familiar, to speak of an encounter 
allows us to resist the temptation to associate relational thinking with a general 
appreciation that would proclaim:  ‘everything is interconnected!’. What it does 
instead is to force thought to wonder about when, how, in what manner and 
degree, and with what effects, enduring things come to relate to and affect each 
other. 
  By ‘internalist theories of relationality’ I here mean the various 
propositions that pose relations as primary with respects to the objects they 
relate. In Karen Barad’s formulation (2007: 140), such an account of relationality 
is expressed in the doctrine according to which ‘relata do not preexist relations’. 
The notion of encounter, in my view, points to the limitations of such an 
account at the level of empirical objects. For if all relations among enduring 
things were constitutive of them, internal to their being, if everything was 
always already internally connected to everything else, indeed, if heterogenous 
beings were conceived only as effects of their internal relating, then there would 
be nothing to ‘be met’, and the very possibility of encountering an object would 
become an illusion of language (for an in-depth critique of such forms of 
‘relationism’ see Harman 2009). 
 To be sure, internalist theories of relationality are not uncommon 
features of the structuralist and postrstructuralist traditions that since the 1960s 
have pervaded the habits of thought and practice of the contemporary social 
sciences (Hunter 2006). In this sense, for example, and despite her 
groundbreaking work on the cultural processes of subjectivation, feminist 
theorist Judith Butler (1997: 119) has once explicitly made the case that to 
describe the situation that constitutes the relation between a human subject and 
a set of regulative cultural norms as an ‘encounter’ is ‘to take grammar at its 
word: there is a subject who encounters a set of skills to be learned, learns them 
or fails to learn them, and then and only then can it be said either to have 
mastered those skills or not.’  
 According to her theory of ‘performativity’36 and her reading of Louis 
Althusser’s (1971)37 famous essay on the hailing of the subject by authority, 
                                                
36 I will discuss the question of ‘performativity’ in relation to the connections that inventions 
make in the next chapter. 
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there is no subject prior to the incorporation of cultural rules and skills– the 
relations between the subject and the norm are entirely internal. They constitute 
the subject as such. Indeed they are not relations between subject and norms, 
because the subject herself is the effect of a process of normative inscription:   
 
To master a set of skills is not simply to accept a set of 
skills, but to reproduce them in and as one's own activity. 
This is not simply to act according to a set of rules, but to 
embody rules in the course of action and to reproduce 
those rules in embodied rituals of action (Butler 1997: 119). 
 
Butler is right to say that, in the process of its own composition, the fully 
formed subject cannot itself be the one who encounters cultural norms, for to 
suggest that would be to assume what demands to be explained. But this does 
not make the encounters that lead to the composition of a subject a mere 
grammatical illusion. Indeed, things other than the subject encounter each other 
and it is arguably out of such generative meetings, and not out of a smooth 
process of the internalisation of authority, that her notion of a subject may 
emerge (Savransky 2014). As Deleuze (1994: 75) would ask: ‘what organism is 
not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted 
water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby intertwining all the 
habits of which it is composed?’ In this way, the human subject can be thought 
as an emergent product of a myriad of encounters where modes of relevance, 
forces and habits become together– a form of organisation that emerges out of 
encounters between the habits of hydrogens, family names, bacteria, sexual and 
racial norms, conceptions of the self, carbons, political economy, proteins, etc. 
 In this way, things come (in)to matter, and they matter to each other. As I 
suggested in previous chapters, what allows for qualitative differences between 
things to be discerned is the specific trajectories and habits they inherit, the 
particular social order that each grouping enjoys. In other words, to think in 
                                                                                                                                          
37 Interestingly, the title of a book that compiles the later writings of Althusser (2006), and 
which offers a very different ‘Althusser’ from the one that is normally associated with his 
‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, is no other than Philosophy of the Encounter. In this 
book, Althusser attempts to recover and make present for the Marxist tradition ‘the existence of 
an almost completely unknown materialist tradition in the history of philosophy: the “materialism” of the 
rain, the swerve, the encounter, the take.’ (Althusser 2006: 167 emphasis in original). Arguably, in 
her later works, Butler too has moved away from such an internalist position that precludes the 
encounter (for a wonderfully written example see for instance Butler 2005), although this has 
not prevented her followers from extending earlier arguments to the present. 
102 
terms of encounters is to address the becoming together of enduring objects of 
various natures. Interestingly, the name Whitehead (1978, 1967a) gives to these 
enduring beings that compose the world is that of ‘societies’.  As he puts it, ‘[a]n 
ordinary physical object, which has temporal endurance, is a society’ 
(Whitehead 1978: 35). Thus, rocks, plants, human and nonhuman animals are 
all societies.  
 Now, societies are not simply derivatives of some more primary set of 
relations. They are not mere epiphenomena. While they are indeed composed –
that is, they emerge out of an organisation of composing elements38– they exist 
in their own right. A society, Whitehead (1967a: 203) would say, ‘is its own 
reason.’ And unlike their components, which are passing occasions that do not 
endure but only become and perish, a society ‘enjoys a history expressing its 
changing reactions to changing circumstances’ (1967a: 204): 
 
[i]t is evident from [the] description of the notion of a 
‘Society’, as here employed, that a set of mutually 
contemporary occasions cannot form a complete society. 
For the genetic condition cannot be satisfied by such a set 
of contemporaries. Of course, a set of contemporaries may 
belong to a society. But the society, as such, must involve 
antecedents and subsequents. In other words, a society 
must exhibit the peculiar quality of endurance. The real 
actual things that endure are all societies. They are not 
actual occasions. (Whitehead 1967a: 204) 
 
When addressing societies, thus, the notion of an encounter seems appropriate, 
for while societies are relational, they are not merely relational ‘effects’. 
Whenever societies are concerned, ‘relationality’ means nothing if it does not 
succeed in turning our attention to the creative constraints through which 
concrete things come to matter and relate to each other (see also Debaise 2012).  
 In this way, for an encounter to happen two or more entities have to 
meet, that is, they have to preexist the encounter, even though they might 
certainly be affected by it and although something new –a third entity– might 
indeed emerge from it. The specific life-historical patterns of the many different 
societies that meet, or what Whitehead (1978: 279. see also Shaviro 2009) would 
                                                
38 Whitehead would call them ‘actual entities’ or ‘actual occasions’. 
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call their particular ‘routes of inheritance’, simultaneously enable and constrain 
the manner the encounter takes. That is, they mutually pose their own demands 
and negotiate how a novel thing may come (in)to matter. Creative constraints 
are, thus, reciprocal forms of mattering that simultaneously limit and induce 
novely. 
 As already hinted at by the discussion around the constitution of human 
subjects above, moreover, the creative, reciprocal constraints by which things 
come (in)to matter in and for specific situations are certainly not restricted to 
encounters between humans, but go, as it were, all the way down. As Serres 
(2003: 61) puts it:  
 
‘Nature’ inseminates itself with programmes.[…] To go 
with the physics of forces we require a general theory of 
marks, traces and signs to learn to remember like the 
world and to remember it, to write on and as it writes; 
things are also symbols. There is not just chemistry in 
chemistry: why does an element react or not in the 
presence of another? Why then does it choose it in this 
way? What is the ‘faculty’ that makes it choose? Great 
masses write, molecules read. And, even more so than 
inert matter, living matter writes, reads, decides, chooses, 
reacts– one would have thought it long endowed with 
intentions. One hour of biochemistry quickly persuades 
one of the refined astuteness of proteins.   
 
Conversely, the experience of a meeting of heterogeneous historical modes of 
mattering –of two or more humans; of a student and a book; of a child and a 
dog; of a wasp, an orchid, a philosopher and a non-philosopher; of two atoms, 
etc.– that constitutes an encounter becomes added to, and thus transforms, 
reacts to, their respective routes, thereby inducing a transformation in each of 
the relata.  An encounter is not, then, just a coming together, but a becoming 
together. In this way, the encounter itself, when successful, can give way to a 
novel society –an emotion, a proposition, a child, for example– that might in its 
own turn come to enjoy a history and encounter other entities and milieus. 
Hence, societies encounter and become with each other.  Because encounters 
are always concrete, they do not warrant generalist claims about the priority of 
either things or relations but force us to come to terms with the fact that ‘just as 
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the relations modify the natures of the relata, so the relata modify the nature of 
the relation.’ (Whitehead 1967a: 157). In other words, what is at stake in every 
concrete encounter and in the possibilities for novelty that it may open up is the 
way in which many routes of inheritance become together. That is, the 
particular form the encounter takes.  
 To the extent that inquiries can be thought as particular kinds of 
encounters through which multiple, heterogeneous habits of thought and 
feeling, and patterns of relevance, become together to produce problem-
oriented propositions, the notion of an encounter prompts us to pay attention to 
what I , paraphrasing Michel Serres  (2003, 2012, also Serres & Latour, 1995), 
would call an ethico-politics of prepositions in the process of social inquiry. 
Prepositions, as is well known, are those words that express the manner that a 
relation between two elements takes. Indeed, can it be that the social sciences 
have been, perhaps for too long, invested in knowing ‘about’? In conducting 
experiments ‘on’? In doing ethnographies ‘of’? In speaking ‘for’? In arguing 
‘against’? Might this attention to the prepositions that characterise the manner 
of social scientific encounters become a productive way of approaching the 
challenge of encountering objects in such a way that questions and their 
patterns of contrast be put at risk? What would it mean, for instance, to 
experiment with; to know before an object? 
 In this way, the possibility of cultivating a different care of knowledge 
that is made available by the question of relevance, that is, the question of how, 
in a given situation, things come to matter, may perhaps be approached in a 
more practical fashion: ‘How to make this encounter fertile?’ (Serres 2012: 166). 
Indeed, which modalities of encounter might become available in the process of 
wondering about how things come (in)to matter ? In this chapter I shall aim to 
experiment with some of these questions. Because of the contingent and 
concrete nature of encounters, however, such questions can hardly be 
experimented with in general, as a matter of pure abstract thinking. Thus, I 
must attempt to think with encounters.  
 
A Preliminary Note: Encounters All The Way Down (and Up) 
 
 In what follows I will discuss three concrete encounters drawn from 
published material by contemporary social researchers from very different 
geographical, disciplinary and methodological backgrounds (namely, Despret 
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2004a, Hetherington 2013 and Motamedi-Fraser 2012). It would be too easy, and 
too unproductive, to select all those abundant encounters which belong to the 
sorts of inquiry animated by the ethics of estrangement that the adventure of 
relevance would attempt to resist; to speculate on their limitations and the 
reasons for their failures; to read them against themselves and to denounce 
them as irrelevant. Moreover, to do so would silently transform this practice of 
thinking with encounters into one of mobilising ‘bad’ examples.   
 In contrast, as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Six, speculation 
also involves the taking of risks. In this case, that is the risk of thinking with 
those implausible, infrequent, yet actual encounters that ‘exhibit the possibility 
of an approach by the very fact that they have already undertaken it’ (Stengers 
2011b: 313). In other words, the encounters explored in what follows have been 
selected, first and foremost, because in one way or another they testify to 
having taken risks that I have associated with the adventure of relevance. None 
of them is simply an empirical report, nor a pure methodological reflection. 
Rather, each of them attests to having posed their own modes of guiding 
inquiries as a problem that demands to be developed. 
  Needless to say, my exploration will be necessarily partial, selective and 
pragmatic. These three encounters are surely not the only ones that have posed 
the question of relevance as a problem to be developed. Moreover, in discussing 
these encounters and in relating them to the histories of the modes of inquiry to 
which they become a possible mutation, I will not be trying to characterise such 
histories and the complex varieties of, for example, ‘experimentation’ or 
‘ethnography’, in any exhaustive way. Rather, I will do so only from the 
perspective of a speculative reconstruction that might nevertheless offer 
insights into the practical challenge posed by the question of relevance to a 
social science to come.   
 Having said that, I believe the selection made here does present its own 
advantages. First, the three encounters that I will attempt to think with belong 
to three different disciplines in the contemporary social sciences. While the first 
is clearly inscribed in the history of social psychology, the other two are closer 
to inquiries traditionally associated with the disciplines of anthropology, 
sociology and historiography. Thus, their co-presence in these pages prevents 
us from reducing the possibilities opened up by the adventure of relevance to 
one single discipline, be this sociology, anthropology, psychology or another. 
Conversely, the exploration of different disciplinary habits involved in what 
follows does not have the ambition to endow the question of relevance with a 
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specific robustness but rather to make apparent the extent to which it might 
force those who are given over to its adventure, to invent a manner of dealing 
with the problems that demand to be dealt with.  
 Second, each of these encounters draws on very different methods. The 
first one confronts us with the very controversial question of ‘experimentation’ 
in the contemporary social sciences, one that saw its 15 minutes of fame in the 
social psychology of the 1960s but which remains a not infrequent modality of 
inquiry in the knowledge-practices of economics and political science. The 
second encounter will prompt us to interrogate the practice of a much 
celebrated method in the so-called ‘qualitative’ social sciences, namely, 
ethnography. Finally, the third method will not only raise questions about the 
encounter with an archive, but will also bring to the fore the challenges of 
encountering a kind of object that all social scientists, in some way or another, 
must learn to deal with. Namely, words.  
 Such methodological heterogeneity will hopefully make apparent 
something I have suggested above. This is that the question of relevance does 
not by itself designate a particular method, nor aims at producing a 
methodological solution, conducive to facilitating the smooth and successful 
development of social scientific inquiries. In contrast, it involves a 
transformation at the level of the ethical sensibilities with which methods are 
identified– its job is not to provide solutions to research problems but to present 
itself as a problem that may force social scientists to hesitate, wonder and 
invent. For this reason, relevance cannot operate under a rule of generalised 
applicability.  The range of different modes of inquiry explored in what follows 
does not have as its aim the implicit suggestion that it can be ‘applied’ always, 
to any method, anywhere. By contrast, it always relates to some habits and some 
methods, somewhere. In other words, the challenges posed by the question of 
how, in a given situation, things come (in)to matter will relate to the demands 
that the specificity of the encounter has to fulfil. 
 Finally, taking the risk of selecting encounters that show signs of having 
been given over to adventures of relevance implies that, unlike the typical 
exercises of ‘debunking’ by critical commentary, these cannot remain mere 
‘cases’, convenient illustrations of an  abstract argument. In contrast, I am, here, 
encountering each of them in their own specificity. Encounters go all the way 
down, and up, from proteins to the play of ideas. For this reason, what follows 
is not an attempt to ‘apply’ the more abstract arguments that precede this 
chapter to more ‘mundane’ situations. The explorations below will themselves 
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bear the mark of an encounter– in discussing them, I will emphasise certain 
elements, propose possible patterns of contrast, and also place certain demands 
upon them, and in turn, they will  –indeed, they already have– obligate my 
thinking in unexpected ways, forcing me to adjust to their demands, and 
attempt to construct a sense of what, in each case, comes to matter.  
 
Experimenting with Objects: Emotions, Social Psychology and 
Multiple Objectors  
 
 Since their modern birth in the late nineteenth century, experimentation 
in the social sciences has become a much employed and debated mode of 
conducting inquiries and posing questions. Understood then –but still, perhaps 
surprisingly, today (see Webster & Sell 2007)– as the ‘gold standard’ of 
‘scientific’ research, many disciplines, including sociology, economics, political 
science, and psychology turned to experimental methodologies to distinguish 
their modes of inquiry from the philosophical institutions from which most of 
its founding members proceeded. In this way, they begun to shape new 
inquiries according to a model of scientific knowledge which, founded upon the 
modern bifurcation discussed in the previous chapter, placed the methods of 
other sciences like physics, chemistry and biology as the best means for 
accessing the ‘Really Real’. Despite their extended presence in many disciplines, 
it is arguably in psychology and, after the Second World War, in social 
psychology, that such modes of inquiry have enjoyed the most systematic and, 
if one may say so, conspicuous, history.  
 Most histories of psychology associate the ‘birth’ of the discipline as a 
modern science with the inauguration, in 1879, of the first ‘laboratory’ for 
psychological research by the therefore proclaimed ‘father’ of Psychology, 
Wilhelm Wundt (but see interestingly Vidal 2011). This german philosopher 
and his students sought to develop a new empirical study of individual 
consciousness that drew on debates around the methodological opportunities 
afforded by ‘introspection’ and on the then recent innovations in nineteenth-
century physiology. From its inception as a methodology in the social sciences, 
then, the aim of experiments was that of producing ‘precise reports’– as Wundt 
(1983 cited in Danziger 1990: 209-10. emphasis added) himself put it, 
experimental arrangements ‘force introspection to give an answer to a precisely 
put question’. 
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  Although Wundtian experiments generated much debate and opened 
up a prolific tradition of research in psychology, few of its defining 
characteristics have been preserved. Particularly, it was the testing of a 
‘precisely put question’ through the manipulation of a situation –a feature 
arguably inherent to most laboratory experimentation– that remained a 
standard of experimental inquiry in post-WWII social psychology. This is not 
simply to claim that, of course, the nature and meaning of what 
‘experimentation’ is has varied in the history of social sciences39, but that in the 
case of social psychology the particular changes in the aims and processes of 
producing experimental knowledge entailed a series of methodological, 
technical, ethical and ontological assumptions that radically reshaped the 
practice of experimental inquiry and the way in which the nature of the object 
in question was to be conceived (Danziger 2000; Stam et al. 2000). 
 Indeed, while Wundt conceived of social and communal patterns, myths 
and symbolic systems as not susceptible to experimentation40, it was precisely 
the positivist individualism of post-WWII social psychology –the so-called 
‘fallacy of the group’ (Allport 1919) according to which only individuals were 
‘real’– that arguably forced a major reconceptualisation of experimental 
inquiries. Thus, in Wundt’s laboratory, for instance, the roles of the one 
conducting the experiment and the one providing the source of psychological 
data were interchangeable. This suggests that the epistemic value of 
experimental data was one which was situated, that is, it depended on a 
particular interplay of actors, questions and responses that had to be 
collectively cultivated41. In this sense too, the experimenter and the participant 
were described as Mitarbeiter (co-workers) and participants were variously 
referred to in terms of the specific activities they were required to perform, such 
as ‘the discriminator’, ‘the associator’ or ‘the reactor’ (Danziger 1990: 32). 
                                                
39 As it also has in the natural sciences (see Hacking 1983). Indeed, even the notion of what 
constitutes a ‘laboratory’ has not remained stable (Guggenheim 2012). 
40  Wundt would strictly confine experimentation not only to the study of individual 
consciousness but also to the ‘lower’ dimensions of the latter, while ‘higher’ conscious process 
such as memory and language, as well as  social and cultural patterns, would have to be 
studied in a different way. These latter dimensions belonged to what he was to term 
Völkerpsychologie, or Folk Psychology, which employed not experimental but ethnological 
methods (Wundt 1900-1920).  
41 They were not only interchangeable but it was the role of the later called ‘experimental 
subject’ that was ‘considered to require more psychological sophistication than the role of the 
experimenter’ (Danziger 1990: 51). Proof of this is the fact that Wundt hardly ever acted as 
experimenter himself but did serve on many occasions as a source of psychological data for his 
students. 
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 By the time the standardisation of experimental procedures in post-
WWII social psychology came to dominate the modes of inquiry of the 
discipline (Stam et al. 2000), however, the division of labour became fixed, and 
the one acting as the source of psychological data acquired the now common 
name ‘subject’, a term which was used before the eighteenth century to describe 
‘a corpse used for purposes of anatomical dissection’ (Danziger 1990: 53). 
Accordingly, the psychological data provided by the ‘subject’ was no longer 
conceived as having to be cultivated through training and experimental 
interplay, but was now regarded as an abstract, isolated, ‘objective’, datum of 
the individual mind.42  
 It is in this context that we find the famously controversial experiments 
by Solomon Ash, Philip Zimbardo, and Stanley Milgram, that gave the 
discipline its much discussed –and disputed– reputation (for interesting 
discussions of these experiments, particularly of the ‘Obedience’ experiment by 
Milgram see Stengers 1997, Parker 2000). Although perhaps not attracting as 
much media attention, this period of American experimental Social Psychology 
also saw the rise of a number of experiments on cognitive effects upon 
‘emotions’, such as the one conducted by Schachter & Singer (1962), and in 
particular, the so-called ‘Valins experiment’ (Valins 1966). It is the remaking of 
this latter experiment by philosopher and psychologist Vinciane Despret 
(2004a)43 that constitutes our first encounter. 
 The main aim underpinning Valins’s experiments was the demonstration 
of an interrelation between cognition and emotion by showing that emotional 
states are influenced by cognitive cues taken both from the environment and 
from ‘internal events‘, while they ‘in turn arouse further cognitive activity in 
the form of attempts to identify the situation that precipitated them’ (Valins 
1966: 400). Thus, by means of an especially resourceful experiment illustrative 
of the aesthetics of experimentation that characterised American social 
psychology during the 1960s, Stuart Valins posed the question of whether the 
cognitive cues that influence emotional behaviour would still be effected if the 
‘internal event’ which elicited them was ‘fake’. That is, whether a bogus heart 
beat would affect the degree of attractiveness of certain stimuli. 
 Valins (1966) thus devised an experiment in which ‘volunteers’ –actually, 
students for whom 6 hours of participation in experiments were a course 
                                                
42 This abstract conception of the psychological subject as a substitutable, universal data-source  
might explain the extended use of undergraduates in psychological experiments. 
43 In collaboration with Isabelle Stengers. 
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requirement– were told that they would be part of a research project to test 
‘physiological reactions to sexually oriented stimuli’ (401). The alleged 
‘physiological reactions’ –which were actually a pre-recorded heartbeat– would 
be ‘recorded’, the subjects were told, during the screening of ten slides of half-
nude women from the pages of Playboy magazine. The experimenter explained 
to the subjects that, while normally the procedure would take place in a centre 
for medical research which was better equipped, due to lack of available labs 
they had to use ‘a fairly crude but adequate measure of heart rate’:  
 
Here we are recording heart rate the way they used to do 
it 30 years ago. I will be taping this fairly sensitive 
microphone to your chest. It picks up each major heart 
sound which is amplified here, and initiates a signal on 
this signal tracer. This other microphone then picks up the 
signal and it is recorded on this tape recorder (the signal 
tracer, amplifier, and tape recorder were on a table next to 
the subject). […] Unfortunately, this recording method 
makes it necessary to have audible sounds. […] Since our 
procedure does not require concentration, it won't be too 
much of a problem and it is not likely to affect the results. 
All that you will be required to do is sit here and look at 
the slides. Just try to ignore the heart sounds. (Valins 1966: 
402) 
 
The experiment begins and the slides are shown sequentially. Some of them are 
accompanied by an increased heart beat whereas for others the heart beat 
remains normal. When the experiment comes to an end, the researcher 
interviews the subject and asks ‘him’ to rate the slides on a 100-point scale 
according to their appeal, ranging from “Not at all” to “Extremely”(403)44. 
Which images do you prefer? And how much from 0 to 100? Such was the 
‘precisely put question’ that Valins posed to his subjects. According to the 
statistics published by Valins (1966: 405), there was a positive correlation 
                                                
44 As a matter of fact there are several interviews conducted and different ways of measuring 
the subject’s preferences throughout different periods of time after the experiment. However, 
the other two measures make no qualitative difference to the initial question but were devised 
merely to test the longstanding effects of exposure to the experiment. Needless to say, the 
version of the experiment I am providing here is only a simplified summary. For an 
understanding of the full experiment see Valins (1966). 
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between the perceived increase in heart rate and the reported attractiveness of 
the images. The hypothesis was answered positively, and the experiment was 
deemed a success. 
 Despret’s remaking of the experiment respected– despite some minor 
modifications– the original parameters and it initially obtained similar results. 
However, one alteration in the procedure makes present the possibility for a 
different mode of social inquiry that the question of how things matter opens 
up:  
 
Our final change was that we invited our subjects to come 
back ten days later so we could discuss with them how 
they felt about what we had asked them to do. Our second 
interview began with this question: “In your opinion, 
what were we looking for?” (Despret 2004a: 89) 
  
What this additional question makes available in the remake of the 
experiment is precisely what Valins’ version closed off. Indeed, while he did 
test his hypothesis, his precise question did not put the pattern of contrasts 
that the hypothesis made available at risk. In contrast, the question that he 
posed to the subjects of the study already included, implicitly, the pattern of 
contrasts created by the hypothesis that guided the study– should subjects 
prefer the pictures that coincided with the elevated heart-beat sound, this 
will mean, necessarily, that the heart-beat, as a cognitive cue, would be 
relevant for determining the emotional behaviour of the subject. Although 
the experiment was devised to ‘deceive’ the subjects of study so that what 
was asked would not be confused with what was expected (for a brief history 
of experimental deception in psychology see Herrera [1997]), the question –
both in the first interview and in the follow-ups– still imposed a particular 
pattern of contrasts (yes/no) that was relevant to the hypothesis, yet not 
necessarily relevant to the participants. Valins’s question circumscribed the 
question of relevance to options created by the hypothesis– either false cues 
would be relevant factors in determining emotional behaviour, or they 
would not. Accordingly, the subjects actively incorporated the pattern 
generated by the question and ‘reacted’ to it, and to the rating of the pictures, 
appropriately. 
 In contrast, by inviting the subjects to provide their own versions of 
what mattered to them in participating in the experiment, the question posed 
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by Despret crucially puts the pattern of contrasts that the experiment 
originally made available at risk.  Interestingly,  
 
[t]he response[s] to our question caused enormous 
surprise. […] Each of the subjects we asked to help us 
explore our problem had a very exciting story to tell. And 
all of the stories were different!   (2004a: 89-90)  
 
Instead of submitting to the pattern of contrasts made available by the 
experiment, ‘[e]ach had managed to connect his/her version of emotion to what 
the slide suggested.’ (2004: 90) Thus, rather than seeking to falsify or confirm 
the initial hypothesis, Despret sought to explore the many ‘versions’ of how 
things –the participants, the instruments, the experimental situation itself– 
came in(to) matter in different ways, and allowed the participants to propose 
relevant ways of reinventing the problem that concerned the experimental 
situation. In this sense, some suggested that the heart beat –which nobody 
thought was their own!– was indeed a cue that prompted them to become more 
interested in the pictures; another said that he allowed ‘the beat to touch him, 
take him in even, and that the heart-beat had “taken” the picture in as well’ 
(2004:  90). Others, moreover, admitted to ‘playing along’ with what the 
experiment seemed to suggest. As she concludes the discussion of the results:  
 
With these declarations we had many versions of what the 
experience of “being moved” might mean. Not one of 
them would have had the chance of enriching the version 
suggested by the slide if we had stuck to the classical 
process. Valins certainly can claim that emotion is not 
directly or merely dependent on the body, but his reasons 
for being able to confirm this –and the way in which his 
subjects actively contributed to the production of this 
version– continue to be definitively in the off-camera end 
of experimentation. Officially, all they caused was 
“reaction”. They behaved like good subjects: they were 
willing to be taken hostage by a problem of which no one 
knew how far their interest in that problem went and how 
they themselves could construct it. 
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In this way, Despret invented a manner of encountering not an abstract, 
isolated and substitutable ‘subject’, but rather  –if I may reclaim the terminology 
of early experimentation à la Wundt– multiple ‘objectors’, that is, recalcitrant 
objects capable of resisting the pattern of contrasts that an inquiry makes 
available and of constructing multiple versions of how things came in(to) 
matter in the experimental situation. 
 The preposition articulating the encounter is then crucially transformed, 
for the experiment is no longer one conducted on a subject by betting on the 
ignorance of the latter with respect to what is expected of her, but a mode of 
experimenting with an object, an objector, capable of making novel patterns of 
contrast available and, in so doing, of obligating the scientist to explore every 
version that the objects might suggest to her. The question of relevance thus, 
emerges in the process of negotiating the activity of experimentation by forcing 
the experiment itself to invent– to construct, with its objects, multiple versions of 
what matters. 
 In this way, rather than isolating the experience of emotional response 
and relating it to cognitive cues as if in a vacuum, the experiment becomes itself 
an ingredient in the experience it interrogates. To be sure, the experience of 
‘being moved’ that Despret refers to is not independent from the situation that 
the experiment itself created. But this means neither that through the 
experiment Despret was able to reveal the contours an experience in general, 
nor that her experiment produced those results. The participants were moved by 
the experiment, but the latter did not determine how they would be moved. 
Rather, the experiment becomes a factor in the fact of experience, it comes (in)to 
matter in some degree and in some manner. Despret’s question, which includes 
the experiment as a situated constraint upon the experience of the participants, 
constitutes thus a prepositional rearticulation for wondering about how, in 
what degree and in what manner, the images, the fake heart-beat, the objects’ 
own routes of inheritance, and the experimental setting itself come (in)to matter 
in interconnected ways.  
 
Knowing Before the Field: Peasants, Responsibility and How 
Beans Matter 
 
 To be sure, not all modes of inquiry in the social sciences have inherited 
the methodological individualism of experimentation, nor the demand to force 
a ‘subject’ to respond to a precisely put question by means of a controlled 
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intervention upon the conditions in which the question is posed. In fact, 
although the sciences of the laboratory served as a model for the development 
of many social scientific practices, the naturalisms inherent in sciences like 
zoology, botany and geology exerted a major influence in the becoming-
modern of those social scientific modes of inquiry that were associated with ‘the 
field’ (see Kuklick 1997). Indeed, while the major early anthropological 
statements on other ‘human cultural forms’ emerged from data collected from 
missionaries’ travels,  it is the influence of the naturalist traditions of other field 
sciences that imposed the ‘collection of empirical data by academically trained 
natural scientists’ (Stocking 1983: 74) as a modern epistemic distinction. A 
distinction which, in turn, brought about the emergence of the practice that 
later came to define to a large extent the spirit of Anthropology (cf.  Ingold 
2010) and which more recently has been extended beyond that discipline into 
other disciplinary spaces– the practice of ethnography. 
 Rather than the posing of a precisely put question, then, what was at 
stake in such naturalist modes of inquiry was the extensive and intensive study 
of limited areas –‘field-work’– that would provide comprehensive insight into 
‘human nature’. As Gupta & Ferguson (1997: 6) put it: ‘[t]o do fieldwork was, in 
the beginning, to engage in a branch of natural history; the object to be studied, 
both intensively and in a limited area, was primitive humanity in its natural 
state’. 
 Due to the meeting of a humanistic naturalism and a modern, exotic 
fascination with the study of ‘primitive cultures’ in ‘out-of-the-way places’, 
nowhere else have the theme of ‘adventure’ and a particular ethico-politics of 
‘out-there-ness’ and ‘inside-ness’ been more prominent and powerful than in 
the ethnographic tradition (Tsing 1993). Because it entails a leap into 
‘otherness’, a delving into the intricacies of a situation and the developing of a 
feel for the field, the ethnographic mode of inquiry engenders at first sight the 
danger of, as it were, making ‘relevance’ irrelevant. Has not the ethnographer 
already been cultivating, throughout the history of her practice, the adventure 
that the question of relevance opened up?  
 Initially, one might be tempted to submit to the assumption that inhabits 
such a question. However, to equate the adventure that relevance makes 
available to the one that has characterised the history of ethnography would be, 
I think, a mistake. For unlike the adventure that we have been tracing here, one 
characterised by the habitation of a space of wondering effected not by an 
adventurer but by an encounter, the ethnographic adventure has been 
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definitely marked by the rise and fall of its ‘heroes’, and it has, moreover, taken 
a particularly ‘manly‘ form. As Susan Sontag (1966: 74) sharply remarked in an 
essay on the work of french anthropologist and ethnographer Claude-Lévi 
Strauss entitled ‘The anthropologist as “hero”’: 
 
[Ethnographic anthropology] is one of the rare intellectual 
vocations which do not demand a sacrifice of one’s 
manhood. Courage, love of adventure, and physical 
hardiness –as well as brains– are called upon. 
 
Thus, despite the romantic and ‘courageous’ depictions of the empathic and 
other-loving ethnographer during the early generations of the practice, 
anthropologists and other social scientists (see for example Asad 1995) have 
become, at least since the 1950s, acutely aware of the fact that the adventure of 
ethnography was not only manly but indeed, a white, modern and colonial 
enterprise, ‘enmeshed in a world of enduring and changing power inequalities, 
[in which] it continues to be implicated’ (Clifford 1986: 9). Indeed, if Lévi-
Strauss could be said to be the ‘hero’ of French Anthropology, then surely 
Bronislaw Malinowski did it for the British tradition. As Stocking (1983: 71) 
interestingly notes, Malinowski’s  
 
place as mythic culture hero of anthropological method 
was at once confirmed and irrevocably compromised by 
the publication of his field diaries […], which revealed to a 
far-flung progeny of horrified Marlows that their Mistah 
Kurtz had secretly harbored passionately aggressive 
feelings towards the “niggers” among whom he lived– 
when he was not withdrawing from the heart of darkness 
to share the white-skinned civilised brotherhood of local 
pearl fishers and traders”.  
 
In this way, the naturalist adventure which brought ethnography into being 
became, in its modern form, a tolerant conquest of ‘living anachronisms’ 
(Hindess 2008: 201) whose effect was not the cultivation of the heterogeneity 
and plurality of the world’s many human natures –indeed, its multinatures 
(Viveiros de Castro, 1998)– but the creation of a historically and geographically 
homogeneous space divided only by the drawing of two demarcations– the 
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first, between ‘us’, modern, scientific, adults, and ‘them’, pre-modern, 
fetishistic, infants; the second, between ‘us’, humans of ‘undeveloped´ cultures 
and ‘advanced civilisations’, and on the other hand, nothing, bare nothingness, 
that is, the more-than-human world (Hindess 2008, Savransky 2012). 
 With the proliferation of post-colonial critiques of ethnography as a 
Eurocentric mode of inquiry and the later reflections on the writing of 
ethnographic narrative that were advanced in the context of the so-called 
‘reflexive turn’ (see  Clifford & Marcus 1983; see also the recently edited volume 
on the 25th anniversary of Writing Culture, edited by Starn 2012), the politics 
and the care of ethnographic knowledge centred for more than two decades on 
questions of representation, the partiality of its modes of knowing (see 
especially Strathern 1991) and the kinds of discourses that would or would not 
be appropriate to the writing of other cultures through reflexive engagements 
with the field-work. 
 Since then, however, ethnography has not only expanded widely 
throughout social science disciplines, but it has also been transformed in the 
process–  by opening up the range of sites in which it may be conducted (e.g. 
Lynch 1993, Horst & Miller 2012); by including new modes of ethnographic 
engagement through the involvement of the senses (e.g. Pink 2009, Stoller 1989); 
by experimenting with novel forms of collaboration (e.g. Rabinow & 
Stavrianakis 2013); by situating it in new temporalities of emergence (Rabinow 
& Marcus 2008); and so on.  
 Thus, as George E. Marcus (2012a, b) has recently argued, current 
innovations in ethnographic inquiry testify not so much to the ‘crisis of 
representation’ that characterised the concerns with discourse and reflexivity of 
the 80s and 90s, but to a ‘crisis of reception’ in relation to its outsides. A crisis 
which, crucially, forces ethnography not just to continue experimenting with 
different tropes and stylistic writing strategies as it had been doing in previous 
decades, but also to practically create new constraints for producing fieldwork 
(for an interesting edited volume on this see Faubion & Marcus, 2009). In this 
sense, the prepositional modality that the notion of the encounter makes felt 
also problematises the constraints through which a problematic field may be 
inquired. It forces us to wonder about the manner in which the ethnographer 
situates herself in relation to the field and the many entangled modes of 
mattering by which they are brought into being. 
  It is thus that I encounter Kregg Hetherington’s (2013) ethnographic 
account of his fieldwork in rural Paraguay. Hetherington was in the process of 
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producing an ethnography of peasant activism along the turbulent east of 
Paraguay’s expanding soybean frontier. Concerned with issues of poverty, 
property and politics, he initially constructed the scientific problem as laying ‘in 
a new agrarian structure developing in rural Paraguay, [whereas] the beans 
were merely incidental, easily replaced by something else, like canola or corn’ 
(66). But, one night, after having moved into Antonio’s house –a local leader in 
the peasant activist movement– Hetherington was confronted by the former 
with an objection that would obligate him to hesitate and wonder about his 
mode of encountering the field; an objection which would, moreover, ‘redefine 
[their] relationship’ (65). As he relates it, 
 
[h]e [Antonio] had been telling me the story of a friend 
who, while working for a nearby soybean farmer, had 
contracted a mysterious illness that had made him 
suddenly swell up and die. Upset by the story, he 
launched into a rant about soybeans until he was almost 
shouting above the din of rain on the roof. “You come 
back in two or three years,” Antonio said. “We’re all going 
to be dead. All of the children are going to die. There’s no 
future left for us. It’s the soybeans that are killing us.” He 
went on for some time like this, telling similar stories 
about soybeans and death, and I realized, with some 
discomfort, that he really meant it. Then, after a brief 
hesitation, he turned to me and asked, “What do you 
think of what I just said?” I had a lot more difficulty 
responding to this question than I like to admit. (2013: 65) 
 
After this encounter –which was followed by a second one, with Andrés, a 
business consultant who while reading the newspaper commented mockingly, 
‘“So now your campesinos are afraid of soy!” (2013: 66)– Hetherington’s 
ethnographic inquiry was forced to initiate a process of metamorphosis that 
would prompt him to cross the two demarcations that the history of 
ethnography had delineated and which, he realised, had themselves become 
built into the pattern of contrasts with which he initially posed questions to the 
field. He no longer could define the problem as he had before, nor could his 
ethnography be simply one of peasant activism: 
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Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an 
extended discussion with humans about humans, and I 
was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio 
said about them. Which meant that it wasn’t much of a 
conversation with humans either. To be blunt, Antonio 
kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him. I 
instinctively translated his statements about the nature of 
beans into social phenomena: I was comfortable saying 
that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, 
or even to claims that this is what Antonio believed, all of 
which explicitly framed  “la soja mata” (soy kills) as data 
for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of 
response. (2013: 67) 
 
It is precisely the need to articulate a response to the obligation posed by his 
‘informants’, an obligation which forced him to wonder about and learn how to 
come to terms with the situated mattering of beans instead of reducing them to 
products of human representation –that is, to affirm soybeans as a situated 
presence that matters, in some degree and manner– which prompted him to an 
adventure that was doubly risky. First, he had to take the risk of crossing the 
Great Divide (Latour 1993a) that had historically made the more-than-human 
world irrelevant to ethnographic inquiry. Second, he took the risk of becoming 
responsible, which is to say, of inventing a manner of responding to the situation 
he was studying.  
 In other words, the encounters with Antonio and Andrés provoked him 
into a different prepositional mode of conducting ethnographic research– it was 
not, it could no longer be, an ethnography of peasants, and neither could it turn 
into a post-humanist study of multi-species entanglements, even though such 
worldly entanglements were certainly at stake (for very interesting multi-
species ethnographies see for instance Haraway 2008, Hayward 2010). That 
soybeans kill was certainly no cause for celebrating their relevance, even 
though they were, in fact, relevant– ‘that nagging thing, not an object or 
instrument of some malevolent agency, but a thing that exceeds such 
explanations’ (Hetherington 2013: 74). 
 Sitting uncomfortably with his cultivated habits of posing questions, 
Hetherington’s encounter with the field forces us to interrogate the ethico-
politics of propositions in play. For the encounter prompted him to know not 
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about, not even and only from the field, as if he could ‘become’ another peasant 
in the fight against soybeans45, and neither was he working with the peasants in 
what could be misread as a kind of participatory action research. In contrast, he 
was, I propose, knowing before the field, that is, producing propositions and 
articulating responses in the presence of all the entities, human and other-than-
human, that constituted the situation in which he was entangled. He was 
making the problematic togetherness of their heterogeneous modes of 
mattering  that composed the situation constitute the very risk of invention. As 
Hetherington (2013: 72) argues: 
 
An ethnography in response to Antonio can be formulated 
in one of two ways. On the one hand, it can do what I 
initially did: participate in reestablishing the priority of 
frames of reference by disqualifying the talk of killer beans 
as, at best, a figure of speech not meant to be taken 
literally or, at worst, a mistaken reading of the situation 
caused by a restricted understanding of what was going 
on (what Andrés would call “ignorance”). On the other 
hand, it can itself be formulated very much from within 
the situation, as a proposition addressed to campesinos as 
the creators of killer beans. […] It is therefore appropriate 
that the response I offer here, the proposition I am 
formulating after so much hesitation of my own, did not 
initially present itself in representational form but, rather, 
as situated interventions that arise from both 
conversations with campesinos and much exposure to 
soybeans. 
 
His response not only involved the production of a very well written piece of 
ethnographic writing but, in addition, he himself became involved in the 
attempt to articulate a proposition that assigned relevance and responsibility to 
soybeans so that it would effectively make them legally responsible too, so that 
it would bring them ‘before the law’. Hetherington’s proposition sought to make 
                                                
45 As he himself argues, not only was he ‘a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer 
beans’ (2013:72) but also, the demands –but also the suspicions– placed upon him certainly 
interpellated him as an ‘expert’ of a certain kind, a position he had to learn how to enact 
responsibly. 
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the relevance of killer beans felt not only in the making of social scientific 
knowledge, but also, and crucially for the peasants, to make beans legally 
relevant. 
  By producing knowledge before the field, and in collaboration with 
peasants, they initiated a process that involved both the tradition of Western 
anthropological reasoning and the Supreme Court of Paraguay in an attempt to 
push both of them beyond the habitual patterns of contrasts that would allow 
them to disqualify the peasant’s obligation (“soy beans kill!”) as a pre-modern 
animistic belief. As a result, the process opened up the possibility of a worldly 
reconceptualisation of the relationship between soy producers, peasants, beans, 
and the law; the human and the more-than-human world; the Anthropos and the 
Oïkos; a reconceptualisation that has made a major difference in the rural 
political economy of eastern Paraguay (2013: 76).  
 Finally, because the adventure of relevance to which Hetherington was 
given over proved to be in many ways a success, one might feel tempted to 
ascribe to him the position of the true ‘hero’ who devoted his inventive 
knowledge-practice to work for the sake of the peasants. However, I would be 
wary to give in to such a temptation. For his success is not that of the resolution 
of a situation by the empowerment of the peasants’ capacity to act and to make 
the presence of killer beans relevant to Anthropology and to Paraguay’s law.  
 In contrast, by producing knowledge before the field, that is, in the 
presence of all the heterogeneous entities that brought it into existence, what he 
managed to cultivate was a proposition that would reinvent the problem that 
concerned the situation. His inventive practice thus consisted in developing the 
problem in particular ways so that the many beings with which it was 
concerned might be articulated (Dewey 1989). As Hetherington (2013:  80) 
notes, ‘“[l]a soja mata” [soy kills] didn’t become a matter of undisputed fact, but 
it was also not easily disqualified. Instead it became a serious proposition in a 
wider dialogue of actions and responses’. Unlike heroes who, since the Greek 
tradition, always bear with them the promise of immortality, the success of this 
proposition is one which provides no guarantees, and it does not prevent the 
emergence of new forms of disqualification: ‘I wonder, in fact, if the greater 
danger for campesinos in this new position isn’t the temptation to use 
disqualification themselves.’ (2013: 80) 
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Knowing in The Midst of Words: Social Science, Interpretation 
and The Risk of Telling 
 
 As is well known, the decades of the sixties and the seventies saw the 
rise of a number of criticisms and attacks on the neo-positivism that prevailed 
in the social sciences of previous years, criticisms which problematised the 
sheer possibility of any unmediated access to an outside world and increasingly 
came to emphasise the socially constructed and discursive nature of reality. In 
Chapter Two we have already explored some of the epistemological 
dimensions of social constructivism in relation to notions of objectivity and the 
making of social scientific knowledge. It suggested that Science creates the 
phenomena which they claim to study (Knorr-Cetina 1981, Gergen 1997, Gilbert 
& Mulkay 1984, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Potter 1996, among others). The 
epistemological position it made available was not however its only effect. The 
slogan ‘everything’s a text’, inherited from the deconstructionist tradition 
initiated by Jacques Derrida (1976, 2001) and the rise of postructuralism in 
France more generally46, expressed the emphasis on the discursive production 
of the world through practices of speech and writing and thus also operated at 
a methodological level, by opening up a myriad of interpretative studies and 
modes of inquiry into the oral and written practices of meaning-making. 
 Thus, in disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, sociology and 
political science –to name but a few–, interpretative studies of words and their 
combinations in narrative and discursive patterns of language in use, rather 
than individual consciousnesses or social practices per se, became privileged 
materials of social scientific inquiry (for influential examples in the vast 
literature see Whetherell & Potter 1987, White 1973, Clifford & Marcus 1986, 
Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Such a turn to language and meaning produced a mode 
of inquiry which saw words as the very stuff of which the world is made. To the 
extent that this was thought to be the case, moreover, words were read not as 
referring to an outside to which they would relate, but only to other words in 
an endless play of signification and différance in which one interpretation would 
                                                
46 Michel Foucault would normally be also included in such a list, but I am reluctant to do so. 
Indeed, although a certain reading of his work (particularly of The Archeology of Knowledge 
[2002]) was immensely influential for a variety of modes of ‘discourse studies’ (some more 
overtly analytical than others. For a range of different readings, see Fairclough 1992, Hall 1997, 
Laclau & Mouffe 1985, Rose 1999), his own notion of ‘discourse’ was, in a strict sense, hardly 
reducible to the linguistic. There are others who could be included in this list too such as 
Roland Barthes, John Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
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follow another ad-infinitum. As Derrida (2001: 351) urged the ‘human sciences’ 
in quoting Michel de Montaigne, if everything is, or can be read as, a text, then 
‘[w]e need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things’. Rabinow 
and Sullivan (1987: 6, for a more recent account, see Becker 2007) made a 
comparable statement in an early reader on the interpretive turn in social 
science: 
 
interpretation begins from the postulate that the web of 
meaning constitutes human existence to such an extent 
that it cannot ever be meaningfully reduced to 
constitutively prior speech acts, dyadic relations, or any 
predefined elements.  Intentionality and empathy are 
rather seen as dependent on the prior existence of the 
shared world of meaning within which the subjects of 
human discourse constitute themselves. 
 
Knowledge about worlds was thus replaced with an interpretation of words, 
their patterns and webs of meaning in action. Moreover, insofar as 
interpretation was seen as unlimited,  it became relatively unconstrained as a 
practice– because words and texts are made of and refer to nothing more than 
other words and texts, to other webs of meaning, semiosis is an open-ended 
process which entails no risks. No interpretation can, in any strict sense, ‘fail’, 
for it is the interpretation of the text which brings the text into existence47.  
 To be sure, the proliferation of studies in the social sciences that, during 
those decades, proudly admitted their inheritance to the so-called ‘linguistic 
turn’ has by now diminished in number and strength, and the concept of 
‘discourse‘ is perhaps no longer capable of capturing the empirical imagination 
of contemporary social scientists quite in the way that it used to. Not 
surprisingly, the laissez-faire attitude of interpretation associated with such a 
practice, once very much celebrated by researchers, is now seen as lacking 
‘accountability’ in relation to the relative outsides to which the knowledge-
                                                
47  While the notion of unlimited semiosis was initially proposed by C.S. Peirce, other 
semioticians like Umberto Eco (1992: 24) disagree with the deconstructionist reading according 
to which ‘the text is only a picnic where the author brings the words and the readers bring the 
sense.’ ‘Even if that were true’, Eco argues, ‘the words brought by the author are a rather 
embarrassing bunch of material evidence that the reader cannot pass over in silence, or in 
noise.’  
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practices of the social scientists relate (see for example Rabinow & Marcus 
2008).  
  Indeed, while many –if not most– social scientists still feel compelled to 
add scare quotes to “reality”, the anxiety over issues of language and 
representation is now perceived, by some, as a malaise of the past. Not only 
have critics of the linguistic turn argued that not everything is a text, but, 
through the kind of pendular movements that often characterise the dynamic 
intellectual investments of the social sciences, theorists and practitioners have 
also encouraged others to move beyond language into the study of the material 
dimensions of experience– practices, bodies, affects, emotions, etc. (see for 
instance Blackman 2012, Massumi 2002, Schatzki et al. 2001, among many 
others). 
 While these may generally be welcomed moves, there still remains the 
question of what manners of encountering words are made available in a world 
that, while decisively not entirely made of them, still includes them as specific 
elements in its own process of becoming. Indeed, even if ‘ethnography‘ may 
have become a new preferred methodology in many contemporary social 
sciences concerned with the study of practices48, ‘discursive’ modes of inquiry 
still abound in social research, and ‘words’ are still the main material in which 
the inventions of social scientific knowledge-practices are crafted. Moreover, 
the need to think about the specificity of words and their patterns becomes 
particularly pressing, for example, in historical social scientific modes of inquiry, 
where words –in official textual records, in written testimonies, in works of 
fiction, in inscribed objects–, often in incomplete form, that is, as traces and 
threads of another present, remain, both empirically and in principle, crucial 
objects of encounter (see Ginzburg, 2012; for a discussion of the effects of the 
linguistic turn in the historical social sciences see the edited collection by 
Attridge et al. 1989; see also Clark 2004). 
  The question, or questions, I think, could be posed thus: in a world 
which is neither the self-evident world that allowed social scientists to use 
words to describe reality ‘as it really is’, nor a world exclusively made of words, 
                                                
48 And indeed a common response to the question of the specificity of words in a world of 
material practices has been to treat the former as the product of the latter. In other words, a 
rather reductionist, that is, unspecific response. Such a move, moreover, has arguably been 
infused by a renewed empiricist ethos which, following the steps of ethnomethodology, 
understands the process of knowledge-making not through a logic of inquiry constrained by 
problematic situations but as a rather unproblematic description of what is given in experience 
(See Chapter Six) 
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how may words come (in)to matter? What kinds of relations might allow for an 
encounter with words to become fertile?  
 Rather than articulate an abstract response to these questions, I will 
attempt to experiment with them by encountering the recent adventure of 
sociologist Mariam Motamedi-Fraser (2012) with archives and words. As she 
describes it (2012: 85), ‘this project came out of a series of unlikely coincidences 
and strange encounters’ which perhaps began –because, as Motamedi-Fraser 
argues, it is never easy to determine when, or where a project begins– when she 
came across two references to a story called ‘Irradiant, written by a tribesman 
from Lorestan in World War II occupied Iran’ (2012: 86)49. Such encounter 
prompted her to trace the story to the Bodleian Library in Oxford, England.   
 From the outset, however, the Irradiant archive was recalcitrant to being 
traced: 
 
The Bodleian Library took some time to find the Irradiant 
archive because it did not, until I asked to read it, have a 
permanent shelf-mark. Indeed it did not have a permanent 
shelf-mark until I kept reading it. […] I began by creating 
a rough catalogue of the contents for my own use […], 
which was sometimes a disorienting experience, early on, 
because the materials were often transferred overnight, 
over a series of nights, into renumbered acid-free boxes 
and, in the process, slightly reorganized. That feeling of 
delirium, in the morning, on finding new boxes, and 
finding things, or not being able to find things in them. 
(2012: 87) 
 
Indeed, it was the very objection posed by the elusive materiality of the archive, 
its recalcitrance to being catalogued, and the difficulties, both institutional and 
material, associated with its conservation, which served as an initial creative 
constraint for the encounter, so that she began an attempt at cataloguing it, and 
it ‘transformed [her] from reader into sometime-archivist’ (2012: 87). To be sure, 
as she realised soon enough, archives are not just made of words either, but are 
complex physical objects of paper, clips, binders, variously shaped boxes, ink 
                                                
49 ‘[A]nd let it be said’, Motamedi-Fraser (2012: 87) notes, ‘that references to Irradiant in the 
English-speaking world are rare’. 
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and rust that are themselves in a continuous process of transformation (on the 
materiality of archives see for instance Ko 2005, Steedman 2001 and Rao 2008).  
 But the adventure to which this sociologist was given over cannot be 
reduced, in any way, to one that might have taken her from an encounter with 
words, that is, with the story of Irradiant, to a material ethnography of the 
archive. Although the awareness of the archive’s materiality, indeed, of the 
story’s materiality, contributed to her cultivation of a different kind of 
‘attentiveness to the materials, the kind of attentiveness that often does not 
produce immediate (or even any) results, and that takes time’ (Motamedi-
Fraser 2012: 89), it was also the specificity of words and their heterogeneity, that 
obligated her to transform the mode in which she might encounter them, to 
open up the ethico-politics of prepositions that articulated her practice, and to 
be transformed by words in the process. As she put it:  
 
I was ‘handling’ a lot of words, written in many kinds of 
texts; I was thinking about how words are, and could be, 
generated and generative, manipulated and manipulative; 
I was reading and writing about a writer, and how he 
came to write a novel in a third language; I was 
experimenting with writing myself, and with two 
different languages; I was not doing much else. (2012: 96-
97)  
 
Indeed, many words, in many texts, in various languages, and with many 
different natures: factual, fictive, truthful, artful. Motamedi-Fraser was 
encountering words, she was not just producing knowledge about them, 
interpreting them, as if they were ‘necessarily bound to language and literacy’ 
(97). As she notes, even when she at first tried to produce knowledge about 
them, to tell a story of them, to ask them the question that most habits of telling 
seem to require, namely,  what kind of story can I tell about you?, she failed to 
receive a response, for the proliferation of materials and words of many 
different kinds and natures –‘the excess of them even’ (89)– amid which she 
found herself, ‘[suggested] to me that these materials do not want to tell; or at 
least, that they are not for telling about; and certainly, that they will not be told.’ 
(89) 
  This excess of words that objected to make itself told, to become the 
object of yet another ‘interpretation’, open up, I think, the possibility of a 
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different way of articulating an encounter, one that is not about the interpretive 
creation of stories about stories, but rather one which requires a different 
manner of relating to words, of attending to their obligations and of wondering 
about how those words matter. In Mariam Motamedi-Fraser’s encounter with 
the words of the Irradiant archive, the putting at risk of the question “what kind 
of story can I tell about you?”, forced her to become attentive and responsive to 
the risk of words that object to being told about, and to invent ways to ‘lure 
those materials and methods into posing their own problems’ (2012: 85). If the 
words could not be told about, if telling was not relevant to the encounter with 
them, she had to invent a manner of learning how they came (in)to matter– a 
manner that required ‘living there for a while’, in the midst of words, ‘without 
knowing what it will yield, if it yields anything at all’ (2012: 89).  
 Her adventure did yield, however, a form of writing, and a product, a 
book, that is not for that reason a mere ‘interpretation’ of what she read. 
Because the many and multiple words of the archive refused to be told, 
Motamedi-Fraser could not just simply trace the story of Irradiant by writing 
about it, as the habitual manners of any sociologist would dictate. Indeed, it was 
this obligation to inhabit the archive, to live, feel, read and know in the midst of 
the many words that compose it, that forced her to embark on a different kind 
of adventure. An adventure which, she wonders, might perhaps constitute a 
form of sociological failure (2012: 90), so long as the success of sociological 
propositions is reduced to telling about society, and to do so either by means of 
facts or by means of fictions (cf. Becker 2007). Indeed, the words of the Irradiant 
archive objected to the two patterns of contrast generated by the implicit 
question of ‘what kind of story can I tell about you?’.  First, they resisted the 
pattern that immediately assumes that it matters that ‘some’ story be told. 
Second, they objected to the pattern created by the notion of a ‘kind’ of story, 
that generates an array of relevant options concerning the many pre-established 
genres that normally dictate the types of stories that may be told in general. A 
contrast that suggests that it matters to the story that it be one pre-established 
kind of story rather than another.  In this sense, the words that Motamedi-Fraser 
(2012: 93) encountered objected to the very distinction of kinds that would 
separate factual from fictive stories– they ‘mostly refuse to identify themselves 
as clearly one or the other (regardless of the author’s intentions or of the 
disciplinary, professional, institutional, legal, and commercial processes by 
which a text comes to be constituted as, say, a work of history).’  
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 This objection took at least two entangled forms. First, Irradiant is itself a 
story, ‘believed by some to be an epic account of an ancient Mithraic or possibly 
pre-Zoroastrian religion in Iran‘ (2012: 86), and by others to be a ‘literary hoax’ 
(2012: 88). Second, the archive did not only contain the story of Irradiant. Or 
rather, it contained much more of the story than any number of words 
populating the manuscript. There were also letters, ‘factual’ documents, and 
other papers and objects that related the temporary disappearance of the 
manuscript and which made apparent50 the multiple relationships between the 
(hi)story of Irradiant, the 1953 coup in Iran and the involvement by Britain and 
America in its unfolding. Indeed, the historical nature of the stories belonged to 
 
a period of Iranian history when the relations between 
facts, truths and fictions were used and abused by some 
Iranians and especially by the British and the Americans. 
Or, more accurately, a period when many of the scales and 
perspectives by which realities are constituted were 
purposefully or inadvertently rendered inoperative. (2012: 
93-94) 
 
Thus, because the words in the midst of which she risked knowing objected to 
the pattern of contrasts that the question ‘what kind of story can I tell about you?’ 
generates, that is, the assumption that it matters that some story be told, and 
that it matters whether the story is a work of fact or fiction, a third objection 
made itself felt. Namely, an objection to the assumption that it matters that 
there be a distinction between the one being told and the one doing the telling. 
Obligated by these three objections, the adventure materialised –always 
provisionally– in a book that does not, indeed, cannot tell about society, but 
develops the activity of ‘storying’ as a problem for the story, for her, and for 
reader, to be developed. In her words, 
 
[i]n short, if these materials do not exactly tell, they are 
intended to provoke. In the book, this provocation unfolds 
in a number of different ways, by foregrounding the 
process of storying (or historying) for example or by 
                                                
50 At least to the point of forcing Motamedi-Fraser to also come to know in the midst of the 
words of a second archive to deepen her inquiry, namely, the British National Archives (2012: 
88) 
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exploiting historical facts, fictions, and the fact of historical 
fictions (such as Irradiant) to create a paranoid reader who 
cannot be sure – as one could not be sure, in Iran – of the 
tale told, the telling, or the teller. (2012: 94)  
 
Thus, what is produced by this encounter with words, one which cannot rest 
comfortably in the practice of interpreting them freely, but which involves the 
risk of inventing in the midst of them, of putting at risk the pattern of contrasts 
that the question ‘what kind of story can I tell about you?’ generates, is not the 
elimination of all contrasts between teller and told, fact and fiction. Indeed, the 
elimination of a contrast has no other effect than mere anaesthesia, an 
indifference to what may come (in)to matter (Whitehead 1967a). Instead of 
eliminating the contrasts that were objected to by the objects, the encounter has, 
I contend, intensified the complexities of patterns. It has transformed the 
distinction between truth and fiction, teller and told, by dramatising their 
problematic relationship as one which is not mutually exclusive but rather, as 
historian Carlo Ginzburg (2012) has proposed, constituted by risky and 
reciprocal borrowings. Wondering about how those words of different kinds, 
languages and materialities, situated by archives that not only contained them 
but were part of them, came (in)to matter in specific ways, allowed for the 
problematic togetherness of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’, teller and told, story and history, 
to be felt. 
 
Conclusion: Cultivating Perplexity 
 
 In this chapter, I have explored three different encounters which have 
been given over, in one way or another, to the sorts of practical adventures of 
inquiry that may emerge whenever the question of relevance is taken seriously. 
As each of these encounters has shown, however, what brings them together is 
neither a discipline, nor a methodology, but an ethical sensibility to the 
constraints posed by the question ‘how is it, here, that things matter?’. The 
cultivation of such a sensibility, therefore, only acquires concrete definition in 
relation to the specific challenges and obligations that an encounter poses. The 
point of this chapter, thus, has been neither to ‘demonstrate’ a purported 
application of the arguments of preceding chapters to more concrete situations, 
nor to inductively draw from such situations general prescriptions for the 
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conduct of inquiry. Rather, it has been to make perceptible, and by the same 
token, to cultivate from a different angle than heretofore explored, the real 
possibilities from which this speculative inquiry into the question of relevance 
in contemporary social science emerges. 
 In this sense, while the encounters explored in this chapter have forced 
this text itself to invent, to propose possible prepositional modalities that might 
help us disclose the intricacies of their developments, it would be a mistake to 
read them as examples, that is, as exemplars of the kinds of procedures that all 
experimenters, all ethnographers and all readers should implement and follow.  
 Knowing with, before, and in the midst of objects are propositions whose 
sense comes into existence by and depends on the encounter with each of these 
concrete practices, and thus do not ‘exemplify’– they do not create a new norm 
for articulating modes of inquiry, and they do not allow us to legislate, in 
advance, what pattern of contrasts will make the obligations posed by the object 
of an encounter felt. Encounters like these remain improbable, perhaps even 
implausible, certainly infrequent in comparison to the hundreds of other 
existent and published research articles to which they nevertheless relate by  
way of contrast. But it is precisely their actuality, the fact that they have been 
undertaken, regardless of how improbable or implausible they may seem, that 
makes them felt as real possibilities. Some may object to the attempt to think 
with and construct propositions from such rare encounters. I believe, on the 
other hand, that as James (1956: 299-300. emphasis in original) once put it, 
 
[r]ound about the accredited and orderly facts of every 
science there ever floats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional 
observations, of occurrences minute and irregular and 
seldom met with, which it proves more easy to ignore 
than to attend to. The ideal of every science is that of a 
closed and completed system of truth. The charm of most 
sciences to their more passive disciples consists in their 
appearing, in fact, to wear just this ideal form. Each one of 
our various ologies seems to offer a definite head of 
classification for every possible phenomenon of the sort 
which it professes to cover;  and so far from free is most 
men’s fancy, that, when a consistent and organized 
scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and 
assimilated, a different scheme is unimaginable. No 
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alternative, whether to whole or parts, can any longer be 
conceived as possible.  […] [However], Any one will 
renovate his science who will steadily look after the 
irregular phenomena. And when the science is renewed, 
its new formulas often have the more of the voice of the 
exceptions in them than of what were supposed to be the 
rules. 
 
For sure, such exceptional encounters do not teach us what to do, they do not yet 
afford the proclamation of new rules, nor do they guarantee what might 
happen to that which they bring into existence, and to the many other 
existences with which these novelties might, in turn, come to relate. This latter 
question, which I have associated with the concept of ‘connections’, will be the 
concern of the next chapter. 
  By itself, then, an encounter does not offer solutions without, at the 
same time, becoming problematic: it ‘moves the soul, “perplexes” it – in other 
words, forces it to pose a problem’ (Deleuze 1994: 140). Indeed, the problematic 
lesson our encounter with these three encounters poses is that the perplexity 
that may ensue from them does not dictate the terms in which the perplexed 
might respond.  In other words, the perplexity induced by an encounter, one 
that might induce not paralysis or retreat into old habits, but the adventure of 
inventing a manner of making that encounter fertile, also requires careful 
attentiveness, wondering, and imagination. It is what, paraphrasing Dewey 
(1998), I would call a ‘cultivated perplexity’, for these encounters make present 
the difficult, patient and uncertain process that is required to transform the 
habits with which inquiries are conducted so that an encounter may become 
endowed with the capacity to transform them, to put the patterns of contrast 
that initial questions generate, and to change the manner in which the 
relationships between researcher and researched are experienced such that a 
proposition that matters may be invented.    
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Chapter Four: 
Modes of Connection 
 
Introduction: Knowledge and Its Effects 
 
 To speculate about the modes of inquiry of contemporary social science 
in light of the question of relevance requires, as I have suggested, that we 
conceive of relevance not simply as something that knowledge-practices or 
publics add to an object or a situation by a process of recognition, but as itself 
belonging to the world, and as an unknown concerning the varying manners 
and degrees in which things come (in)to matter in situated and specific ways. 
But as I argued in Chapter Three, whenever an encounter succeeds in becoming 
fertile, it does not only induce a transformation of the elements that are brought 
into delicate contact by the encounter. A successful encounter also fosters the 
invention of propositions that may in turn come (in)to matter in relation to, and 
beyond, the situation with which a problem is concerned.  
 In this sense, the knowledge-practices of the contemporary social 
sciences must also be thought as potential factors in the process of mattering of 
inventions that will become added to, and thus change the composition of, the 
worlds with which they relate. In other words, that which is brought into 
existence by the encounter will come to enjoy a history of its own and will thus 
come itself into contact with and affect the many other existences and ‘outsides’ 
to which it may become connected. Thus, cultivating an ethics of adventure also 
requires attention to the mode of becoming that connects the world that a set of 
practices inherit to the world that those practices may come to affect.  Thus, my 
own speculative adventure of following the question of relevance through 
processes of invention in social inquiry poses the challenge of addressing the 
question of connections. The question, that is, of the many differences that the 
novelty brought into being by the encounter might make to the ‘outsides’ which 
it may affect. It is this attempt to think with and through the question of the 
effects of what a practice of social inquiry might succeed –or fail– in cultivating 
that will constitute the aim of the present chapter. 
 To be sure, to pose the question of how to think through the effects that 
social scientific inventions might or might not be able to set in motion confronts 
us again with the assumptions of some of the contemporary demands for 
relevance explored in Chapter One. For the ways in which the notion of 
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relevance is often mobilised would seem to imply a certain scepticism, a sense 
of suspicion, concerning the possible effects, or more precisely, the societal 
implications of knowledge-making in the contemporary social sciences. 
 Indeed, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to understand the nature and 
stakes of recent debates around the crisis of the contemporary social sciences 
without drawing attention to what the crisis itself seems to put into question– 
namely, the affirmation that the knowledge produced by the social sciences 
establishes a connection to the world; that doing social science makes a 
difference beyond the academy. For in the many forms of research audit in 
universities and other higher education institutions, relevance, a term that has 
become a veritable ‘tyranny’ for many researchers in the contemporary social 
sciences, tends to become coupled –confusingly, as I have argued in Chapter 
One– with notions of ‘impact‘ and ‘engagement’, suggesting that the manner in 
which it concerns knowledge-production is of the order of an effect upon a 
wider public that might –should!– be measured by ‘outputs’ capable of 
exhibiting ‘obvious, direct and auditable real-world effects‘ (Flinders 2013: 153). 
Alarmingly, then, the procedural language of audit systems and novel forms of 
scientific governance designates ‘relevance’ as that operator which questions, 
skeptically and from the point of view of a logic of accountability, the effects of 
scientific knowledge-production upon scientific and more-than-scientific 
worlds (Nowotny et al. 2001).  
  To be sure, what does and what does not constitute ‘proof’ of a ‘real-
world effect’ is itself a matter of heated debate and scholarship, one which 
unfortunately exceeds the scope of our present discussion (for interesting 
studies see Burrows 2012, Flinders 2013, Strathern 2000, among others).  Aside 
from the problematic definition of what is conceived by such demands as a 
‘real-world effect’, however, the sheer concern with the wider implications of 
social scientific knowledge-production has infected the moral economy  of such 
sciences (Daston 1995) beyond mere calculative aims, forcing social scientists to 
interrogate their practices in challenging ways. They have prompted many 
researchers not only to contest the rationalities that pervade the definitions of 
what effects count and how, but also to raise the much more interesting –albeit 
quite possibly less obvious, direct and auditable– question of how to think 
about the differences that knowledge makes. 
 Conversely, such a concern has a clear resonance with the anxiety that 
seems to run through and between the lines of some of the calls for new forms 
of public social science discussed in Chapter One. Despite the fact that they aim 
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to construct more of a moral and political project than simply an instrumental 
response to the demands of audit systems, the debates around public social 
science discussed above seem, from this point of view, to actively incorporate 
the pattern of contrasts that such demands generate. Indeed, in identifying the 
‘crisis’ of social scientific knowledge with the practical and communicational 
difficulties of engaging in a conversation with multiple publics, they seem to 
take at least two elements for granted. First, they accept the way the problem of 
relevance is defined –‘relevance is something that is added by way of impact’. 
Second, in reducing the achievement of relevance to a matter of communicating 
the findings produced by the more ‘professional’ strands of the disciplines, in 
attempting to define the problem as the difficulty of making publics ‘listen’ and 
‘understand’ science, they seem to take for granted that the ‘solution’ can also 
be reduced to more and better public engagement.  
 As I have argued above, such a conception of relevance imagines it as a 
mere subjective judgement of worth, rather than situating as a part of the 
world. Furthermore, it seems to exclude the ‘real world’, that is, the world of 
socio-material, naturalcultural modes of mattering that compose actuality, from 
the very definition of what constitutes a ‘real-world effect’. Indeed, unless one 
were, a priori, to arbitrarily exclude scientific knowledge-practices from the set 
of human practices that since the industrial revolution are seen to have 
progressively acquired a tectonic force, the proposition of the Anthropocene 
forces us to cast the question of the effects of knowledge-practices under a 
different light. That is, no longer from a position of suspicion and skepticism –
‘does knowledge really matter? does it actually have an effect upon the world?’– 
but with a careful attention to the multiple and immanent productions of value-
actuality that different modes of connection make possible.  
 In other words, the suggestion that the proposition of the Anthropocene 
puts forth, whereby the existences of both humanity and its milieus depend 
upon the modality of their reciprocal relations, is not one that would cast 
doubts upon the efficacy of human practices for making connections, but one 
which forces us to care for the kind of connections that they make. In this sense, 
a different tradition of thinking in the social sciences and the humanities might 
seem, at least at first sight, better equipped for allowing us to explore such 
questions. This is the tradition that, in various ways and as a response to the 
widespread positivist claim that the social sciences merely ‘mirror’ or ‘reflect’ 
the real, has argued for the ‘performativity’ of knowledge-making– it has 
affirmed that knowledge does not simply reflect a pre-existing real but 
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performs, enacts or constructs the real through its own theories, practices, 
methods and propositions. In contrast to those who doubt whether the 
contemporary social sciences produce effects, and to those who think that 
public communication might secure the taking-hold of effects, for this tradition 
the efficacy of social scientific inventions is actively affirmed. Indeed, what 
could be more effective than having ‘reality’ itself as an effect? 
 In what follows, I will revisit recent debates around the performativity of 
knowledge-making in order to explore both its valuable lessons and some of its 
limitations. As I will argue below, insofar as most –if not all– of its versions 
suggest that knowledge-practices are not just effective but constitutive of reality, 
‘performativity’, as a general logic of the effects that knowledge induces, 
presents a promising but ultimately inadequate approach to the question of 
connections. For it ends up presupposing that which it seeks to explain, namely, 
the question of how, in certain circumstances, scientific propositions might take 
hold.  
 After discussing such approaches and their limitations, I will suggest 
that the question of the efficacy of knowledge production requires a more 
nuanced and textured understanding of the interactions between scientific 
inventions and the different milieus to which they might come to connect. In so 
doing, I will attempt to propose a different understanding of efficacy that might 
provide us with a more nuanced interrogation of what might be at stake in the 
question of connections. As will become clear, however, my intention is not to 
so much to replace performativity with some alternative theory, but to make 
present the extent to which the achievement of a successful connection between 
an invention and its milieus is, as it were, beyond theory. Indeed, I will contend 
that the efficacy of the production of values made possible by a connection 
belongs not to a relationship between means and ends, which would be 
susceptible of being explained by a general theory of effects, but to the order of 
a negotiation that is immanent to the problem at stake.   
 
Do The Social Sciences ‘Perform’ Reality? From Performativity to 
Connections 
 
 Although ‘performativity’ has become a widely employed term in some 
strands of the social sciences and humanities, it might be worth, for reasons that 
will become apparent in what follows, revisiting the tradition of performativity 
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from its earlier stages and following its development. While a certain logic of 
performativity could be traced back to the early American pragmatists, or 
indeed to the sophists (Cassin 2014), the notion itself was coined by English 
philosopher of language John L. Austin in his 1955 William James Lectures at 
Harvard University and later published in his famous How to Do Things with 
Words (1975). In these lectures, Austin sought to problematise the assumption, 
commonly held by analytic philosophers, that all a linguistic utterance could do 
was to reflect some state of affairs, to state a pre-existing fact of the world. The 
immediate implication of this ‘constative’ understanding of language, as Austin 
called it, was that insofar as utterances state facts, all statements could be 
judged as to their truth or falsity with regards to the reality of the stated fact. 
There are utterances, Austin (1975: 5) contested, that ‘do not “describe” or 
“report” or state anything at all, are not “true or false”; […] the uttering of the 
sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action’. Such utterances, which 
perform an action rather than state a fact, he called them ‘performatives’.  
 ‘I declare you husband and wife’, ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’, ‘I 
promise that...’– such utterances have become famous examples of 
performatives, whereby what the utterance accomplishes is not a statement that 
could be said to correspond truly or falsely to a pre-existent state of affairs, but 
an act that, at least in these examples, creates its own reality: the consummation 
of a marriage, the naming of a boat, the enunciation of a promise. According to 
Austin, however, to call the force of such acts ‘performative’ is hardly specific 
enough. Indeed, all of the aforementioned examples are characteristic of a 
particular kind of performative act which Austin (1975: 116) termed 
‘illocutionary’: 
 
[t]he illocutionary act ‘takes effect’ in certain ways, as 
distinguished from producing consequences in the sense 
of bringing about states of affairs in the ‘normal’ way, i.e. 
changes in the natural course of events. Thus ‘I name this 
ship the Queen Elizabeth’ has the effect of naming or 
christening the ship; then certain subsequent acts such as 
referring to it as the Generalissimo Stalin will be out of 
order. 
 
According to Austin, then, an illocutionary act is its own effect. It brings that 
which the utterance claims into being. This specification is important. For, as we 
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will see shortly, it is this sense of the performative, the sense of a conventional 
claim which brings that which it names into existence, of an act that is 
constitutive of that which it speaks, that –on the face of it– has been taken up more 
emphatically by some contemporary social scientists to account for the effects of 
knowledge-practices. But before addressing this issue, we should attempt, with 
Austin, to distinguish this illocutionary effect from another type of 
performative which he termed ‘perlocutionary’: 
 
[s]aying something will often, or even normally, produce 
certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, 
or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other 
persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or 
purpose of producing them; and we may then say, 
thinking of this, that the speaker has performed an act in 
the nomenclature of which reference is made either […], 
only obliquely, or even […], not at all, to the performance 
of the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall call the 
performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 
‘perlocutionary act’, and the act performed, […] a 
‘perlocution’. (1975: 107) 
 
As this passage makes explicit, then, performatives may not just have the effect 
of bringing into being that which is performed but also of producing a 
consequence, of affecting an ongoing course of events.  
 The logic of performativity invites thus an attention to the effects that 
certain claims bear upon reality. It is this kind of attention, expanded beyond 
the strict linguistic phenomena that were Austin’s original concern, that has 
been capable of attracting the interests of many scholars in the humanities and 
the social sciences in order to account for the processes, both semiotic and 
material, through which humans and nonhumans produce and transform 
reality.  
 Arguably, one of the first thinkers to successfully expand and reshape 
what we may call the ‘logic of the performative’ in the humanities and the 
social sciences has been feminist philosopher Judith Butler. Ever since her 
famous Gender Trouble (1990), Butler has put forth an understanding of gender 
and sex formations not as expressions of an inward nature, but as thoroughly 
performative acts. Unlike Austin, however, for whom the efficacy of a 
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performative depended largely upon the intentions of the speaker, Butler was 
interested, as we already saw in the previous chapter, in understanding the 
formation of the gendered and sexualised speaking subject itself as the effect of 
a performative operation. By supplementing Austin’s work with Derrida’s 
(1992) reading of the former, Butler situates the efficacy of the performative not 
in a theory of subjective intentionality, which would require a preformed, 
‘natural’, subject constituted before language and culture, but in a theory of 
iterability. That is, a subjectivity which is not the originary cause of its own 
sexualised and gendered being, but the effect of a process of citation of cultural 
norms that regulate gender and sex.  
 In a different context and somewhat more recently, some social scientists 
have expressly incorporated a logic of performativity to account for the effects 
that knowledge-practices, both within and outside the social sciences, induce 
upon, or rather, within, reality. In this sense, for instance, Thomas Osborne and 
Nikolas Rose (1999: 370) have sketched a brief history of the emergence of 
‘public opinion’ as an effect, after the Second World War, of the theoretical, 
methodological and technical procedures of statistical polling thereby 
advancing the contention that ‘[t]he social sciences have brought, and can bring, 
many new phenomena into existence. The social sciences can and do create 
phenomena.’  
 Similarly, in their co-authored article titled ‘Enacting the Social’, John 
Law and John Urry (2004, see also Law 2004) have made an explicit case that 
the social sciences ‘are performative. By this we mean that they have effects; 
they make differences; they enact realities; and they can help to bring into being 
what they also discover’ (2004: 392. emphasis added). In their view, thus, reality 
is ‘produced with considerable effort, and it is much easier to produce some 
realities than others. In sum, we are saying that the world we know in social 
science is both real and it is produced’ (2004: 396). 
 Moreover, in what has been perhaps the most prolific recent debate 
around performativity in and by the social sciences (for interesting 
contributions to this specific debate in economic sociology see the edited 
volumes by Callon 1998 and MacKenzie et al. 2007 and the special issue edited 
by Barry & Slater 2002; see also MacKenzie 2004),  Michel Callon (1998) sets out 
to contest the assumption held by economists regarding the failures of 
economic theory. Namely, the assumption that the failures of economic theory 
in addressing the realities of markets, that is, economic realities, can be 
explained by arguing that in striving to abstract and generalise its knowledge 
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claims, economics has become too detached from its object of study. ‘The 
matter, however,’ Callon (1998: 1-2) argues, ‘is not so simple’: 
 
[s]aying that economics  has failed by neglecting to 
develop a theory of real markets and their multiple modes 
of functioning, amounts to admitting that there does exist 
a thing –the economy– which a science –economics– has 
taken as its object of analysis. The point of view that I have 
adopted […] is radically different. It consists in 
maintaining that economics, in the broad sense of the 
term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather 
than observing how it functions.  
 
This is perhaps the clearest example of the sort of illocutionary logic of 
performativity that has pervaded the approach to the effects of knowledge-
making in the social sciences. Indeed, Callon’s argument suggests that the 
economy is not that in relation to which the science of economics poses 
questions and makes ‘claims’ that are to be assessed as to their truth or falsity. 
The economy is, by contrast, the product of those ‘claims’. ‘Claims’ here are to be 
conceived broadly. More specifically, Callon’s argument suggests that both 
economic theories and what he calls ‘calculative agencies’– economic 
inventions, technological devices, practices such as marketing and accountancy, 
as well as the many technologies of ‘metrology’ (MacKenzie 2004: 305)– rather 
than the linguistic statements of a few economists, actively bring the economy 
into being.  
 Although there are some undeniable similarities, it is important at this 
point not to confuse the aforementioned arguments with the same old dictum 
of social constructivism that many have learned to treat with suspicion. On the 
one hand, both such positions can be read to have a common intellectual 
enemy, or at least partially so. The common enemy is the positivist, self-
proclaimed ‘empiricist’ –yet actually rationalist– account that suggests that 
science can tell us how the world ‘really is’, that it provides privileged access to 
a Really Real which is perennial and inevitable. In other words, that they 
provide access to a world that is indifferent to history.   
 However, there are at least two important differences between social 
constructivists and those proposing a logic of performativity. First, social 
constructivism was famously humanistic and idealistic in its arguments. ‘Man’ –
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and, perhaps to a lesser degree, ‘woman’– was truly the measure –and source– 
of all things. The logic of denunciation underpinning social constructivist 
arguments was, almost without exception, that behind any process that could 
be depicted as being ‘out there’ in reality– or worse, in ‘nature’– one could 
always find a human, social and discursive arrangement of forces that would 
uncover the ‘reality-effect‘ of the process (see famously Hacking 1999). 
  Although this discursive and anthropocentric emphasis is to some 
extent still present in the earlier work of Judith Butler mentioned above (for an 
interesting discussion of this see Bell 2007, 2008, 2012), the same cannot be said 
of the arguments put forth by Osborne and Rose (1999), Law and Urry (2004), 
Callon (1998) or most of the other proponents in this tradition (e.g. Law 2004, 
Mol 2004, MacKenzie 2004, among others). Performativity, for this latter group, 
is neither exclusively a human nor a linguistic process. In contrast, the emphasis 
is rather on the orchestration of the many human and nonhuman, semiotic and 
material, agencies –i.e. technologies, instruments, methods, modes of 
calculation, etc.– that together enact realities into being.  
 Such a materialist character points to a second, and perhaps more 
consequential, difference. Social constructivism was invested in an 
epistemological project of debunking the sciences’ –and social sciences’– own 
epistemological accounts. As we saw in Chapter Two, their concerns related to 
how the supposedly objective, realist and impartial account of reality produced 
by science could be explained instead by means of macro and micro-social 
processes of interaction, negotiation and consensus-building, rather than by 
anything related to an ‘outside’ world. Thus, for them, ‘construction’ was 
indeed a mot d’ordre against ‘realism’, and any notion of ‘effect’ might be better 
read in the optical sense, namely, as an illusion. In contrast, the concerns of 
these arguments on performativity are more ontological than epistemological. 
They concerned not only the epistemologies underpinning processes of 
knowledge-production but also the very ‘real’ effects of those processes. Thus, 
in an important sense, ‘construction‘, ‘performance’, ‘enactment’, ‘production’, 
etc., are not terms that would seek merely to debunk the realistic claims of 
scientific theories, methods and claims but to draw attention to how those 
scientific constructions, quite literally, bring realities into existence.  
  ‘Quite literally’ is, however, a very misleading expression. Indeed, it is 
often relatively unclear what is meant by the process whereby reality is said to 
be ‘produced’, ‘enacted’, ‘constructed’, ‘brought into being’, etc., by the social 
sciences. While in many cases these authors draw on a notion of performativity 
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that could be quite closely mapped onto Austin’s account of illocutionary 
effects –and ‘bringing reality into being’ is surely the most emblematic 
phraseology– oftentimes such contentions are, as it were, appeased, in one and 
the same argument, by statements that would suggest that rather than full-
blown illocutionary effects, the sort of efficacy associated with social scientific 
inventions could be likened to perlocutionary effects. That is, that inventions 
have consequences upon a world of phenomena, entities and relations which 
are however not entirely of their own making.  
 For example, although Osborne and Rose (1999) make the explicit claim 
that the social sciences create the phenomena which they purport to describe, 
they also argue that they ‘have played a significant role in making up our world, 
and the kinds of persons, phenomena and entities that inhabit it’ (1999: 368. 
emphasis added). Does this mean that they create only certain phenomena but 
not others? Or that the phenomena that they do create are not, or at least not 
immediately, constitutive of ‘our world’? Or that the social sciences are not the 
only factors in the production of phenomena? If so, how do the different factors 
interact in the composition of the world? Is the question of efficacy and ‘real-
world effects’ then displaced onto how a phenomenon created by the social 
sciences comes to make up our world?  
 Not dissimilarly, while Law and Urry (2004: 392) argue for a view that 
suggests that the social sciences ‘enact realities’, that they bring them into being, 
at some other point in the article they also affirm that ‘[the social sciences] (help 
to) make social realities and social worlds.’ (2004: 390. emphasis in original). The 
introduction of the term ‘social’ here is rather puzzling– is it, as someone like 
John Searle (1996) has argued, that only ‘social reality‘ is constructed? The rest 
of the article and indeed the rest of their work seems to suggest –rightly, I 
think– that any clear-cut distinction between ‘social‘ and ‘non-social‘ reality 
does not hold. How shall we interpret, moreover, the use of the parenthesis 
when Law and Urry claim that the social sciences (help to) make reality? 
 Again, while Callon (1998: 2) and his colleagues put forth the radically 
illocutionary argument that ‘economics, in the broad sense of the term, 
performs, shapes and formats the economy’, he also concedes that, by and 
large, ‘perlocution is actually more fundamental and in any case more general 
than illocution’ (Callon 2007: 164). Thus, the ‘performativity’ of economics is to 
be understood through a process of ‘framing’ and ‘overflowing’ whereby a 
certain economic theory, model, or assemblage of calculative agencies ‘frames’ 
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the market in particular ways while also necessarily leaving other relations and 
effects out of its calculations –what economists usually refer to as ‘externalities’. 
  According to Callon, after this initial framing economists attempt to 
insert corrections in order to include, which is to say, to internalise, the 
previously externalised elements. What explains the constative failure of 
economics, Callon argues (1998: 17, see also Callon 2007), is thus not that 
economic models are false or inaccurate in their framing, but that ‘total framing’ 
is by necessity impossible. ‘Any frame is necessarily subject to overflowing’. But 
why, one may wonder –and I certainly do–, would there be failures –misfires, in 
Austinian terminology– if the reality which is said to exceed any framing is 
nothing but the effect of the frame itself? How can a reality that is nothing but 
the effect of a model object to the latter and put it at risk?  
 I raise all these questions neither with the aim of analytically 
deconstructing these arguments nor of suggesting that the questions I identify 
in them can be solved simply by claiming, in the same analytical tone, that one 
should write clearly. Neither is it my intention to ‘save Austin from’ any of 
these authors (cf. Mäki forthcoming). I believe in none of those analytical 
procedures, nor share their commitments. Rather, I am convinced, with Butler 
(2007: 153), that ‘it matters whether we think we are building a reality or 
making certain things happen.’ Thus, I raise these questions precisely to make 
present, in the interstices of what sometimes reads as a celebration of scientific 
efficacy; as a final blow to anybody who might still wonder whether there is 
something ‘out there’ in relation to which social science attempts to pose 
questions and produce propositions; and as an intellectual achievement on the 
author’s part; I raise them to make present the difficulty inherent in thinking 
about the relations between scientific inventions and their effects. My aim is, as 
Haraway (2012b) would put it, to ‘stay with the trouble’. 
 Indeed, I fear that if one were to be committed to the illocutionary sense 
of performativity, to conceive of the effects of social scientific inventions as 
none other than singlehandedly producing the reality for which they make 
themselves true, as being the very sources of reality, then ‘reality’ itself would 
become rather impoverished.  Indeed, in such accounts of performativity the 
efficacy of inventions is always already presupposed because, to put it bluntly, 
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illocutionary effects are all-mighty51. They not only make certain things happen; 
they are also said to produce the very worlds in and for which certain things 
happen.  
 Nevertheless, if as Haraway (1991: 198) once put it, ‘the world is not raw 
material for humanization’, then neither can it be a mere receptacle for 
whatever social scientific practices make to inhabit it. If questions of efficacy 
matter, then, it is precisely because sometimes the making of a difference is 
achieved, and sometimes it is not. Or more precisely, because even though 
differences may always be produced, they are not always differences that 
matter. In other words, a failure, however partial, however relative, to achieve a 
certain effect, matters as much as a success does.  
 Now, while Butler’s account of performativity is certainly attentive to the 
possibility –or rather, the necessity– of failure, the logic of repetition that she, 
with Derrida, deems essential to understanding the efficacy of performativity 
only views such failures as constitutive: ‘performativity never fully achieves its 
effect, and so in this sense “fails” all the time; its failure is what necessitates its 
reiterative temporality, and we cannot think iterability without failure’ (Butler 
2007: 153. emphasis added). This account however seems to forget that 
‘performativity’ in the Derridarian, and indeed, in her sense, is defined not as a 
single act but already as a series of repetitions. What is it, then, that fails? And 
when? If failure is always part and parcel of performativity, why does it matter 
when it succeeds? In this sense, as Paul du Gay (2007: 174) interestingly 
suggests, while this view subordinates empirical failures to theoretically 
congenital ones, the explanatory power of Butler’s argument still depends upon 
a more nuanced –yet theoretically under-explored– set of empirical possibilities: 
that sometimes inventions produce certain effects, and sometimes they do not.  
 This difficulty in giving an account of the empirical possibilities of 
failure or success poses, moreover, an additional problem. Because it either 
presupposes efficacy or its failure as necessary, the logic of performativity that 
understands knowledge as a source of reality does not appear to be particularly 
well-equipped for addressing the contemporary demands upon the social 
sciences to account for the differences they make. From this point of view, such 
demands can only be thought either as a badly thought question or as the effect 
                                                
51 Indeed, when taken far enough, the logic of performativity manages to turn failures into 
successes, as exemplified by Donald MacKenzie’s (2004: 306) notion of ‘counterperformativity’, 
which involves the successful accomplishment of a self-undermining effect. 
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of naturalisation of something that in fact would not be possible without social 
scientific inventions. 
  In this sense, for instance, one might be tempted to argue that the 
procedures through which ‘relevance‘ and ‘impact‘ are measured are heirs of a 
tradition of sampling and statistical reasoning that is itself one of the many 
‘impacts’ of mathematical and social scientific inventions.52 Nevertheless, to 
dismiss the concern for the effects of social scientific inventions in this way does 
not make the potential threats to the futures of contemporary social sciences 
any less pervasive, and it precludes the possibility of extracting from its 
interstices potentially powerful propositions for engaging it. 
 Thus, although illocutionary effects are both possible and actual, and 
Austin’s examples are clear indications of their actuality, abstracting from them 
a maxim that could become a generalised theory of the effects that social 
scientific inventions induce seems to diminish, rather than enhance, their 
capacity to force our thinking in productive ways. For whenever that to which 
an invention connects is thought of as the effect of the invention itself, 
performativity becomes a preformism ‘that regards the real as simply the 
realisation of the possible’ (Bell 2008: 402). As Vikki Bell  (2007, 2008, 2012) has 
argued, in order to avoid this, performativity needs to be complemented with, 
and problematised by, a consideration of both the intrinsic, creative, 
differentiating capacities of the world to organise and individuate itself, and the 
reciprocal relationships between the entity in question and its milieus. As she 
puts it:  
 
[i]f processes in the world can self-organize and emerge so 
as to surprise us, such that matter cannot be said to imitate 
forms according to laws […] the operations of a social 
apparatus of normalization cannot be considered to 
constitute matter, nor to control the processes at stake 
(Bell 2007: 110-111). 
 
Thus, as both critics and proponents of performativity often implicitly and –less 
often– explicitly suggest, the effects of scientific inventions might be better 
understood by recourse to a process that is more akin to what Austin would call 
a ‘perlocution’. In contrast to illocutionary effects, the notion of a 
                                                
52 I will return to a different account of the efficacy of statistics below. 
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perlocutionary effect requires that we conceive of the relationship between an 
invention and a milieu as something other than a unilateral creation of the latter 
by the former.  
 As I mentioned above, perlocutions do not belong to an operation of 
reality-making tout court, but rather to the more modest logic of connection-
making: making a difference, introducing a novelty which might be capable of 
acting as a vector in the transformation and/or sustenance of the becoming of 
an ongoing process of events. In this sense, the inventions produced by 
knowledge-practices are neither coextensive with, nor the source of, reality as 
such or in general, but become factors in the sustenance and transformation, in 
the cultivation or decay, of the worlds with which they connect. 
 Such a move from ‘reality-making’ to ‘connection-making’ is however 
not yet a solution to the problem of effects but an alternative way of 
approaching it. Thus, we cannot finish our argument by saying that we should 
not be looking at how social scientific inventions ‘produce’ the world but rather 
at how they affect it. This is of course an important premise, but as with any 
other problem, this one too demands to be developed. In order to do that, we 
need to attend, I suggest, to two interrelated questions that, although they will 
not find final answers in the course of this chapter, might open up a different 
sensibility for approaching the question of the effects of knowledge-making 
upon the world, one that is perhaps more modest and curious.  First, the 
question of the efficacy of inventions requires a more nuanced and textured 
exploration of the interrelations between inventions, efficacies and milieus– 
how and in what circumstances does a social scientific invention produce what 
effects? Second, and subsequently, we have to interrogate the question of how 
to think about different modes of connection. In other words, we need to raise 
questions that inquire not only into the question of efficacy as matter of degree 
–that is, that treat efficacies as something to be quantified– but also into the 
manners of the coming (in)to matter of inventions, and its consequences.  
 
On the Efficacy of Inventions: Knowledge and Its Milieu 
 
 As Austin (1975: 8) himself claimed at the beginning of his lectures, the 
production of the performative may be one, or even the ‘leading incident in the 
performance of the act […], but it is far from being usually, even if it is ever, the 
sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been performed.’ To pose, 
rather than presuppose, the question of the efficacy of inventions is thus to 
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induce a mode of interrogation that the tradition of ‘performativity’ after 
Austin has either taken for granted or addressed only in terms of general 
‘conditions’. Thus, while Derrida and Butler posed iterability as a condition for 
the efficacy of a performative –and its paradoxical, constitutive failure–, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1992) argued that the conditions for the efficacy of an act were to be 
thought of in terms of social fields and symbolic power: who, in a certain social 
field, has a power to say what and with what effect. 
 But to think of efficacy in terms of conditions is to address both the 
invention and its coming (in)to matter as abstractions divested of any 
specificity, whereas the problem of efficacy cannot be dissociated from the 
always specific, fragile and situated modes of connection that may take hold. 
The question is thus not how ‘knowledge‘, in general, relates to ‘the world’, in 
general. Those are abstractions which might help us think –or not– but which in 
any case should not be confused with the concreteness of this invention and 
how it might come to relate to that part of the world to which it might connect. 
‘Conditions’, by contrast, designate what needs to be met, in general, so that an 
effect might be possible. As Stengers (2011d: 49) argues, to speak of ‘conditions’ 
is to emphatically dissociate the production of knowledge from its adventure: 
‘conditions are supposed to answer a fundamentally anonymous problem, 
which anyone could raise, the answer to which will therefore be valid in 
principle for anyone’.  
 To counter such an anonymous mode of thinking, Stengers proposes that 
we think in terms of ‘requisites’ or requirements, which ‘for their part, are 
immanent to the problem raised; they are ‘what this problem needs for a 
solution to be given to it’ (2011d: 49). What thinking of efficacy in terms of 
requirements makes present, thus, is the question of when, in what 
circumstances, and how, a scientific invention may acquire a capacity to come 
(in)to matter. It is to suggest that effects do not take hold either by themselves 
or in a vacuum but do so only in relation to a milieu (see Canguilhem 2008, 
Deleuze & Guattari 1987, Foucault 2007).  
 Taking into account the ‘milieu’, which is to say, the specific patterns of 
relevance that constitute a space of interdependencies in relation to which 
connections may take hold, involves entertaining the thought that ‘[t]he 
universe is not only open’, but that ‘there is an “outside” to every temporal 
force-field’ (Connolly 2011: 7), and that these interactions between force-fields 
may have a bearing upon the success of a connection. Wondering about the 
milieu is to affirm that it matters to what social scientific inventions become 
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connected; that inventions do have consequences, but they do not control the 
process through which such consequences take hold. In this way, the notion of 
‘milieu’ also raises the question of how to characterise the various modes of 
connection that may be established between an invention and the milieus with 
which it connects. Namely, not only whether or not an invention succeeds in 
coming (in)to matter but, again, the situated question of how it comes (in)to 
matter in and with a particular milieu. 
 Thus, approaching efficacy through milieus allows us to entertain the 
question of the effects of a social scientific invention ecologically, as the 
question of how different parts of the world come to relate to each other in 
specific and potentially novel ways. Thinking ecologically, however, does not 
necessarily entail a disguised reintroduction of a notion that Michel Serres 
(1995a) has taught us to distrust. Namely, the notion of ‘environment’.  For 
while an ‘environment‘ requires the postulation of a centre around which other 
existences may come to be situated and sustained, a milieu53 designates ‘a pure 
system of relations without supports’ (Canguilhem 2008: 103). It is a space of 
complex interdependencies without centre that is constituted by the diverse 
patterns of relevance, problems and solutions that the things that compose it 
propose to each other.  
 For this reason, whereas the ‘environment’ presupposes a static relation 
between that which is placed at the centre and those other existences that 
surround it, the relationship between an entity and its milieu is crucially 
dynamic. It is, in Georges Canguilhem’s (2008: 113) words, ‘a debate’– a fragile, 
precarious, and metastable negotiation between elements that are brought into 
contact. In this way, even though not all may experience them in the same way, 
none of the elements concerning a milieu are exempt from the consequences 
that will bear upon it, for the milieu itself is nothing but a ‘certain number of 
combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it’ (Foucault 2007: 21). 
 Constituting nothing but a system of relations without support, one 
should not look for an underlying substance capable of expressing the essence 
of a milieu. The milieu is, by contrast, thoroughly problematic– it comes in(to) 
matter only through situations that put the question of the togetherness of 
things as a problem to be developed. Thus, just as what happens between 
subjects and objects, and between encounters and connections, the difference 
                                                
53 Which in French simultaneously denotes the ‘medium’, the ‘surrounding’ and the ‘middle’ 
(Massumi in Deleuze & Guattari 1987: xvii). 
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between a thing and its milieu is never absolute but relative, both in the sense 
that a thing also acts as a milieu of its components, and in the sense that their 
existences are mutually sustained or transformed by the ways in which they 
matter to each other. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 313) put it:  
 
[e]very milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of 
space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the 
component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of 
materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and 
composed substances, an intermediary milieu of 
membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy 
sources and actions-perceptions.  
 
In this way, the relationship between a thing and its milieu can be conceived as 
a process of transitioning between the one and the many– the synthesis of a one 
from the many that constitute its interior milieu, or its milieu of emergence (or, 
the encounter), and the addition of the one as a novel component to the many 
that constitute its exterior milieu (or, its connections). As Whitehead (1978: 21) 
has famously argued: ‘[t]he novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 
“many” which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive “many” which 
it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it 
synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one.’ 
 Thus, unlike a ‘condition’, which by its very ambition of anonymous 
generality must remain causally stable, the mutual requirements that emerge 
between an invention and its milieu create a space for thinking in terms of 
complex, dynamic, circulating and emergent understandings of causality, 
where a partial effect from the point of view of one process becomes a partial 
cause from the point of view of another (Foucault 2007). In this sense, François 
Jullien’s (1995, 2004) work on the concept of ‘efficacy‘ –or shi– in Chinese 
culture54 might provide us with a cue for exploring the question of connections 
in a more textured, demanding, and modest, manner. 
                                                
54 Although Jullien is not too widely read in the anglophone world, it is important to specify the 
kind of reading of Chinese culture and thinking that he constructs, and, accordingly, the mode 
in which his work will be taken up here. Jullien’s approach to China is not exactly that of a 
conventional sinologist, but of one who works ‘at once as a philologist and a philosopher‘ 
moving between hermetic sinology and a non-simplistic comparativism ‘toward the elaboration 
of a theory‘(1995: 19). Although the contrasts drawn in his work oftentimes seem to convey a 
considerable amount of Occidentalism (particularly in Jullien 2004), one should bear in mind 
that their task is neither simply to compare, nor to celebrate Chinese thinking per se, but to 
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  As he argues, in contrast to Western traditions of model-making which 
involve setting up the conditions for a means-end relationship whereby what is 
at stake is the intrusion of an idea, ‘however arbitrary or forced’, into the realm 
of fact (Jullien 2004: 32), efficacy depends not on abstract, general conditions 
and goals, but on immanent and always shifting dispositional determinations of 
reality (Jullien 1995: 61). A disposition designates, crucially, the reciprocal and 
dynamic connections between the invention and its interior and exterior 
milieus. In fact, for Jullien, the very achievement of efficacy depends upon the 
degree of dynamism which the relations between milieus may attain:  
 
a disposition is effective by virtue of its renewability; it is a 
tool. To say that shi [efficacy], as a strategic tool, must be 
as mobile as water […] means more than merely saying 
that the ability to adapt is necessary or purely a matter of 
common sense. What is involved is the deeper intuition 
that a particular disposition loses its potentiality when it 
becomes inflexible (or static).  
 
Thus, in this account, efficacy strictly opposes general conditions and operates 
by means of dynamic dispositions or requirements. Its force emanates from the 
shifting movements that are instituted between an invention and its milieu (for 
a good illustration of this process albeit in terms of ‘fluidity’ see Laet & Mol 
2000).  
 What a disposition of reality at a given moment generates, then, is a 
propensity for certain effects to take hold. Unlike the production of a 
performative, which is more or less arbitrary and whose success depends either 
on the intention of the actor, on her symbolic capital, or on the historical 
iteration of the act, the art of establishing an efficacious connection is that of 
cultivating the propensity emanating from a disposition of reality, to the maximum 
effect possible (Jullien 1995: 15). Let us explore this art in the midst of the 
process of invention I have been sketching in previous chapters. 
 First, there is the crucial question of the encounter as an interior milieu 
for an invention, or a milieu of emergence. That is, the relationship between the 
actual world that a process of knowledge-making inherits, the many routes of 
                                                                                                                                          
articulate, by means of a ‘tentative entrée’ (1995:20), propositions for the transformation of our 
habits of thought. It is thus with this constructive, speculative gesture that I draw upon his 
work.     
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inheritance of the entities that meet, and the proposition that may come in(to) 
matter through the becoming together of the many patterns of relevance 
involved in the encounter. To this extent, and insofar as dispositions are 
dynamic and shifting, there is much that the practice of knowledge-making 
itself is responsible for in contributing to the particular modality by which the 
encounter is articulated (See Chapter Three). For this reason, the term 
‘propensity’ must not be taken to entail a reinstatement of the figure of the 
‘neutral’ scientist that the more conservative versions of positivism may have 
tried to enforce. For as Whitehead (1978: 85. emphasis in original) has 
contended, 
 
[t]he breath of feeling which creates a new individual fact 
has an origination not wholly traceable to the mere data. It 
conforms to the data, in that it feels the data. But the how 
of feeling, though it is germane to the data, is not fully 
determined by the data. The relevant feeling is not settled 
[…] by the data about which the feeling is concerned.55 
 
The objects of an encounter may object, but they do not simply impose a pre-
existing propensity, and they do not dictate the terms or manner in which the 
encounter might become fertile. As I argued in Chapter Three, the perplexity 
induced by an encounter such that it may launch the process of knowledge-
making into an adventure is not merely a gift that might sometimes obtain, but 
requires a task of cultivation. And scientific habits and practices are certainly 
responsible for what they cultivate. Cultivation does not, on the other hand, 
designate an all-powerful social scientist that can singlehandedly bring about 
an effect.  Indeed, the efficacy of a proposition is not dependent upon the 
mastery that the social scientist may claim over the process of invention itself or 
over an act of communication and ‘public engagement’ that might be said to 
                                                
55 By now, the reader might have noticed that I have, whenever possible, tried to confine textual 
quotations of Whitehead’s work to passages that do not require much explanation of technical 
vocabulary. This one, however, demands a note. For although it has clear aesthetic 
connotations, the term ‘feeling’ here does not denote a human psychological operation but a 
metaphysical one. As Haleweood (2011: 32) suggests with –serious– humour, for Whitehead ‘[a] 
stone feels the warmth of the sun. A tree feels the strength of the wind’. Elsewhere, Whitehead 
(e.g. 1967b) also refers to feelings as ‘positive prehensions’. In both cases, feeling and 
prehension denote the basic metaphysical operation whereby one entity entertains or 
experiences another as a component in its own process of becoming, or concrescence. It is by 
synthetically feeling all the other entities that compose the actual world that a novel entity 
comes into existence.  
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follow. This is an adventure without a hero, whereby the encounter itself, and 
not those who might imagine themselves as eliciting it, becomes endowed with 
the power of relaying its own propensity. 
 An essay by Emmanuel Didier (2007) provides us with an interesting 
example of this process of cultivating –or in his reading of Deleuze, 
‘expressing’– a propensity emanating from a particular disposition of reality. 
His encounter is with the practices of the first agricultural statistics produced 
by the government of the United States during the first half of the twentieth 
century. As Didier (2007: 302) summarises the process, statistics could not be 
said to ‘perform’ nature or the economy for they too require an encounter with 
farming-related objects that precedes them. This however does not mean that 
statistics merely ‘reflect’, innocently or without any degree of responsibility, the 
reality of those objects:  
 
[o]f course, if statistical manipulations presuppose the 
existence of several objects prior to their description, at the 
same time they transform those objects by establishing 
relations between them, thereby actualizing some of their 
previously nonexistent characteristics. This is why the 
word “preconditions” does not fit perfectly with our 
argument: the problem is not only one of a stable mold 
(the conditions) that would shape the iron in fusion (the 
theory, the model, or the statistics); but the problem is in 
fact which elements will be used by the statistician, how 
precisely he or she will use these resources, and what 
specific relations he or she will find between them. That 
things exist prior to their description is unquestionable, 
but those things look much more like a set of resources for 
action than like an unchanging and determining 
condition.  (Didier 2007: 302) 
 
For Didier, statistical reasoning and techniques certainly do something, and 
their actions are not determined by the objects whose possible relations they 
actualise, although those objects are certainly there, present, making their 
obligations felt. On the other hand, that they do something does not imply that 
the action they perform is that of creating those objects. To express or cultivate a 
potential is not to generate it ex-nihilo. It is a potential born of 
151 
 
an arrangement of at least two elements and […] it is this 
arrangement, constituting what is expressed, which is new 
and surprising. Expression is what oozes from at least two 
elements when we find a way to put them together, rather 
than a sudden occurrence following an explosion 
produced by the waving of some magic wand (Didier 
2007: 302-303. emphasis in original). 
 
Didier’s description of the process of ‘expression’ has strong resonances with 
our own process of invention (See Chapter Two and Three). What both of them 
make present is that, in being caught up in an encounter, the challenge is that of 
experimenting with modes of inquiry that may be capable of discerning and 
articulating –by paying due attention to the obligations that objects make 
present, by putting at risk the patterns of contrasts that the questions generate– 
the patterns of relevance emanating from the process in which social scientists, 
objects of inquiry, methods, instruments, technologies, and questions, partake. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, such a process cannot be determined in 
advance, by a pre-established procedure that could guarantee a certain degree 
of efficacy, but requires piecemeal, progressive adjustments that relate to the 
specific demands that the encounter has to fulfil. Thus, like relevance itself, the 
success of invention belongs to what, in Chapter Five, I will refer to as an 
‘event’. As Jullien (2004: 38. emphasis in original) argues, 
 
[w]e cannot help wondering whether in effect it ever happens 
that, engaged as we are in all the complexity of situations 
still in the process of evolving, we are ever in a position to 
“choose” means that are sufficiently clear and distinct, like 
(Descartes’) ideas, and whose future effects it is possible 
for us to foresee in order to compare them and 
“deliberate”upon them. 
 
Nevertheless, while relaying the efficacy of an invention by means of 
cultivating the potential born of disposition (Jullien 1995: 25) makes its coming into 
existence possible, this does not by itself dictate the degree and the manner in 
which its effect upon a milieu may take hold. For once a proposition has been 
brought into being, once the many become one, there remains the question of 
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how the latter might come to relate, whether it will endure in, and what kind of 
difference it will make, to the milieus to which it connects. And such a question 
cannot be answered unilaterally, by looking only at the invented proposition 
itself. Another way of saying this is that one cannot provide an adequate 
account of the efficacy of social scientific inventions –or anything else, as far as I 
can imagine– without including in the account an attention to the way in which 
the milieu itself experiences the invention; without coming to terms with the fact 
that both invention and milieu participate in their own becoming together. As 
Whitehead (1967b: 94) phrases it, 
 
[t]hat which endures is limited, obstructive, intolerant, 
infecting its environment with its own aspects. But it is not 
self-sufficient. The aspects of all things enter into its very 
nature. It is only itself as drawing together into its own 
limitation the larger whole in which it finds itself. 
Conversely, it is only itself by lending its aspects to this 
same environment in which it finds itself. 
  
Indeed, for an invention to endure, for it to survive as a factor and fact in 
reality, more is required than its mere coming into existence. Between itself and 
its milieu there is a connection whereby the invention, as a factor in the 
becoming of its milieu, stubbornly affirms its own mode of relevance. At the 
same time, the milieu entertains its own sense of how the invention may matter 
to it, inheriting the former in its own manner, so that whenever a connection 
succeeds, invention and milieu exchange some of their properties. Pace the 
illocutionary logic of performativity, an invention does not by itself bring its 
milieu into being but finds itself ‘both dominating the milieu and 
accommodating itself to it’ (Canguilhem 2008: 113). The one is added to the 
many and the many become one, not by the deliberate waving of a magic wand 
but through the process of an immanent ‘debate’ (Canguilhem 2008), a co-
adaptation of values that Isabelle Stengers (2011d: 157-158, see also Debaise 
2008), commenting on Whitehead, has referred to as a ‘dynamics of infection’. It 
is in this infectious dynamic, in this process whereby the milieu feels the 
invention and the invention the milieu, that a transformation of both might take 
hold in a way that cannot be fully anticipated. As Whitehead (1955: 86) suggests 
in his Symbolism,  
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[i]t is the transformation of this potentiality into real 
concrete fact which is an act of experience. But in 
transformation from potentiality to actual fact inhibitions, 
intensifications, directions of attention toward, directions 
of attention away from, emotional outcomes, purposes, 
and other elements of experience may arise. 
 
Paying attention to the possible transformations of experiences involved in 
connections invites, I believe, a less aggrandised and more textured 
appreciation of the question of the efficacy of knowledge. Relatedly, it also 
raises historically situated questions as to the many modalities in which 
inventions and milieus may have become connected, and the consequences they 
have entailed. It also raises speculative questions, to be entertained but never 
dispelled in advance (see Chapter Six), concerning the manners in which 
propositions yet to be articulated or yet to be connected may come to in(to) 
matter in possible milieus and vice versa– what are the temporalities of actual 
connections? how are certain inventions experienced by their milieus, and how 
are the milieus experienced by those inventions? how are the intensifying and 
inhibiting effects of a connection distributed? what are the unexpected 
outcomes? 
 I will not provide definitive answers to such questions. In fact, I could not 
provide them even if I tried, for what such questions make present is that 
connections cannot be explained through abstract principles and do not submit 
to the ‘conditions’ that a general theory of effects might force upon them. By 
contrast, it requires attention the specific modes of connection that might obtain, 
or fail to obtain, between certain inventions and their milieus.  An attention, 
that is, not to whether knowledge has certain effects or not, but to how its 
efficacy is actually achieved– to what degree, in which manner, with what 
consequences, at what price, and in the name of what (Savransky forthcoming 
b). Such an attention must ultimately be historically, empirically grounded in 
actual connections. In the next section, thus, I will attempt to experiment with 
the some of these questions by drawing, however briefly, on a historically 
situated connection to illustrate some of the possible complexities involved. To 
be sure, it is not my purpose in what follows to preempt such questions from 
finding other empirical responses. In the spirit of a speculative reconstruction, 
my only aim, by contrast, is to attempt to open up or intensify the possibility of 
an interrogation that our current habits might make difficult to explore. 
154 
 
Modes of Connection: Matters of Belief, Partial Efficacies, 
Circulating Effects   
 
 In order to open up an exploration on the diverse modes that 
connections between inventions and milieus may take, I will briefly draw on a 
historical connection that, because of its unstable, ambivalent, and problematic 
character, might help us illustrate the complexities associated with such 
processes and the difficulty of approaching questions concerning the efficacy of 
knowledge either with skepticism or with an inflationary optimism. The 
connection in question concerns a non-secular –or non-Christian– chapter in the 
‘biography’ (Daston 2000) of the Western, secularised invention of ‘matters of 
belief’. 
 Although the term ‘belief’ has, to be sure, a very long past, with its 
origins in Vedic and Latin languages, for a long time it was inextricably 
connected to practices that embodied ‘the promise or the trust in the objectivity 
of some gesture.’ (Certeau 1985: 195). By contrast, its current meaning as ‘a 
representation capable or not of enjoying an individual or collective assent (of 
the type: “I believe in it” or “we do not believe in it”)’ (Certeau 1985: 196) dates, 
according to Michel de Certeau (1992), only to the seventeenth century. 
Namely, when a series of transformations of the relations between the 
theological, the social and the epistemological dimensions that composed the 
Christian, Western milieu (Asad 1993) –transformations associated with the rise 
of modern science but also with the emergence of so-called ‘natural religion’– 
reinvented ‘belief’, alongside with the notion of ‘religion’, into a discrete realm 
of experience and thus, turned it into an intellectual object, dissociating it from 
the complex economy of practices it entangled (Certeau 1985).  
 While this reinvention surely predates the modern birth of the social 
sciences, it is one which has been cultivated within Western milieus until the 
present (Certeau 1992). Moreover, the so-called founding fathers of the social 
sciences, including thinkers like Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Frazer, and others, 
crucially contributed to cultivating it while reinventing it, again, as a ‘universal’ 
problem of empirical, social inquiry. So have many sociologists, anthropologists 
and historians of ‘religion’ –and not only of religion– to this day (Asad 1993, 
Seth 2013). Bifurcating the world into those who ‘know’ and those who 
‘believe’, matters of belief became not only what was to be expelled from the 
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practice of science, but also, and simultaneously, what a specialised science, a 
science of the social, would make a privileged object of scientific knowledge– a 
practice of ‘knowing’ what others ‘believe’. 
  In this way, ‘religion’ was carved out as a discrete realm of reality to be 
understood as a matter of belief, ‘a matter of symbolic meanings linked to ideas 
of general order’ (Asad 1993: 42), and beliefs were, in turn, taken as symbols of 
a ‘deeper’ meaning concerning society. As de Certeau (1992: 138) put it, many 
social scientists ‘spontaneously take their task to be the need to determine what 
a field delineated as “religious” can teach them about society […]. What they 
place under the rubric of “society” is not one of the poles of a confrontation 
with religion but, rather, the axis of reference, the obvious model of all possible 
intelligibility, the current postulate of all historical comprehension.’ 
 At this point, one might be tempted to denounce the very invention of 
‘belief’ as an all-too-modern artifice that remains inadequate to the study of any 
experience whatsoever, including Christian, Western experiences. For although 
God is now, for many Christians, a private matter of belief indeed, ‘He’ too once 
performed miracles and intervened publicly and materially in the world ‘He’ 
had created (Certau 1992). Of course, it would be a blatant gesture of 
‘presentism’ to attempt to connect the modern experience of ‘belief’ to the 
Christian West before the event of the invention of matters of belief and the 
correlative desacralisation of society had taken place. It would certainly be a 
mistake to attempt to connect ‘belief’, that is, to a time when Western inquiries 
were not concerned with what others believed in but with discovering the 
innumerable wonders and marvels that, literally, populated the Western world 
with divine presence (see Daston & Park 2003).  
 As Sanjay Seth (2004: 89) has suggested, however, ‘the procedures and 
categories and protocols of the present are themselves (sometimes) connected to 
the past that is being objectified.’  Thus, while in the middle ages the milieu that 
I have here sketchily termed the ‘Christian West’ did experience the relevance 
of witches –to the point of burning them– and of a God that could make direct 
interventions upon human affairs, it then was the same milieu that underwent a 
transformation of how those beings came (in)to matter, and  turned both 
witches and Gods –and indeed many other-than-human beings– into matters of 
believing, or not, in them. In this way, even though the Christian, Western 
milieu inhabited by witches and God can be seen as part of the West’s past and 
perhaps not of its present, it ‘is (seen as) part of the same past that then gave up 
belief in witches, and that withdrew from God his agency in history. That is, 
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this was part of the same past that subsequently disenchanted and desacralized 
the world […], and engaged in rational practices like writing history.’ (2004: 89, 
emphasis added).  
 In other words, to the extent that the invention of ‘matters of belief’ is 
connected to the transformation of a particular milieu that has in turn sustained 
the invention while becoming together with it, ‘belief’ is not to be completely 
rejected but rather affirmed as a historically and geographically specific mode 
of experience.  Indeed, the point is not to denounce ‘belief’ as an abstraction 
that may occlude or prevent the experience of a Christian, Western, world 
pregnant with divine presence. Rather, and so far as the Christian West is 
concerned, ‘belief’ has succeeded in establishing a connection with the milieu 
and has thus come (in)to matter as a fact to be encountered. In other words, for 
many in the West, beliefs do matter. 
 Such affirmation is not necessarily warranted, however, when the 
question concerns the mode of connection between matters of belief and other 
milieus that do not share the same history. Indeed, a different problem emerges 
when we interrogate the attempts made by government administrators, 
educators, policy makers, and social scientists to connect such a modern, 
Christian, and Western, invention to milieus with which it had not experienced 
any such ‘debate’. To claim that ‘matters of belief’ may have become a possible 
element of a modern, Christian and Western experience is not the same as 
taking it to be a self-evident, abstract and universal factor (Asad 1993) capable 
of connecting to, and explaining the experiences of, others for whom that 
connection has not been experienced– of accounting for the ways in which 
other-than-human beings matter everywhere, always.   
 In this way, in his Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India, 
Seth (2007)56 describes the problematic modes of connection of the Western 
invention of ‘matters of belief’ as it was exported to Hinduism in colonial India 
through practices of Western education. Ironically, secular education in 
government schools and colleges was introduced in India with the aim of 
shaping the character of the Indian subject without interfering with their 
religious beliefs (Seth 2007: 49). The problem was, however, that while 
government officials and educators presupposed that ‘secular education’ meant 
leaving religious beliefs out of education, they also assumed by the same token 
that Hindu gods came (in)to matter and were animated, like in the Christian 
                                                
56 I have discussed aspects of this book in a different way in Savransky (2012). 
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tradition, as a set of compartmentalised beliefs experienced by human subjects. 
Before colonialism –and to a large extent, as we shall see, also after colonialism–
, however, Hindus did not believe in gods. Rather, ‘[t]he numerous deities of 
Hinduism are co-present with humans, and highly visible; they exist as spirits, 
ghosts, and in the form of those numerous idols that so offended the sensibility 
of their rulers.’ (Seth 2007: 64) And they could not be just ‘set aside’ into a 
private affair, for ‘these obstreperous deities infect [their] life, pervade it, even 
invade and take it over, independently of [their] likes and dislikes.’ (Nandy 
2001: 127-128) 
   Thus, as Seth explains it, the mode of connection of matters of belief, 
conceived as a universal proposition for inquiring into and dealing with any 
‘religion’, including Hinduism, entailed a transformation of the manner in 
which the many Hindu gods came (in)to matter in the Indian milieu57. By 
attempting to transform the pattern of relevance of these gods into a matter of 
Hindus believing or not in them, one of the consequences of the connection was 
that of intellectually bifurcating Hinduism into two forms. On the one hand, a 
‘high’ or ‘classical’ form which transformed Hindu polytheism into a ‘more-or-
less monotheistic creed, with the profusion of Hindu gods representing 
different aspects of one God’ (Seth 2007: 62). On the other, a ‘primitive, even 
‘‘animist’’ popular Hinduism, swarming with gods and spirits and idols’ (2007: 
63). As Seth (2007: 63) argues, such a connection was partly efficacious, in that 
 
[s]ome Hindus also came to reinterpret and redefine 
their religion in ways influenced by western accounts 
and critiques of it. In the course of the nineteenth 
century movements of religious reform such as the 
Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj sought to reform  or 
redefine Hinduism (often by claiming that popular, 
“superstitious” forms represented a degradation of an 
original Hinduism, or “survivals” of the religious 
beliefs of the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India). The result 
was that the riotous pantheon of gods was 
downgraded, and Hinduism emerged, like other 
                                                
57 Indian  –and not Hindu– milieu because as Ashis Nandy (2001: 126) argues, ‘these gods and 
goddesses not only populate the Hindu world but regularly visit and occasionally poach on 
territories outside it.’  
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“proper” religions, as a philosophy and a set of 
coherent beliefs to which its adherents subscribed. 
 
Thus, matters of belief did infect the Hindu and Indian milieus in a manner that 
Santos (2009, see also Chakrabarty 2000) has aptly termed ‘orthopaedic’. 
Orthopaedics, in this sense, can be thought as a mode of connection whose effect 
takes hold ‘by reducing the existential problems to analytical and conceptual 
markers that are strange to them’ (Santos 2009: 110)– by connecting matters of 
belief to a milieu for which believes did not matter, thereby exorcising its 
deities and effectively desacralising the more-than-human world that did 
matter to it (Savransky 2012). But in the case of Hinduism, the success of 
connection was only partial. For despite the exportation of Western education, 
‘for the vast majority of Hindus, then and even today’, Seth (2007: 63) argues, 
‘their religious practice was not an expression of their religious belief. […] 
Hindus did not in fact “believe” in their religion, and it was not beliefs that 
constituted Hinduism’.  
 Now, from the point of view of an illocutionary logic of performativity 
this partial efficacy of the invention of matters of belief might be deemed a full-
blown failure. For if we take such a logic seriously, we have to acknowledge 
that the invention of ‘matters of belief’ did not succeed, in spite of its influence 
in bifurcating Hinduism intellectually, in bringing a new Hinduism ‘into being’. 
The most that can be said, I think, is that it succeeded, as a ‘perlocutionary’ 
effect, in partially affecting the milieu with which it was made to connect58. This 
is not to say that it did not make certain –quite interesting– things happen. To 
the contrary, the mode of connection it established was indeed complex and 
suffused with unexpected consequences.    
 For those –rather few– Hindus for whom the connection was indeed 
efficacious and thus came to experience Hinduism as a matter of belief, the 
reported consequence was, largely and for some time, an experience of ‘moral 
crisis’. One characterised precisely by the ‘inconsistencies’ of a yet incomplete 
transition to ‘secular values’ that made them, in the eyes of the British as in 
                                                
58 This is arguably the case for the ‘Christian West’ too, even in spite of the efficacious 
connection of “religion” and “belief”,  and despite so-called ‘secularisation’ theories which 
prophesied the erosion of everything ‘sacred’ in an increasingly ‘modernised’, western milieu 
(see Bruce 1992). In fact, some affirm that the West is witnessing an expansion of the sacred that, 
as Vásques and Marquardt’s (2000) example of the apparition of the Virgin Mary on the facade 
of the building of the Financial Corporation of Clearwater (Florida) makes manifest, can 
sometimes take trenchant, if humorous, forms. 
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their own, susceptible to ‘impiety, dissolute behaviour, bad manners, conceit, 
immorality, and a decline in respect for elders and for “authority” more 
generally’ (Seth 2007: 57). As Seth (2007: 75) discusses,   
 
[t]he discourse of moral decline arose because it was felt 
by many that the knowledge disseminated through 
schools and universities had produced an unexpected 
effect: educated Indians had been plunged into a moral 
crisis, no longer fully able to believe in the moral code 
derived from the own religion and worldview, without 
yet being in a position to embrace the rationality and 
morality corresponding to the new world of colonial civil 
society.  
 
Overestimating the scope of the diagnosis, such a concern was commonplace 
among British Indian government officials and administrators, Church 
missionaries and educators, who regarded the ‘moral decline’ brought about by 
their own Western invention as a serious danger to British rule and East India 
Company profits (Seth 2007: 48). The scope of the diagnosis was overstated 
however, because, to be sure, the very experience of a ‘moral crisis’ due to an 
incomplete transition between beliefs systems and moral codes presupposed 
that an efficacious connection had taken place when, in fact, it had not. In other 
words, for there to be an ‘inconsistency’ of beliefs, there had to be beliefs– 
beliefs had to matter. And they did come (in)to matter, but only for some.  
 Thus, ‘moral crisis’ was not just a possible corrosive effect of the 
orthopaedic connection of ‘matters of belief’ to Hinduism that could be 
remedied, as some Church missionaries might have wished, by imparting not 
only secular education but also the word of (the Christian) God59. It was itself 
the mode in which the effects of the connection took hold. As Seth (2007: 77) puts 
it, ‘[o]nly for those for whom the categories of mind, belief, the indivisible self, 
and the like had become meaningful could characterize their experience (or that 
of others) in terms of crisis and inconsistency.’ The many others that were 
described as subject to such a moral crisis but for whom matters of belief were 
                                                
59 As this phrase suggests, they might have wished an addition of Christian teachings to secular 
education rather than a replacement of one by the other, because ‘missionaries and government 
officials alike shared the belief that modern science was a solvent of Indian religious beliefs, 
which in their view mingled a false theology with fantastical and nonsensical explanations of 
the world and its functioning.’ (Seth 2007: 49) 
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never as efficacious were ‘quite unaware that they were’ in any such crisis 
(2007: 75), because in fact, they hardly could be. For them, it was not that the 
mismatch between secular and Hindu moral beliefs did not matter or was seen 
as unproblematic. Rather, beliefs as such did not matter, and hence no crisis 
could ensue from what did not matter –or equally, from what did not exist. 
 Nevertheless, this partial failure of the connection between matters of 
belief and Hindu/Indian milieus did not necessarily make those for whom the 
invention was inefficacious less well equipped to manage the practical 
demands of educational life under colonial rule. Instead, they would experience 
and engage Western education in a way that met the practical demands of 
passing examinations, but which was otherwise set entirely in their own terms– 
treating education as a mere instrumental affair for accessing government jobs; 
using techniques of rote-learning instead of developing forms of 
‘understanding’; producing ‘keys’ and ‘made-easies’ instead of studying from 
the actual textbooks; and so forth (Seth 2007: 17-46).   
 Indeed, this was not only a way of resisting the taking hold of effects. It 
was also a way of infecting these very effects with the milieu’s own patterns of 
relevance such that  ‘a circular link is produced between effects and causes, 
since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another’ (Foucault 
2007: 21). Thus, although the aim of the introduction of Western education in 
colonial India was to shape the character of the Indian subject by forcing it to 
abandon ‘religious beliefs’ and instead embrace and develop a ‘taste for 
literature and science’ (Seth 2007: 17), the techniques of rote learning, or 
cramming, employed by many students ‘[were] seen to be closely connected 
with an indigenous pedagogy’ which thus ‘infected’ government schools with 
‘old methods, simply applying them to new materials‘ (Seth 2007: 32). They 
were altering the very inventions that were meant to alter them. Who was the 
effect of what and who was, in fact, learning what? In the process of 
connections, efficacies were only partial, effects became causes, and causes 
became captured by effects.  
 To be sure, much more could be discussed in relation to Seth’s 
fascinating account of the Western education of colonial India, but I hope this 
summary incursion already makes perceptible some of the possible questions 
and problematics that an interrogation into modes of connection, rather than 
the skeptical quantification of the efficacy of knowledge or its aggrandising 
celebration, might be capable of yielding. What it might also make perceptible, I 
think, is that to speak of ‘connections’ and to inquire into their actual modalities 
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of taking hold is to imagine a different world, and different ways of taking care 
of it, to that assumed by those who distrust that social scientific inventions 
make any differences as well as by those who celebrate, perhaps in excess, the 
differences they make.  
 
Conclusion: Connections in What World? 
 
 In this chapter I have attempted to follow the adventure of relevance by 
posing the question of how social scientific inventions may come (in)to matter– 
by inquiring into the ecological question of the connections between knowledge 
and its milieus. Such a question, I have suggested, seems especially pressing 
today, when different yet interrelated concerns seem to present incompatible 
assumptions about it. On the one hand, the demands for relevance affecting the 
contemporary social sciences have become articulated around a suspicion as to 
whether in fact the knowledge produced by such sciences has any 
consequences whatsoever beyond the academy. On the other, the challenge put 
forth by the Anthropocene suggests that the source of concern might not be 
whether knowledge and other human practices have an effect upon the world, 
but rather what kinds of effects they might produce. 
 Thus, in order to explore the question of efficacy, I have first discussed 
the tradition of ‘performativity’ in the social sciences and humanities and 
argued that, although it does allow us to take some important steps towards a 
conception of the difference that inventions make, its emphasis on the logic of 
illocutionary effects whereby the effect of an invention is the production of the 
milieu in which the invention might come (in)to matter is ultimately incapable 
of offering a more complex understanding of what is at stake in the successes or 
failures of actual, empirical inventions. In addition, it also prevents us from 
engaging in a more textured and nuanced inquiry into what I have termed 
‘modes’ of connection– namely, the question of how efficacy is actually 
achieved, to what degree, in which manner, with what consequences, at what 
price, and in the name of what. 
 In contrast, I have suggested that the effects of inventions are not that of 
bringing entire realities into being, but of producing subtle, piecemeal 
transformations in ongoing courses of events. Their efficacy, moreover, can be 
established neither by means of a theory capable of explaining and justifying 
the success of a connection –the capacity of an invention to become interesting, 
as Stengers (1997: 83) would put it, to a milieu– in advance, nor by the 
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designation of a set of abstract and general conditions that may assure, under 
‘the right circumstances’, that certain effects will take hold. Efforts can and 
must be made, and one is certainly responsible for paying due attention to the 
obligation that objects pose, for putting the patterns of contrast that a question 
generates at risk. But the requirements of a connection are always immanent to 
the concrete connection at stake.  
 Insofar as it depends upon the debate established between the invention 
and its milieus, the success of infecting the lives of those an invention may 
come to address and of being able to transform them and be transformed by 
them, cannot be promised. It can, however, be approached with the care that 
any cultivation of possibilities demands. The question of connections, thus, 
allows us to think the problem of how inventions come (in)to matter, and how 
they endure in existence, in terms of a process of becoming together of patterns 
of relevance. A process whose success depends not only upon invention alone 
but upon the modes of exchange between the invention and the milieus to 
which it connects. 
  Now, to claim that social scientific inventions are not in and of 
themselves capable of making certain effects take hold is not so much to make a 
claim about the nature of  those inventions as it is to make one about the world 
in which inventions come (in)to matter. Because if social constructivism 
dwelled in a world that was raw material for humanisation (Haraway 1991: 
198) and the illocutionary optimism inherent in some theories of performativity 
tends to live in one that is a passive receptacle of our socio-material fancies, 
connections presuppose a world whose destiny is neither fixed, determined in 
advanced, nor entirely susceptible to what an invention might seek to make of 
it.   
 By contrast, to think in terms of connections is to inhabit a 
fundamentally unfinished world organised by numerous, diverse and changing 
milieus. A world requiring both invention and a singular attention to how 
things, in different milieus, come (in)to matter. Thinking in terms of 
connections forces us to come to terms with a world of events, of things that 
matter, void of foundations yet full of partial stories and efficacies, unexpected 
consequences and intrusions, out of which novelties sometimes may and do 
emerge. 
 As I shall argue in the next chapter, however, an event is nobody’s 
creature, it can never be traced back to an author that could be said to have 
brought that partial story into being. If, as James (1996: 130-131) put it in his 
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Some Problems of Philosophy, ‘we ourselves are constantly adding to the 
connections of things, organising labor-unions, establishing postal, consular, 
mercantile, railroad, telegraph, colonial, and other systems that bind us and 
things together in ever wider reticulations’, this ‘we’ must not designate any 
stable identity defined in advance –be that ‘we humans’, ‘we westerners’, ‘we 
men’, ‘we social scientists’, not even ‘we humans-plus-technology’– but must 
itself refer to the very achievement of a connection, a form of problematic 
togetherness of all those who, for better or ill, have experienced, and still 
experience, its becoming.   
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Chapter Five: 
An Ethics of Adventure 
 
Introduction: The Transformation of the Possible 
  
 As I have argued in previous chapters, the speculative reconstruction of 
the contemporary social sciences that the question of relevance makes possible 
involves not the proposition of a different job description of their many 
practices but a possible transformation of the ethical sensibilities that inform 
them. Indeed, even though I have tried to articulate the implications of such a 
question within an argumentative complex that I believe resonates with some 
characteristic lines of inquiry of certain versions of contemporary social science, 
my sense is that the mode of operation of a project of reconstruction is not that 
of arguing itself through such a complex, of presenting itself as a proposition 
that demands to be entertained because it be necessarily ‘truer’ or ‘better 
articulated’, or because it could be said to be more ‘persuasive’. To be sure, 
argumentation and persuasion are crucial tools, but as William James (1956) 
intuited more than a century ago, their efficacy is not merely ‘rational’– reasons 
are felt. Put differently, they work not merely by presenting a thought, but by 
provoking thinking and feeling. Thus, if this attempt at reconstruction that I 
have sought out to develop in this thesis might become capable of affecting the 
practices with which it engages, its ultimate aim is that of inducing a 
transformation of the ethos with which such practices are identified, of 
prompting them to ‘feather and launch the arrow of the question another way, 
from another departure point, toward something else’ (Cortázar 2011: 43). 
  In this sense, because it attempts to invite practitioners to cultivate a 
perplexity that might allow them to wonder about the obligations that a objects 
may pose, to put the pattern of contrasts that their questions generate at risk, 
and to come to terms with what may come (in)to matter in specific situations, 
the question of relevance proposes a different image of practice that is none 
other than what I, paraphrasing Deleuze (1994) in Chapter Two, have referred 
to as an inquiry without image– an inquiry whose ethos is that of cultivating, in 
the very process of thinking and learning how to know, sensibilities that may 
allow an inquiry to become singularly sensitive to the demands that an 
encounter has to fulfil. I have provisionally called that ethic an ‘adventure’, for 
its coming about is never one that could be secured or guaranteed either by 
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means of epistemological formalisms or by strict methodological prescriptions. 
Rather, an adventure is characterised by an investment in the possibility, not of 
providing a solution to a pre-existing problem, but of an invention that matters 
for those concerned.  
 After the detailed explorations carried out in all the preceding chapters, 
we might now be in a position to pursue the challenge of providing a more 
general characterisation of such an ethics. In order to do that, in this chapter I 
will suggest that we need to come to terms with a notion that has made 
repeated appearances throughout these pages but whose definition has 
remained, until now, not sufficiently specified. Namely, the notion of the event. 
The aim of this thesis, I suggested, is to provide a response, however partial, to 
the question of what might be required for contemporary social scientific 
practices to take up ‘relevance’ as an event that concerns the coming (in)to 
matter of the situated facts and patterns that organise and relate humans, other-
than-humans, relationships, ideas, feelings and so on in ways that matter for 
those with which a problematic situation might be concerned. As I have 
suggested, moreover, the possible success of an adventure belongs neither to 
the order of a form of scientific or technical mastery that would endow the 
social scientist with a right to establish what the relevant questions may be, nor 
to a matter of mere empathy for those to whom questions are posed.  Rather, it 
constitutes, in its own right, an achievement that cannot be secured in advance 
but towards which inquiries may strive to work. In this sense, I shall argue in 
what follows that, ultimately, taking the question of relevance seriously 
involves orienting knowledge-practices by, and towards, events.  
 The aim of this chapter, then, is to explore the complexities and 
requirements of this notion of event and, more importantly, to appreciate the 
place it occupies not only as a philosophical notion, but as an ethical instrument 
for the practical reorienting of forms of social inquiry. It will become evident 
throughout this chapter that, of all the concepts and intellectual instruments 
explored thus far, the concept of event is perhaps the most demanding. Indeed, 
one of its virtues, I am tempted to suggest, is that it makes knowledge a 
difficult, risky achievement that affords no guarantees and offers no 
legitimation. Thus, if social scientific practices are to become capable of coming 
to terms with it, it is imperative that we explore what such a notion demands of 
them. In the first instance, then, we must ask: what is an event? 
  Briefly put, an event is the effect of something that happens, a 
transformation induced by an occurrence. However, it is not to be confounded 
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either with the happening itself –which might instead receive the name of an 
‘accident‘ or an ‘incident’–, or with the many different ways in which it might 
be experienced or inherited by the milieus with which it might connect (see 
Chapter Four). For the event ‘subsists or inheres‘ as an incorporeal effect in the 
actions and passions of bodies and their practices (Deleuze 2004: 7): ‘[t]he event 
has a different nature than the actions and passions of the body. But it results 
from them’ (2004: 108, emphasis in original). Thus, the event is not what occurs 
but a novelty introduced in that which occurs (2004: 170). As Michel de Certeau 
(1997: 17) famously wrote in relation to the event of May ‘68: ‘Novelty remains 
opaque; it “cannot be taken” in the name of what it consciously represents’. In 
this sense, the event is not the bearer of its own signification and it does not 
dictate the terms in which its heirs will interpret it (Stengers 2000); it testifies 
less to what it is than to the multiplicity of responses it generates.  
    Because it is not simply an accident that happens, but both an opening and an 
achievement that emerges from and within that which happens, an event 
cannot be said to occur in time, as if time and space could precede it. Rather, it 
is that which marks time by throwing it ‘out of joint’ (Deleuze 1994: 89), 
producing a caesura, a difference between a before and an after. Betraying all 
predictions based upon probabilistic calculations or on the plausibility of a 
historical narrative that would privilege a regular and continuous temporality 
from past to present, from present to future, the event is, in short, the 
transformation of the possible. As Deleuze (2007: 234) has phrased it, ‘[t]he 
possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event’: 
 
the event is itself a splitting off from, or a breaking with 
causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to 
laws, an unstable condition which opens up a new field of 
the possible (2007: 233). 
 
It is the event, then, or events, in the plural, which synthesise time and space on 
and for each occasion, throwing them out of joint and transforming the 
distributions of what is, and what is not, possible. In this sense, the names that 
certain political events often acquire seem to silently transmit this wisdom 
about the relationship of the event to time and historicity– it is not only that 
things happened in May 1968, on the 9th September 2011, or on the 15th May 
2011 –although of course a myriad of accidents and incidents happened on 
those dates– but rather that they happened, May ’68, 9-11 and 15-M, as events 
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that demand to be inherited. ‘This experience happened. It is impregnable; it 
cannot be taken away. But what does it mean for us?’ (Certeau 1997: 13. emphasis 
in original). 
  Indeed, because the event is creative of time rather than contained by it, 
because it presupposes not a chronology but a veritable poetics of time, its own 
temporality can never be the present as such. Instead, ‘an event is always what 
has happened or what is about to happen, but never that which is happening’ 
(Deleuze 2004: 10). Thus, no one can proclaim an event in the present nor assign 
oneself authorship over it.60 From its own point of view, the event, as a 
becoming, conjoins future and past, active and passive, more and less, too much 
and not enough, the already and the yet to come (2004: 10). As Deleuze (2004: 3 
emphasis added) suggests with reference to events in Carroll’s Alice’ Adventures 
in Wonderland:  
 
[w]hen I say “Alice becomes larger,” I mean that she 
becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, 
she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not 
bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she 
was smaller before. But it is at the same time that one 
becomes. 
 
Conceived of as a wrinkle on the surface of history (Serres 2013: 17), thus, the 
event could be regarded as the incorporeal backbone of the processual 
cosmogram in which we have situated our inquiry into the knowledge-practices 
of the contemporary social sciences. For, as I suggested in Chapter Four, it 
affirms a world that is both sustained and transformed as its many 
heterogeneous actors intervene in it, ‘even though it is replete with neither 
divine providence nor ready susceptibility to human mastery’ (Connolly 2012: 
6). In other words, it inhabits a world without foundations, in the sense that its 
foundations are always being created anew with every event (Brown & Stenner 
2009).61 
                                                
60 Another way of saying this is that the present is nothing but the transition between events 
(See Chapter Six) 
61 This is not to be taken to mean that history is erased with every event, and thus, that the 
actual world poses no constraints on how the future might be shaped (see Chapters Three and 
Six). What this means is that the continuity of history, or indeed, of any experience for that 
matter, is not a given, but itself an achievement– a process whereby events conform to previous 
events. In Whitehead’s (1978: 35) words, ‘there is a becoming of continuity but no continuity of 
becoming’. 
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  For this reason, it should come as no surprise that the social sciences 
have traditionally sustained a rather conflictive relationship with the concept of 
event. In this sense, although it could be said to constitute the very conundrum 
of historiographical inquiry, historians have rarely addressed the event as a 
problematic concept to be developed theoretically in any deliberate fashion 
(Dosse 2010, Sahlins 2005, Sewell 2005). Moreover, those who have not simply 
taken it for granted, ‘have spent’, in the words of Marshall Sahlins (2005: 294), ‘a 
lot of waking hours puzzling over events in order to invent all those ways of 
putting them down.’ Embracing an ethics of estrangement that would invite 
social scientists to search for regularities and law-abiding patterns of historical 
and social processes in order to explain the would-be ‘apparent’ nature of 
experiences, the social sciences have for a long time experienced and been 
oriented by what might be called, in the words of one if its strongest detractors, 
‘a horror of the event’ (Braudel 1982: 28).  
 Thus, members of the Annales School initiated by Fernand Braudel and 
Lucien Febvre regarded what they called ‘evenemential history’ as a whimsical 
endeavour that is overtaken by the capricious, dramatic and ‘delusive smoke’ of 
the instant (Braudel 1982: 27).  In contrast, they proposed that in order for 
historiography to become truly ‘scientific’ and even endowed with 
mathematical rigour (1982: 42), historiography had to abandon its fascination 
with events and focus on the very long time span patterns of the longue durée:  
 
[t]o go from the short time span, to one less short, and 
then to the long view (which, if it exists, must surely be 
the wise man’s time span); and having got there, to think 
about everything new afresh and to reconstruct 
everything around one: a historian could hardly not be 
tempted by such a prospect. (1982: 77-78) 
 
What is involved in the notion of the longue durée, thus, is a teleological 
temporality that attributes the causes of events to abstract, transhistorical 
processes or laws that may moreover lead to some other historical state in the 
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future. From this point of view, events are nothing but epiphenomenal 
instances of deeper, enduring, more-than-historical patterns of order.62   
 Furthermore, this transhistorical explanatory character of the longue durée 
testifies to its debt to the notion of ‘structure‘, as the latter was developed 
particularly by the Structuralist tradition of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) and 
which, after the Second World War, pervaded the social sciences –at least in 
Europe– as a whole (Dosse 1998)63. Drawing on a combination of lessons from 
the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Émile Durkheim, this immensely 
influential school became equally dismissive of the event, thereby becoming a 
crucial actor in the ‘evolution of a more and more immobile history’ (Dosse 
2010:67. my own translation). For structuralists, the task was to do away with 
the event –and indeed, whenever possible, with history altogether– by 
searching for the universal laws unconsciously governing social and cultural 
phenomena: 
 
In anthropology as in linguistics, therefore, it is not 
comparison that supports generalization, but the other 
way around. If, as we believe to be the case, the 
unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing 
forms upon content, and if these forms are fundamentally 
all the same for all minds– ancient and modern, primitive 
and civilized (as the study of symbolic function, expressed 
in language, so strikingly indicates)– it is necessary and 
sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying 
each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a 
principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and 
other customs, provided of course that the analysis is 
carried far enough. (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 21) 
 
As various scholars have attested, even if today not many researchers would 
claim without caveats to be orthodox structuralists or historians of the longue 
durée, such ‘horror of the event’ still pervades the ethos of many contemporary 
social scientific practices and conceptualisations (Bensa & Fassin 2002, Dosse 
                                                
62  At most, the only event that such a form of historiography does take seriously –for some 
reason– is an inaugural, cosmic-like event such as, say, ‘capitalism’, which ipso facto becomes 
the subsequent determining cause of everything that follows (Sewell 2005). 
63 In fact, in his On History, Braudel (1982: 31) himself explicitly acknowledges his debt to Lévi-
Strauss, arguing that ‘for better or ill, [structure] dominates the problems of the longue durée’. 
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2010, Fraser 2010, Sahlins 2005). For instance, William Sewell (2005) has shown 
how such teleological and structural conceptions of temporality still remain at 
work in much of contemporary historical sociology, including the work of 
Immanuel Wallerstein and Charles Tilly, among others. 
 A similar case could arguably be made about many social science 
readings of the work of Michel Foucault which, despite its emphasis on a form 
of effective history that would deal ‘with events in terms of their most unique 
characteristics, their most acute manifestations’ (Foucault 1984b: 88); despite the 
fact that among the aims of his genealogical project was that of ‘restor[ing] to 
discourse its character as an event’ (Foucault 1981: 66); despite his radically 
evenemential archeology, as François Dosse (2010) has called it, the 
contemporary social sciences have not hesitated in turning the curious and 
unique events that interested Foucault into a critical theory of neo/liberalism 
tout-court, and they have not hesitated to turn ‘discourse’ into a general theory, 
an approach even, to the relationship between power and subjectivity 
(Savransky 2014). 
 Thus, to restore the event to the world that a contemporary social science 
would have to learn to come to terms with involves a profound shift in its 
habits of thought and practice, one which we have been exploring through 
different problematics in preceding chapters and which might now be 
confronted directly. First, it is necessary that we pause and consider some of the 
specificities and requirements that such the concept of the event might demand. 
As I will show in the next section, by articulating a processual world, the event 
becomes the site where history and metaphysics join hands, forcing our thought 
to pragmatically move between the general and the singular, the ordinary and 
the exceptional.  
 Second, I will suggest that it is out of the double temporality that 
characterises events, out of their subsistence as that which has happened and 
that which is about to happen, that emerges a double ethical challenge for a 
social scientific practice that could be said to constitute a veritable adventure– 
that of learning to become situated between the event as a fact–that–matters 
which demands to be inherited, and that of learning to become exposed to an 
event as a possibility of the coming in(to) matter of a different world to come. I 
shall explore these two temporal and ethical dimensions of the event in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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Between the Ordinary and the Exceptional: A Pragmatics of the 
Event? 
 
 In throwing time out of joint, the event becomes the site where history 
and metaphysics meet– histories matter. Time and space become abstractions 
that do not explain but are to be explained by the becomings of always contingent 
and changing events (Whitehead 1967b, Fraser 2010). Both generated by, and 
generative of, naturalcultural histories, events are, in a sense, the very pulse of 
reality, which is also to say, of what comes in(to) matter. In this way, in The 
Concept of Nature (2004: 14-15), Whitehead proposes that ‘the immediate fact for 
awareness is the whole occurrence of nature. It is nature as an event present for 
sense-awareness, and essentially passing. There is no holding nature still and 
looking at it.’  
 To conceive of events as the very pulse of the real constitutes both a 
necessary metaphysical requirement of any attempt to think about the 
relationships between events and difference and, simultaneously, an important 
realisation with respects to the legitimacy of their scope. From the point of view 
of a metaphysics of the event, therefore, no legitimate scope can determine its 
status, for the world is itself a process of concatenation, of comings in(to) matter 
that may be thought in terms of a microphysics of events (Morin 1972).64 No 
sunset repeats itself twice. The importance of this metaphysical requirement lies 
in the implication that no one can be endowed with the right to set a threshold 
above which one can declare an event, and below which one must remain 
silent. As Stengers (2000: 67) argues, ‘[the event] has neither a privileged 
representative nor legitimate scope. The scope of the event is part of its effects, 
of the problem posed in the future it creates.’ 
 Having said this, from the point of view of the way in which the concept 
of the event may be capable of orienting social scientific practices, and to that 
extent, of pointing towards those comings in(to) matter that may contribute to 
the inquiry of a problematic situation, the celebration that ‘all is event!‘ should, I 
believe, be approached with care, for its implications might otherwise become 
counterproductive. In other words, although such may be indeed the case from 
the standpoint of a dispassionate consideration of the nature of things –thus 
                                                
64 For Whitehead (1978, 2004), however, certain factors in nature, for example, those that 
contribute to the definiteness of events, such as a colour, or a definite shape, are not themselves 
events but are pure potentialities situated in events. The term Whitehead will assign to such 
potential factors is that of ‘eternal objects’ (1967b, 1978). 
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remaining a potent critique of modern scientific materialism (Whitehead 
1967b)– we should be careful not to extend the affirmation of the ubiquity of 
events into an all encompassing abstraction that, instead of confronting the 
event as that which may stop our thinking from turning around in circles 
(Stengers 2000), may inhibit our capacity to care for those differences that make 
a difference.  
 Specifically, the implications of such an undifferentiated and celebratory 
claim may give rise to at least two different positions that risk losing sight of the 
pragmatic force of such a concept.  The first might receive the name of the 
‘banalisation of the event’. Indeed, if we rested in the comfort of such a 
celebration, if events of varying scope and consequences were to constitute the 
very effects of a ‘whatever happens’, if no role could be found for them other 
than sustaining the ordinary succession of things, then what practical difference 
does the notion of ‘event’ itself make? And how might it be able to prompt, 
rather than paralyse, practices of inquiry? Indeed, if we stop at the affirmation 
that everything whatsoever is an event, then why would events matter 
anyway? What would it mean to claim that May ’68 was an event –in contrast 
to, say, June ’68? In this way, the banalisation of the event operates by 
multiplying differences to the point of a general indifference to what may come 
(in)to matter. 
 The second perilous implication of overemphasising the ubiquity of 
events belongs not to the danger of downplaying the differences they create 
but, in contrast, to a certain attitude that I would call, paradoxically, a ‘cynicism 
of the event’. Indeed, if we take an undifferentiated approach to the becoming 
of events that suggests that everything is an event and, ergo, that whatever 
someone or something does constitutes an event, then we might run the risk of 
reducing the event to the actions of a wilful author. In this way, the event 
becomes prey of the very ethics of estrangement it might otherwise be capable 
of challenging. The cynicism of the event makes itself perceptible, for example, 
in the discourse of certain sociological approaches that, in adopting a social 
constructivist position, would argue that an event is nothing other than 
whatever the media present as such (for a classic text see Nora 1972, more 
recently Bensa & Fassin 2002). As Pierre Nora (1972: 162. my translation) has 
classically phrased it: 
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The mass media have from now on the monopoly over 
history. In our contemporary societies, it is through them 
and through them only that the event strikes upon us, and 
it cannot escape us. It is not enough, however, to say that 
they stick to reality, in the sense that they would become 
part of it and of us in restoring to it its immediate presence 
[…]. The press, the radio, images, are not simply the 
means of relatively independent events, but their very 
condition of existence. 
 
The cynicism of the event is paradoxical for it at once affirms the ubiquity of 
events yet confounds their heirs with their authors, reducing the event to its 
retrospective recognition produced by actors and practices. In other words, all 
is event, yet there is nothing new under the sun, nothing new has in fact come 
in(to) matter. To warn against a ‘sociology of events’ in a social constructivist 
sense, however, is not to suggest that the coming of events is in any sense 
otherworldly, that events come from a beyond that concerns no one and that 
requires nothing. The emergence of an event does require a milieu, even a 
milieu characterised by dimensions one could call ‘social’, but it cannot be 
explained by it as if the event were the product of a choice. Indeed, as Stengers 
(1997: 216-217) puts it, 
 
to combine the notions of event and choice implies that no 
instance – whether political, ethical, of the mass media, or 
technical– can be said to be the “author” of this choice. 
Because in this case, it is much rather the event itself that 
has decided the manner in which these instances will be 
articulated. Many accounts enable one to follow the 
history that has led to this choice, its hesitations, and the 
relationships of forces involved in them. No account can 
have the status of explanation, conferring a logically 
deducible character to the event, without falling into the 
classic trap of giving to the reasons that one discovers a 
posteriori the power of making it occur, when, in other 
instances, they would have had no such power [.] 
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Insofar as the event marks a difference and an opening, whoever speaks in its 
name, even if with the purpose of denying it, of swearing that nothing, in fact, 
has come (in)to matter, is already situated by the event, becoming its 
inescapable heir. For this reason, and as will become clearer in the coming 
sections, allowing for the event to orient social scientific practices in order to 
cultivate a different care of knowledge does not involve a process of turning 
those practices around the true or correct explanation of the former, nor of 
claiming authority over its production, but of inventing ways of inheriting and 
remaining open to it, of exploring the possibilities it creates.  
 In any case, then, it would seem that there is a tension between 
metaphysical and historiographical approaches to events. For the former, as we 
have seen, events constitute the very pulse of the real thereby providing an 
image of a world of becoming that exists only insofar as it differentiates itself. 
For the latter, if the event is to matter, it must constitute an intense and rare 
achievement, a shift in the order of things, an unpredictable opening onto a 
future that is more than a mere prolongation from the past. From the point of 
view of history, the event is something that ‘stands out against a background of 
uniformity; it is a difference, a thing we could not know a priori’ and that 
cannot be reduced to its cause (Veyne 1984: 5).  
 Such an apparent tension is not, however, insurmountable. Affirming the 
significance of certain historical –and as we will see, scientific– events and 
inheriting the difference they create, does not necessarily presuppose a world 
where processes of differentiation and creativity are, by definition, rare. The 
distinction between one approach and the other belongs rather to the particular 
standpoint from which events are discerned.  In other words, to affirm that 
events matter is not to immediately provide an answer to the question of how 
they matter, that is, to what degree and in what manner. While the 
metaphysician approaches the question of events from the point of view of a 
dispassionate consideration of the nature of things, of the cosmos itself as being 
both universe and event (Morin 1972), the historian approaches the event from 
the situated perspective of the past and future an event creates, from the 
situation to which it belongs and contributes to composing, and from a 
particular genealogy of other events. In this latter view, ‘in discerning an event 
we are also aware of its significance as a relatum in the structure of events. […] 
A discerned event is known as related in this structure to other events whose 
specific characters are otherwise not disclosed in that immediate awareness 
except so far as they are relata within the structure.’ (Whitehead 2004: 52).  
175 
 Thus, the ordinary and the exceptional are not necessarily antithetical 
notions. The historical event is not in any way incompatible with the 
metaphysical event but is rather that which is experienced as a transformation 
of the possible from the point of view of a particular situation marked by a 
trajectory of past and future events. To put it another way, although the 
possible difference between events is only a matter of degree and not of 
substance, from the point of a situated inquiry, it is that matter of degree that 
matters. For instance, the transformation effected in the world of a child who 
has just learned to walk constitutes an event within a particular genealogy 
which corresponds, say, to the child’s biography. Times and spaces both shrink 
and expand, allowing her for the possibility of reaching previously unattainable 
objects, and confronting her with a future the temporal and spatial dimensions 
of which are much larger than previously imagined. In parallel, the Second 
World War can be said to constitute an event where, ‘[f]or the first time, reason, 
science and technology went beyond the deadly laws of life. War for the sake of 
war prevailed over the struggle for life. The Bomb beat Darwin.‘ (Serres 2013: 
14)65.   
 To be sure, to say that both of these cases constitute events in their own 
right is not to attempt to flatten out their important differences. Thus, their 
respective scopes and capacities for propagation – understood in terms of those 
who will come to be affected by the event and will have to learn to inherit it–, or 
in other words, the horizon that defines the limit of their respective situations, 
may vary greatly. So much so that, while from the point of view of a genealogy 
of war and death the significance of the event of a child learning to walk might 
be rather negligible, to the biography of a child who has to learn to inherit a 
culture of science, technology, war and death, the transformation of possibilities 
effected by the Second World War still matter66.  
                                                
65 Strictly speaking, this example could easily be inverted, as chaos theorists have suggested 
with the parabola of the ‘butterfly effect’, where the event of a butterfly fluttering its wings in 
China can, over time and space, propagate into a major climatic event such as, say, a hurricane 
in Mexico. This should not however be taken to mean that the butterfly is causally responsible for 
the hurricane, but rather, that from the point of view of the evolution of this chaotic climate 
system, the butterfly event matters. 
66  Interestingly, in the latter genealogy, a child learning to walk might perhaps be 
conceptualised as what Paul Veyne (1984: 19) would call a ‘non-event’. A non-event is not the 
absence of an event but ‘an event not yet recognized as such– the history of territories, of 
mentalities, of madness, or of the search of security through the ages’. Curiously, in drawing a 
comparison between such non-events and the usual ‘political’ events of conventional 
historiography, it is surely not by chance that these examples resonate intimately with the work 
of Michel Foucault.  
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 What also varies in this comparison is the degree of novelty each event 
introduces. In this sense, as Michel Serres (2013: 2) proposes with the humour 
and the rigour of a geometrical formulation, insofar as events are always at the 
same time achievements and openings, their novelty ‘is proportional to the 
length of the preceding era concluded by the event.’ Differences of scope and 
novelty notwithstanding, both events suppose, from their own point of view, 
that is, from the point of view of the situated genealogies to which each of them 
belong, an asymmetry between cause and effect, and thus, the creation of a 
radical difference between a before and an after that involves a change in the 
order of things. In other words, if an event can be said to be a wrinkle on the 
surface of history, it is only on condition that histories themselves be conceived 
of as entirely composed of wrinkly surfaces.  
 The importance of this difference between the general and the 
exceptional in the becoming of events lies in that it enables an attention to the 
radical contingency and novelty of events in relation to others without thereby 
denying the thoroughly evenemential character of reality67. Thus, in order to 
approach the question of the event so that it may be capable of orienting the 
ethics of inquiry of the contemporary social sciences, what is required is neither 
a metaphysics nor a historiography, but a pragmatics of events that approaches 
them in terms of the differences that situated novelties create, of the specific 
manners in which events come (in)to matter, of the problems they will pose to 
their heirs, of the many ways in which events are inherited, thereby 
propagating their effects.  
 Constituting modes of inquiry whose risk is that of coming to terms with 
a world of contingent, complex, and unpredictable changes in the order of 
things, adventures are situated by, or in the middle of, the double temporality 
of the event, that is, by what has happened and by what might happen. They 
are both heirs of the multiple series of events that compose the actual world 
they must invent a manner of encountering, and they can also, potentially, 
become involved in the transformation of the possible by inventing 
propositions that matter. As the ‘horror of the event‘ makes perceptible, 
                                                
67 Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of Alain Badiou's (2013) philosophy of the event and 
how it compares to the concept of event elaborated here exceeds the scope of this chapter (for 
an edited collection that comparatively explores the notion of ‘event’ in Badiou, Deleuze and 
Whitehead, see Faber et al. 2010).  It can be noted in passing, however, that although for Badiou 
events are thoroughly historical and they too constitute ruptures with the established order of 
things, they are only ever exceptional and, considering his examples (e.g. Christ’s Resurrection 
and the French Revolution), spectacularly so. 
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however, the ethics of estrangement that could be said to characterise much of 
contemporary social scientific knowledge-practices does not contribute to 
cultivating modes of inquiry that be particularly sensitive to an eventful world. 
Rather, it fosters an ethos by which the epistemic merit of its practices and 
propositions is often understood against such sensitivity– the less constrained 
by events, the more ‘scientific’.  
  Thus, in the following sections of this chapter I will attempt to begin to 
sketch what such a process of pragmatic attunement to events might entail. In 
order to better account for the double temporality of events, I will address this 
challenge in turns, asking first what might be required for a social scientific 
practice to be situated by what has happened, and second, what it would mean 
to orient such practices towards what might happen.  It must be noted, however, 
that such a partition has the only purpose of approaching this difficult question 
slowly and with as much clarity as possible. For the fact remains that both 
dimensions of the orientations discussed in what follows are to be understood 
not only as mutually compatible, but as reciprocally articulated, so that there 
cannot be one without the other. 
 
Children of The Event: Towards An Ethics of Inheritance 
 
 As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, the history of the 
contemporary social sciences has been marked by a horror of the event. From 
historiography to sociology, the modern ethics of discovering –or perhaps, of 
un-covering– the unconscious or underlying laws governing cultural, social and 
historical patterns turned the event into a monster that anyone who would take 
pride in calling herself a ‘social scientist’ should combat. To confine the ‘horror 
of the event’ to the search for structural laws, however, would not only be 
inaccurate but would risk inciting a false sense of comfort about the present of 
social scientific practices. The danger such confining poses is that of prompting 
us to think that this fear of events belongs to an infancy the contemporary social 
sciences have now outgrown. Indeed, a critic may argue, they no longer aspire 
to such a quest for the laws of the social but have become more modest in their 
ambitions, seeking to provide meaningful interpretations, and probable or 
plausible explanations of phenomena which nevertheless cannot, by right, gain 
the status of immobile laws. The critic may rebut that the reign of structuralism 
has given way to a so-called ‘post-structuralism’ which has claimed, by 
contrast, to foreground the significance of ‘contingencies’ in the becomings of 
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history and, by so doing, has placed the horror of the event in the recent past, 
one defined by a mix of innocence and hubris which contemporary knowledge-
practices have amply overcome.   
 But even if the notion of social or cultural ‘law’ might no longer have the 
rhetorical or the epistemic force it once had, even when it has come to be looked 
upon with suspicion, as a term of abuse, by all of those contemporary social 
scientists who have –for better or ill– been affected by critiques of Enlightened 
thought, even so, this does not automatically mean that contemporary social 
scientific practices are, in a way, ‘beyond‘ this horror that once explicitly 
characterised their relationship to heterogeneous, historical events. Indeed, my 
sense is that whenever the social sciences see their task as providing 
explanatory ‘conditions’ or ‘contexts’ for the becomings of events in general (on 
‘conditions’ see Chapter Four), it is not ludicrous to assume that the experience 
of horror induced by the novelty of an event still persists. 
 In this sense, for instance, the social constructivist positions discussed in 
Chapter Two provide a good example, for in approaching experimental 
scientific inventions from the point of view of their micro- and macro-social 
conditions, their studies effectively sought to dispel the contingent and rare 
achievement that makes of a scientific invention an event. Because to challenge 
the account of an event by ‘uncovering’ its social conditions is to suggest that 
the event was in fact made possible by those conditions. The event, however, is 
just what betrays its own conditions of possibility. It is not what is made 
possible, but what makes the possible. Thus, it cannot be explained by general 
conditions ascribed to it a posteriori.  
 To be oriented by past events, by the contingency, and irreversibility of 
that which has happened, is not to approach them with the aim of explaining 
them away, nor of restoring to them the rightful sense of belonging to an epoch 
for which they might simply constitute examples. Insofar as relevance belongs, 
as I have suggested, to an event of a coming in(to) matter, to suggest that events 
matter might be rightly seen as a tautology. Logical considerations 
notwithstanding, it seems like a tautology worth incurring into: events matter, 
they cannot be taken away. As is part of the tacit wisdom of many historians, to 
be oriented by past events, in contrast, is to invent a manner of inheriting them, 
to affirm that it is never those who come after it that situate the event within a 
context or a set of historical, social, economic, and cultural conditions, but that 
it is the difference the event creates that has already situated them as children of 
the event. It is to its heirs, children of the event, that the event poses a problem 
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demanding inquiry. And it is with them, that the problem of how events have 
come (in)to matter is to be developed. As Deleuze (2007: 234) claimed about the 
event of May ’68: ‘May ‘68 was not the result of a crisis, nor was it a reaction to 
a crisis. It is rather the opposite: it is the current crisis, the impasses of the 
current crisis in France that stem directly from the inability of French society to 
assimilate May ’68’.  
 To be sure, a number of extraordinary, epochal events such as Galileo’s 
scientific invention, the French Revolution, the Second World War, May ’68, or 
911, among others, tend more easily to become representatives for illustrating 
what might mean to become oriented by what has happened. Thus, they are 
frequently taken as privileged examples of the transformation of the possible 
(e.g. Badiou 2013, Certeau 1997, Deleuze 2007, Dosse 2010, Sewell 2005, 
Stengers 2000). We should resist the temptation, however, of assuming that 
only epoch-making events in science and politics have the capacity of situating 
us as their heirs. First, because as it was argued above, a pragmatics of the event 
prevents us from setting a threshold that could designate the legitimate scope 
of an event in advance. This is why the question of relevance cannot establish a 
priori what the limits of a situation are. Second, because the ‘nature‘ of an event 
belongs not to the event itself but to the task of inheriting it, of inquiring into 
the problem it has posed to those who have become its heirs. In this sense, for 
example, Michel Serres (2001, 2013) has argued that the coming about of a 
‘global’ situation –at least to the extent and manner that the West has inherited, 
I might add– cannot be possibly understood without taking seriously the ways 
in which six, almost imperceptible yet truly novel events of the century have 
transformed the world and its possibilities.  
 While one of them is indeed the Second World War, the other five could 
be said to be primarily agricultural, technological, pharmaceutical and 
demographic events. Namely, the urbanisation of the world in the 1960s, which 
supposes the end of the Neolithic period (2013: 3); the thousandfold increase in 
human and non-human global mobility which transforms conventional 
geographical scales making a country like France ‘a city with the TGV as its 
subway system and the freeways as its streets’ (6); the pharmacological 
invention and mass production of penicillin and antibiotics that, since the 1950, 
transformed the very status of health from an accomplishment to a norm and 
gave rise to new bodies ‘that have little in common with those of their fathers’ 
(9); the generalised drop in infantile mortality and the expansion of life 
expectancy, which transforms ‘institutions and traditions such as the family, 
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retirement, inheritance, succession, and transmission’ (10); and the proliferation 
of technologies of ‘connectivity’ which have transformed the nature of 
knowledge, memory, pedagogy, social relations and the topology of space (12).  
 Relatedly –perhaps even scandalously?–, cultural and literary studies 
scholar Harold Bloom (1997, 1999) has put forth the provocative proposition 
that the work of Shakespeare constitutes an aesthetic event that has not only 
shaped what he terms the ‘western canon’ (1994), but whose effects extend far 
beyond the realm of aesthetics, involving a radical transformation of the 
possible ways of becoming a self, a psycho-social mutation of western 
subjectivity that he polemically calls ‘the invention of the human’ (1999: 4): 
 
The idea of Western character, of the self as a moral agent, 
has many sources: Homer and Plato, Aristotle and 
Sophocles, the Bible and St. Augustine, Dante and Kant, 
and all you might care to add. Personality, in our sense, is 
a Shakespearean invention, and is not only Shakespeare’s 
greatest originality but also the authentic cause of his 
perpetual pervasiveness. Insofar as we ourselves value, 
and deplore, our own personalities, we are the heirs of 
Falstaff and of Hamlet, and of all the other persons who 
throng Shakespeare’s theater of what might be called the 
colors of the spirit. 
 
Writing against a certain version of the ethics of estrangement that he calls, after 
Nietzsche, the School of Resentment –which in his account refers primarily to the 
proliferation of poststructuralist and ‘postmodern’ traditions in cultural and 
literary studies–, and who, in his view, ‘insists upon a Shakespeare culture-
bound by history and society‘ (1997: xv), he argues that no approach that seeks 
to explain the Shakespearean event, or the ‘Shakespearean difference’, in terms 
of Western culture and dominance, in terms of gender, class, discourse, or 
colonialism will be able to provide a satisfactory answer to the question: “Why 
Shakespeare?”68. As he expresses it in his always combative tone, 
                                                
68 It should be noted that ‘Shakespeare’ here names the event of the work itself and not the 
author, of whom we know close to nothing (Bloom 1999: 718). Indeed, the difference between 
the former and the latter is the very difference between a pragmatics of the event and a theory 
of genius. Although a reading of Bloom certainly makes both readings possible –and I am 
emphatically interested in the former rather than the latter– it is not at all clear to me what his 
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[a]llegorizing or ironizing Shakespeare by privileging 
cultural anthropology or theatrical history or religion or 
psychoanalysis or politics or Foucault or Marx or 
feminism works only in limited ways.  You are likely, if 
you are shrewd, to achieve Shakespearean insights into 
your favorite hobbyhorse, but you are rather less likely to 
achieve Freudian or Marxist or feminist insight into 
Shakespeare. His universality will defeat you, his plays 
know more than you do, and your knowingness 
consequently will be in danger of dwindling into 
ignorance. (Bloom 1999: 718-719) 
 
This is not to be taken to mean that to cultivate anthropological, theatrical, 
religious, psychoanalytic, Marxist, feminist or Foucauldian modes of thinking is 
by definition a doomed exercise. To be sure, each of these traditions of thinking 
and feeling may provide crucial instruments for orienting attention and forms 
of care for what has come (in)to matter that others may have neglected (Puig de 
la Bellacasa 2011), for generating questions that may open an inquiry, and for 
learning to discern and identify possibilities emerging from it. But insofar as we 
remain Shakespeare’s children (Bloom 1999: 726), insofar as we are 
‘monumentally over-influenced by him’, it is in vain mobilise such traditions in 
order ‘to historicise or politicise him’, to reduce the event to an example of what 
we already know: ‘Shakespeare will not allow you to bury him, or escape him, 
or replace him.’ (Bloom 1997: xviii).  
 Whether the affirmation of a Shakespearean event is accurate or whether 
it is mere hyperbole is not for me to judge. What is clear is that such a 
proposition cannot be dispelled simply by saying that literature is, by 
definition, incapable of an event that is more-than-literary. What might the 
meaning of what we call poetry be if not that of an aesthetic invention that never 
confines itself to language?  What interests me here however is the ethical 
exercise proposed by Bloom –and also to be found in the works of de Certeau, 
Deleuze and Serres mentioned above– to read Shakespeare’s plays from the 
point of view of the children of the event, from the point of view of the 
                                                                                                                                          
own position on the matter is, considering that he has dedicated yet another monumental book 
to the question and history of Genius (2003). 
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problematic future –literary, cultural, political, psycho-social– that it created, 
and for which it came (in)to matter. My view is that such an exercise orients 
scientific and interpretive practices away from an ethics of estrangement, which 
ultimately restores to history an inescapable character of continuity, to what I 
would call an ethics of inheritance, which confronts the event not with the 
question of what has made it possible, but with the question of what it has 
generated, of the way it has come to matter for those that have become, in one 
way or another, concerned with it. As Deleuze (2004: 169) phrases it in a 
particularly stoic form: ‘[e]ither ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it 
means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.’ 
 An ethics of inheritance does not however imply resignation69, and it is 
emphatically not to be confused with a moral mandate that would dictate: 
“Thou shalt not historicise”. That events cannot be reduced to social, cultural, 
economic or psychological causes does not mean that such factors do not 
constitute a milieu of emergence for the becoming of events, nor that events 
have no history. Conversely, to relate the history of an event is not necessarily to 
reduce it to the factors that constitute its breeding ground. As historian of 
science Lorraine Daston (2009: 812-813) argues in relation to the historicising of 
scientific categories and events,  
 
to historicise the category of fact, objectivity, or proof is 
not thereby to debunk it, no more than to write the history 
of the special theory of relativity thereby undermines it. 
This is a point perhaps made more easily in ethics than 
epistemology; the fact that the judicial ban on torture 
arose in a specific historical context carries no weight  
arguments concerning its moral validity. Analogously, the 
fact that scientific objectivity arose in a specific historical 
context neither supports nor undercuts its epistemological 
validity. “If historical, then relative” is a non sequitur. 
Why then do so many philosophers (as well as scientists, 
sociologists, and yes, historians) nonetheless believe it 
follows? 
   
                                                
69 For it ‘is highly probable’, Deleuze (2004: 170) suggests, ‘that resignation is only one more 
figure of ressentiment, since ressentiment has many figures’. 
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The answer to this question is, at least partially, that narrating the history of an 
event is certainly not to reduce it to its historical conditions so long as those 
conditions are not endowed with the power of explaining the event away.  In 
other words, so long as it is the event itself that is seen as situating its own past, 
and not the other way around70. In this sense, the work of William Sewell (2005) 
is perhaps one of the most accomplished attempts at providing the 
contemporary social sciences with a means of conducting historical 
explorations of events without thereby doing away with them in the process.  
 In what he terms an ‘eventful’ conception of temporality, which is to say 
that it ‘recognizes the power of events in history’ (2005: 100), Swell develops an 
account whereby ‘[e]vents must be assumed to be capable of changing not only 
the balance of causal forces operating but the very logic by which consequences 
follow from occurrences or circumstances.’ (2005: 101). In order to do this, 
Sewell argues that an eventful conception of temporality must meet three 
requirements which might be worth reinterpreting in the context of our 
discussion.71 
  First, insofar as events are discerned within a genealogy or trajectory of 
other events, one of the first requirements of a social science oriented by ‘what 
has happened’ is the assumption that any given event always maintains a 
relationship to other events that form its trajectories of becoming and with 
respect to which it matters. This does not mean that events directly and actively 
cause and are caused by each other, but it does mean that they are not entirely 
independent from each other, maintaining what are to be thought of more in 
terms of relationships of resonance, or what Deleuze (2004) would describe in 
terms of ‘quasi-causality’.  
 Second, a social science oriented by events would have to refrain from 
presuming to know in advance what might be capable of constituting a possible 
force in history. Again, the singularity of an event affords no confinement 
within a pre-existent set of conditions of possibility. Thus, to approach what has 
happened as de jure an effect of social, or cultural, or economic, or technological 
                                                
70 Interestingly, to the extent that history and event, as I have shown above, implicate each other 
reciprocally, to attempt to debunk an event by historicising it is something of a paradoxical 
operation. For although it mobilises historicism as a method, thereby suggesting that 
everything has a history, it implicitly shares the metaphysical assumptions of those it seeks to 
‘debunk’, namely, that only that which has no history is, in a complete sense, true and real. 
71 Although to my mind Sewell’s (2005) account and the one provided here are to a great extent 
compatible, the two respond to widely different problem spaces and employ quite different 
terminology. Thus, although I intend to follow Sewell’s logic, I will attempt to reinterpret his 
insights to make them appropriate to the present discussion.  
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forces is ultimately incompatible with the question of how the mattering of an 
event might be capable of situating its heirs in multiple ways. As Harold 
Bloom’s thesis makes perceptible, aesthetics might indeed be capable of a 
transformation of possibilities with a scope that radically exceeds its specific 
domain.  This does not mean, however, that the ‘social’ can never be a force of 
history because it would itself always be the effect of something else (cf. Latour 
2005), but rather, that whether or not  the ‘social’ constitutes a factor in the 
becoming of an event is a problem that cannot be solved by recourse to 
principles. It is, in other words, a question of inquiry that is never dissociated 
from the way in which an event is being inherited.  
 Third, and related to, if not emerging from, the other two, an ‘eventful’ 
social science requires the abandonment of any pretension of historical finality, 
and assumes that, as Sewell (2005: 102) puts it, 
 
contingency is global, that it characterizes not only the 
surface but the core or the depths of social relations. 
Contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable 
events […] can and do alter the most apparently durable 
trends of history. This does not, of course, imply that 
human societies are in permanent and universal flux, that 
social change is easy to accomplish, or that historical 
changes display no regularities. I am not arguing that 
capitalism or the global division of labor or sexual 
inequality would go away if only we wished it or that 
history is a tale told by an idiot. History displays both 
stubborn durabilities and sudden breaks, and even the 
most radical historical ruptures are interlaced with 
remarkable continuities. 
 
In other words, insofar as events always force us to sway between the ordinary 
and the exceptional, between message and noise, by breaking with an order of 
things and instituting novel distributions of what is and what is not possible, 
they constitute not only a protest against the rationalisms that would always 
seek to restitute to the world an immobile order, but also a warning to those 
who, in the name of radical contingency or chaos, would proclaim that there 
never is any order. Rather, orders are incessantly being constructed and 
transformed by the becoming of events.  
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 In any case, as I argued above, an ethics of inheritance is only one of the 
two reciprocally implicated dimensions of the relationship between events and 
social scientific adventures. For to affirm the power of events to shape the 
history of which a practice might become an heir has also a more speculative 
dimension. Namely, that other, unexpected, events might happen in the future. 
Thus, an adventure is nothing other than a process of articulating, in practice, 
an ethics of inheritance with what we might call an ethics of exposure. An 
exposure, that is, to the possibility, however unlikely or implausible, of an 
event to come. It is thus to this dimension that we must now direct our 
attention. 
 
The Lure of the Event and the Ethics of Exposure  
 
 The poem by Julio Cortázar that has uninterruptedly inspired these 
pages could be read, I argued in the introduction to the thesis, as a plea for 
scientific knowledges to abandon the immobile comfort of their observatories, 
where galaxies are grasped in a mental fist and the journey of eels is embalmed 
in a nomenclature that presents it as the expectable, indeed, logical consequence 
of a neuroendocrine process. The cry was not merely a protest against science 
tout court, but an invitation to a different science, one that would step out into 
the open, wander in the night, not with the aim of searching as if knowing what 
it will find, of acquiring ‘mental satisfactions or submitting a not yet colonized 
nature to another turn of the screw’, but of opening ‘toward another 
understanding, […] open to another sense that in turns opens us’ (Cortázar 
2011: 49). It is this stepping out into the open, this adventure, that prompts us 
not only to inherit that which has happened but, equally and at the same time, 
to become oriented towards events that might happen, and which might happen 
‘with the suddenness of cats or the bath overflowing while we answer the 
phone’. As the poem suggests, however, such events tend to happen to those 
who step out into the open while carrying ‘the cat in their pocket’ (Cortázar 
2011: 57); to those, that is, who allow the event to become a lure that might 
guide their practices towards cultivating the possibility of its actualisation. But 
what does it mean to be lured by the possibility of an event? 
 This is surely a difficult question, especially in a scientific culture that 
demands that events be defined in advance of the actual research process, in 
advance of the question of relevance, and that they be anticipated in such a way 
that they might always be promised to constitute exceptional events, 
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groundbreaking discoveries, and transformative innovations (Strathern 2000, 
Fraser 2009). But it is also difficult to the extent that the social sciences have 
become prone to think about every-thing, including not only humans and non-
humans but, as we saw in Chapter Four, also their own knowledge-products, in 
terms of actions and effects. And the difficulty has to do with the fact that while 
the event is indeed an effect, it cannot in a strict sense be effected, either 
‘performatively’ or otherwise. Deleuze (Deleuze & Parnet 2006: 48) interestingly 
expresses this paradox when he asks, 
 
How could an event not be effected by bodies, since it 
depends on a state and on a compound of bodies as its 
causes, since it is produced by bodies, the breaths and 
qualities which are interpenetrating here and now? But 
how could the event be exhausted by its effectuation, 
since, as effect, it differs in nature from its cause, since it 
acts itself as a quasi-cause which skims over bodies, which 
traverses and traces a surface, object of a counter-
effectuation or of an eternal truth? 
 
Thus, an event is something that might happen but not something that can be 
made to happen. In contrast, its happening is always the result of an unexpected 
and complex constellation of bodies and its mixtures, and can never be 
contained within the bounds of an explanation that could hold the event still by 
reducing it to its cause, in order to capture it in a mental fist, or worse, to 
embalm it. In other words, to will an event is not to produce events at will– 
orienting social scientific practices towards the possibility of an event is 
certainly not to suggest that everybody should, or even could, go about 
creating, making and proclaiming events – be that the event of a discovery, of 
an accomplished ‘impact’, of yet another intellectual ‘turn’, or any other.  
 Indeed, to the extent that an event can be thought of as an effect, the 
latter resembles less an act than an achievement– namely, a delicate, difficult 
and rare realisation that can be attained by a mingling of bodies and other 
events, but whose success cannot be ascribed to any single author and is never 
guaranteed. ‘Any event is a fog of a million droplets’  (Deleuze & Parnet 2006: 
48). What this implies, then, is that the becoming of an event always requires a 
delicate configuration of multiple entities, practices and trajectories of which 
scientific practices are only one element among the many. It is arguably for this 
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reason that, in the case of the experimental sciences, Isabelle Stengers (2000: 68-
69. emphasis added) describes the scientific practices of experimental 
replicability not as that which conveys a certain phenomenon with the 
authority of an immobile law, but as the effect of an event that reveals its own 
breeding ground so that it can possibly be experienced again: 
 
What scientists know, as I am trying to singularize them– 
thus excluding the systematic producers of artifacts “in 
the name of science” or “in the name of objectivity”– what 
their tradition tells them, is that the foundation has 
already given way to diverse reprises, that the soils have 
been occupied, that is, that the event can be repeated. No 
procedure, however rational it might be, and no 
submission to criteria, whatever it may be, can guarantee 
this repetition. But the repetition would not find the 
terrain where it could be produced were not the scientists 
acting with a view towards its production. 
 
In other words, what any scientist learns, be it experimental or social, ‘hard’ or 
‘soft’, is not the correct formal and methodological procedures for the unlimited 
production of events. It is never about becoming a master of the event, capable 
of producing it at will so long as the right kinds of instruments and mechanisms 
are in place. In contrast, what is at stake is a mode of practice and inquiry that 
forces those who are lured by the possibility of learning anything at all to 
situate themselves in the middle so as to expose themselves, their questions, 
and patterns of contrast, to the buzzing multiplicities that in becoming together 
in a delicate and always fragile constellation might achieve the production of a 
difference that matters, which is to say of an event.  
 This is why one cannot emphasise enough the importance of social 
scientific practices to be defined not by their methods, nor by the theories they 
support, but by the risks they take (See Chapter Two). For the event marks the 
limit of risk. It is the limit that –for those encounters who have succeeded in 
becoming articulated in such a way that a proposition that matters could be 
invented– marks the difference between a before and an after. In other words, it 
provides the signal that something has indeed been learned. To become 
exposed, to put oneself at risk is, thus, what any adventure requires, and it is 
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what opens up the possibility, but never the promise, that something might be 
learned: 
 
Depart. Go out. Allow yourself to be seduced one day. 
Become many, brave the outside world, split off 
somewhere else. These are the first three foreign things, 
the three varieties of alterity, the three initial means of 
being exposed. For there is no learning without exposure, 
often dangerous, to the other. I will never again know 
what I am, where I am, from where I’m from, where I’m 
going, through where to pass. I am exposed to others, to 
foreign things. (Serres 1997: 8) 
 
As I have shown in previous chapters, to become exposed is not simply a 
critique of what has been termed the ‘ivory tower’, nor can it be equated with a 
celebration of just any form of inquiry that calls itself ‘empirical’. Empirical 
research does not, in and of itself, guarantee that an encounter might become 
articulated in a manner that allows for a proposition that matters to be 
invented. Moreover, in the next chapter I shall have more to say about the 
forms of exposure that may characterise those forms of inquiry, like the present 
one, which in the usual parlance of the contemporary social sciences, may 
acquire the name of ‘theory’.   
 In contrast, to be lured by the possibility of an event, to work with a view 
towards the possible invention of a proposition requires, first and foremost, that 
one encounters situations and objects of inquiry without a pre-defined 
conception of what is naturally or culturally possible.  Indeed, insofar as the 
event is that which, by introducing a novelty in the world, makes a difference 
that transforms the possible, to encounter a situation with a pre-defined sense 
of what that situation is capable of is to mobilise the notion of ‘the possible’ as 
that which sets the ultimate limits to what might become relevant in that 
situation. It is, in order words, to reduce the possible to the known and to 
silently prophesy the death of the event72. This is precisely what the question of 
relevance seeks to resist. Indeed, to orient an inquiry not towards the 
                                                
72 It is arguably for this reason that Henri Bergson (see especially his ‘The Possible and The 
Real’ in Bergson, 2007) and, later, Gilles Deleuze, are generally critical –although not always, as 
this chapter shows– of the notion of ‘the possible’ and argue instead for a concept of ‘the 
virtual’. Needless to say, the way in which I have been employing the notion of the possible 
here is closer to their use of the term ‘virtual’. 
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production of a solution to a pre-existent problem but towards the question of 
‘how is it, here, that things matter?’ is to expose such a mode of inquiry to an 
unknown, and thus, to be lured by the emergence of a different order of the 
possible.  
 Relatedly, and insofar as I am not advocating a form of inquiry that, in 
presupposing a conceptual tabula rasa, might confuse ignorance with innocence, 
to become exposed is also to allow that one’s questions, one’s manner of 
defining a problem, one’s sense of what matters, might be mistaken. To believe 
that one could be mistaken is not simply a good antidote against dogmatism –
although it should be noted, this is not minor either–; it is not simply to suggest 
that, indeed, part of the risk of a social scientific inquiry is that it may fail to 
produce what it might have expected, and that it may even fail to produce 
anything that an institution or a funding body might find worthwhile (See 
Chapter Four). Crucially, entertaining the possibility of being mistaken is also 
to affirm that taking the question of relevance seriously matters, that working 
towards the invention of a proposition that matters is indeed worth the trouble.   
 It is here, I believe, that William James’ (1956: 17-19) empiricist 
distinction between the passions of ‘knowing the truth’ and that of ‘avoiding 
error’ profoundly resonates with an inquiry oriented by an ethics of exposure, 
which is also to say, oriented towards events. Indeed, to the extent that many 
contemporary social sciences have –not entirely without reasons– become 
suspicious of the very concept of truth –and some in fact, are suspicious of 
reality as such– and afraid of its normative political consequences, much critical 
scholarship today seems to revolve around the avoidance of error, and operates 
by analysing, which is to say, by undoing, the operations of those who, in 
risking a truth, confuse it with their own unacknowledged habits or desires. But 
as Michel Serres (1997: 79) argued, ‘[o]ne exposes oneself when one makes, one 
imposes oneself when one unmakes. When one unmakes, one is never wrong, 
in effect. I know of no better way to be always right.’ 
 To be sure, I am not suggesting that such critical operations come to a 
halt, for critique is not just an intellectual tool but it is also, after all, a thing of 
this world (Boland 2013)73.  Conversely, neither am I suggesting here that we 
resort to a transcendental notion of truth that might, yet again, restore to social 
scientific practices the modern dream of discovering eternal, unconscious laws 
                                                
73 And I shall have more to say about such critical operations in the next chapter. 
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of the social. To my mind, both such propositions have the same effect– that of 
working towards the stabilisation of the possible.  
 In contrast, in a world of events, errors are not such ‘solemn things. In a 
world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain 
lightness of heart seems healthier that his excessive nervousness on their 
behalf.’ (James 1956: 19).  They are the necessary steps of any practice that is 
oriented by what I am here calling –for lack of a better term– an ethics of 
exposure. Similarly, to seek the truth, as James proposes we do, does not 
require that we abide by a transcendental notion of truth that could deliver the 
timeless predicates of reality. Indeed, in a world of events concrete truths 
perhaps need not be predicates which, for their part, are always entangled with 
the many modes of inheriting an event. Perhaps concrete truths resemble less a 
‘what’ than a ‘that’, a ‘variation of interest’ (Whitehead 1968: 11), the experience 
that something has happened, that something has come (in)to matter, that a 
different order of possibilities has been opened up, and that such an event 
cannot be undone, despite all the critical procedures and exercises in 
estrangement that we might put into play in seeking its dissolution. It is with 
the possibility of such an experience that I want to associate the event as that 
which might happen, and it is towards such experiences that inquiries in the 
social sciences could be oriented. 
 
Conclusion: Transitional Knowledge 
 
 In this chapter I have sought to explore the complexities and 
implications of the concept of ‘event’ as that which constitutes the incorporeal 
backbone of the processual world in which I have sought to situate the project 
of a speculative reconstruction of the contemporary social sciences. In contrast 
to the teleological, chronological, and structural conceptions of temporality that 
have for decades guided practices of inquiry in the social sciences, I have 
suggested that the event, as that which transforms the order of the possible, 
invokes a poetic temporality, a time that is made and remade by the many 
interventions that shape the worlds such practices inhabit and explore. 
 Because it requires us to sway between the ordinary production of 
microevents and the exceptional differences that change the course of what we 
normally call ‘History’, the concept of event provides a powerful instrument for 
the reconstruction of the ethos that may guide social scientific practices. 
Emerging always as that which has happened and that which might, or is about 
191 
to, happen, the event propels a double temporality that is also and at the same 
time a double ethical exercise. Indeed, as I have suggested, to affirm the power 
of events to shape the history of which a practice might become an heir also 
forces such a practice to step out into the open and become exposed to the 
possibility that unexpected events might happen in the future.  
 To cultivate a mode of inquiry that be oriented by events, between 
events, and with a view to their possibility is, ultimately, the task that the 
question of relevance requires. A task that, as I have suggested, supposes a 
transformation of some of the ethical sensibilities that may inform inquiry while 
simultaneously forcing us to reconsider the nature of that process we call 
‘knowledge’ in a world where regularities are not a given but rare and complex 
achievements. In a sense, some of the sensibilities that I have sought to cultivate 
in this and previous chapters –exposure, inheritance, obligation, wonder, 
hesitation, the possible, etc.– could be interpreted as a ‘return’ to a certain care 
of knowledge and care of the world that had, since the rise of Enlightened 
thought, become rather disreputable (Daston & Park 2003).  
 But, just like events, sensibilities do not simply ‘return’ either, and we do 
not return to them. Indeed, if the notion of the event teaches us anything, then 
at the very least it makes evident that there is no such thing as ‘returning’, 
unless that which returns is difference itself (Deleuze 1994, on the question of 
Nietzsche’s eternal return in a world of becoming see also Connolly 2013: 217). 
To attempt to cultivate, in these pages, a different set of sensibilities does not 
mark a ‘return’ to a pre-modern or medieval care of knowledge whereby 
sensibilities such as exposure and wonder were conceived of as the effects of 
divine intervention, just as Deleuze’s reclaiming of the event through a reading 
of Stoic philosophy does not, in and of itself, foster a return to stoicism. Thus, 
such attempts should not be confused with a nostalgic lament that regrets, like 
Max Weber (2009), the modern scientific ‘disenchantment’ of the world. For 
such a lament accepts the very Enlightened disjunction that opposes scientific 
knowledge to the perplexities induced by the transformations of the possible.  
 In contrast, to turn that disjunction into a possible conjunction, as a 
possible social science might do, is simultaneously to suggest that the 
production of knowledge cannot be equated with the ‘true’ definition of 
essences and substances that confuses the question of how things come (in)to 
matter in specific and situated ways with the question of how they have always 
been and how they will always be. It cannot be reduced to the construction of 
systems of correspondences, static differences and immobile relationships. It is 
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also to suggest that producing knowledge cannot be reduced to a celebration of 
chaos, ontological incoherence, elusiveness or mess (cf. Law 2004), even though 
learning to deal with those aspects of the world might often be required.  
 As Michel Serres (1982: 73) argues, ‘[t]he only systems, instances, and 
substances come from our lack of knowledge. The system is nonknowledge. 
The other side of knowledge. One side of nonknowledge is chaos; the other, 
system. Knowledge forms a bridge between the two banks. Knowledge as such 
is a space of transformation.’ Indeed, to resist the disjunction between 
knowledge and the transformation of the possible is to approach practices of 
knowledge-making not from the point of view of what they succeed in holding 
still, but from the standpoint of the transitions their adventures achieve, 
between those events that have come to compose a situation and constitute our 
present, and those that generate an opening towards a different world to come.
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Chapter Six: 
For Speculative Reason 
 
Introduction: “The Latest Theory Is That Theory Doesn’t Matter” 
 
 By following the implications of what in Chapter One I associated with 
the question of relevance, that is, the various manners and degrees in which the 
many heterogeneous facts that compose the world come (in)to matter in 
entangled and situated ways, throughout this thesis I have attempted to discern 
and propose some of the intellectual and practical instruments that might be 
required for certain forms of social scientific inquiry to take the question of 
relevance seriously, that is, to articulate and orient their practices by and 
towards the event of what has and what may come (in)to matter, and by 
wondering about how, in what degrees and manners, that situated coming 
(in)to matter might be characterised.   
 In so doing, I have sought to contribute to a philosophical outlook that 
could be resolutely termed ‘empiricist’, a radical form of empiricism that I have 
inherited from thinkers such as William James, John Dewey, A.N. Whitehead, 
Gilles Deleuze, Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers and William Connolly, among 
others. As I have argued throughout, one of the defining features of radical 
empiricism is, to be sure, its commitment to the priority of experience. Indeed, a 
commitment to experiences of all natures and manners, as means of feeling, 
knowing and thinking the world and the relationship that our practices sustain 
in and with it. It was James (2003: 22) himself who expressed such a 
commitment in a form that could almost be read as a maxim. ‘To be radical’, he 
proposed, ‘an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element 
that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is 
directly experienced’. As we have seen, what is given in experience is certainly 
more than just discrete things in isolation, as classical empiricism would 
otherwise have it. Experience also includes the many relations and modes of 
togetherness by which things come (in)to matter.  
 Thus, I have sought to explore the problematising character of 
‘relevance’ in relation to the ways in which the practices of contemporary social 
science experience and may come to ‘know’ the worlds they encounter, while 
revisiting what ‘knowledge’ as a process and a form of relating to the world 
might entail. At the same time, I have attempted to propose certain instruments 
for a different care of knowledge by which such modes of experiencing might 
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remain open to the situated question and negotiations of how things matter, to 
what degree and in what manner.  
 To the extent that certain versions of the Aristotelian clear-cut distinction 
between theoria and praxis still have some purchase on the ways in which 
contemporary social scientific inquiries are understood, organised, funded and 
alas, experienced, a skeptical reader – I suspect, in fact, many readers– might 
still retain a feeling of suspicion regarding the very nature of my exploration. 
Indeed, for all the discussions around the event of mattering, around practical 
encounters, adventures, objections, wonder, hesitation, events, this thesis, in her 
view, might just remain another ‘theoretical’ exercise. It might thus fail to live 
up to its own commitments. The skeptical reader might then ask: ‘if experience is 
primary and practices are crucial to it, why do “theory”? why does theory matter 
anyway?’ Surely, one could easily dismiss the question by undermining the very 
distinction that underpins it. One could simply reply that ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’, ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ inquiry, are not in fact two distinct 
activities or forms of knowledge. One could argue, as it has been done by many 
authors in various ways, that theorising –or more plainly, thinking– is in fact a 
practice too. A practice that has less to do with the image of ‘The Thinker’ 
conveyed by Rodin’s famous sculpture of a solitary man in reclusion from the 
world, and more to do with a difficult articulation of an array of encounters 
between humans, a more-than-human world, ideas, discipline, creativity and 
events.74  
 To be sure, one might certainly be ‘right’ to suggest that this is the case, 
and I am prone to agree that any simple distinction between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’ ought to be problematised. Nevertheless, to bypass the question by 
suggesting that it is simply unfounded and thus, that it itself does not matter, is 
to presuppose that what makes a question ‘relevant’, even a skeptical one, is a 
logical or intellectual justification whose legitimacy could easily be judged in 
advance. If my attempt at taking the question of relevance seriously has had 
any degree of success, I would hope that it –almost– goes without saying that 
this is not the case. 
                                                
74 There are numerous versions of this argument and even some empirical studies on what sort 
of practice thinking might be (for a historico-philosophical study of ancient philosophy as a 
spiritual exercise see Hadot 1995, on intellectual invention in science and culture see Schlanger 
1983, for a discussion of ‘conceptual practices’ in science and mathematics see for instance 
Pickering 1995, for a recent attempt at empirically studying social theory as a practice see 
Heilbron 2011). 
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  Thus, although from the 1960s to the 1980s the social sciences and 
humanities saw an expansion of ‘theory’ within anglophone universities, there 
are good historical and intellectual reasons for taking such a skeptical question 
very seriously today. For, as historian Ian Hunter (2006, 2007) has rightly 
argued and as I will discuss below, while what is commonly known as ‘theory’ 
–or rather ‘Theory’, with a capital ‘T’– has constituted a very heterogeneous 
intellectual event that defies unification, it can perhaps be best understood as 
the renewal of a certain ethos– one that could be seen as a radicalised version of 
the ethics of estrangement, and which, more specifically, may be characterised 
by an attitude of suspicion about, perhaps even disdain for, the positive 
knowledges produced by the empirical sciences. Moreover, as I will show in the 
next section, some of the recent attacks on ‘Theory’, particularly in the 
contemporary social sciences, can be seen as a set of empiricist responses to 
such a disdain for experience, by calling for a provincialised return to ‘the 
empirical’ (see for instance Adkins and Lury 2009, Boltanski 2011, Latour 
2004a). 
   In this sense, if the social sciences and the humanities can be said to be 
undergoing a crisis that, as I suggested in Chapter One, is expressed through 
various demands for relevance that threaten their intellectual and institutional 
futures, for the past fifteen years there has been a growing, generalised sense –of 
concern, for some; of celebration, for others– that ‘theory’ has already failed to 
meet those demands, that its time is up, that it has run out of steam, and that 
perhaps we might all be better off without it (see for instance Butler et al. 2000, 
Eagleton 2003, Elliot & Attridge 2011, Farred & Hardt 2011, Hunter 2006, 2007, 
Latour 2004a, Mitchell 2004, Patai & Corral 2005). 
 On 11-12 April 2003, for example, the then editors of Critical Inquiry, a 
University of Chicago-based journal that has to this date been at the forefront of 
theoretical work and debates in the humanities and the social sciences, invited 
the members of the journal’s editorial board to a public meeting in Chicago. The 
aim of the meeting was to discuss ‘the future of the journal and of the 
interdisciplinary field of criticism and theory it addresses’ (Mitchell 2004: 324). 
Prior to their attendance, each of the participants was asked to write a short 
statement in response to a series of questions which testify to the climate of 
concern mentioned above. Some of the questions read: 
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Have we now reached a plateau in which the future [of 
theory and criticism] is likely to be one of consolidation, 
refinement, and continuity? Or are we at the threshold of 
new developments, whether reactive rollbacks to earlier 
paradigms or dimly foreseen revolutions and emergent 
innovations? […] 
 
What, in your view, would be the desirable future of 
critical inquiry in the coming century? If you were able to 
dictate the agenda for theory and criticism in research and 
educational institutions, and in the public sphere, what 
would you imagine is the ideal structure of feeling and 
thought to inform critical practice? And, above all, what 
steps do you think need to be taken in the present moment 
to move toward this desirable future? What, in short, is to 
be done? (reproduced in Mitchell 2004: 330) 
 
Interestingly, the public event on the question of the futures of ‘Theory’ and the 
demands for relevance that it faced managed to attract the attention of major 
US newspapers including the New York Times, and the Boston Globe (Mitchell 
2004). Despite the variegated statements produced by the long list of 
distinguished scholars that participated in the symposium,  however, the New 
York Times sentenced the event with a headline that read: ‘The Latest Theory Is 
That Theory Doesn’t Matter’ (Eakin 2003, April 11).  
 Thus, the question of the role of theory today and of its place within the 
radical empiricism in relation to which I have developed this work is one that 
cannot go unexamined. To be sure, the scope of such questions amply exceeds 
any response I can and shall risk giving within the bounds of this chapter. 
Furthermore, even if my response was to constitute a whole book instead of a 
chapter –a book I might one day wish to write–, it can never be, nor pretend to 
be, a final response capable of singlehandedly settling the stakes of the debate. 
Thus, in this chapter I will attempt to explore some aspects of these questions 
with the aim of articulating a plea for the possibility and the role of theoretical 
activity today. The hope is that it might, first, provide a partial response to the 
questions posed by my imaginary –yet possibly quite real– skeptical reader, 
and second, make a contribution, however modest and partial, to the ongoing 
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debate on the future of theorising in the contemporary social sciences and the 
humanities.  
 In so doing, I will propose a particular mode of theorising or thinking that 
differs in important respects from the ethos that has been associated with the 
moment of ‘Theory’ emerging from the work of structuralist and 
poststructuralist thinkers in France towards the end of the 1960s and that made 
its way into anglophone universities in subsequent years (Hunter 2006).  What I 
will attempt to propose is another type of intellectual exercise, one that I will 
seek to extract from the seminal insights of many of the empiricist thinkers 
mentioned above while reworking it for our present purposes. This other mode 
of thought is what I want to associate with a practice of ‘speculation’, indeed, 
with what I will call a speculative reason. As I will argue, instead of turning the 
ethics of estrangement into an exercise of mobilising thinking, or theory, to 
suspect experience and the empirical, speculative reason always begins from 
the facts of experience and seeks to return to them, albeit in a transformed way. 
It is thus a radical empiricist theorising whose ethos is cultivated by the 
articulation of an inheritance of the past and an exposure to possibilities 
emerging from the present that, as I argued in the last chapter, characterises an 
adventure as an ethics of events.  
 Thus, while what we commonly associate with ‘Theory’ constitutes, as I 
will argue in the next section, an intellectual operation committed to the 
production of critical diagnoses of the present such that its time is always the 
‘now’ (Lauretis 2004), the business of speculative thinking like the one 
performed in this thesis is, as Whitehead (1958: 82) once put it, ‘to make 
thought creative of the future’. I will argue that speculative reason, as a form of 
theorising, is to be conceived as a wager on the possibility that the future might 
be more than a mere continuation from the present. It is a gamble on the 
possibility that our propositions might find a response from the world as it 
transitions into what is yet to come, allowing it to actualise a different mode of 
becoming, one that may allow our practices, in turn, to move from another 
departure point, towards somewhere else. 
 In order to understand the meaning and potentiality of the wager 
involved in speculation we first have to explore some of the reasons for the so-
called demise of ‘Theory’ in the contemporary social sciences and the 
humanities and its relation to a certain revival of empiricism, so that we can 
extract from its interstices constraints and propositions that may allow us to 
devise a different relationship to, and a different role for, the practice of 
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theorising. I will thus turn to this thorny question in what follows, and then 
come back to the question of speculative reason in subsequent sections of the 
chapter. 
 
Theory’s Thousand Tiny Deaths: Social Theory, Experience and 
the Ethics of Thought 
 
 That what we once knew as ‘Theory‘ is dead seems nowadays to be both 
a generalised concern and a new common knowledge within certain strands of 
the contemporary social sciences and humanities. Indeed, claims that we are 
situated ‘after Theory’ are shared both by critics of so-called ‘Theory’ (e.g. 
Eagleton 2003) and by those who seek to expand novel forms of theoretical 
inquiry into the future (Elliot & Attridge 2011). As soon as one  –prompted by a 
feeling of curiosity or mourning, or a mix of both– attempts to explore the 
reasons for its demise, however, it becomes progressively less clear why it died, 
who or what killed it, whether its death is something to be grieved or 
celebrated, or whether it has in fact died at all.  
 Indeed, it has been argued that ‘Theory’ was too philosophical and not 
specific enough to survive in the disciplines it nevertheless affected (Patai & 
Corral 2005); that it was ‘so wilfully obscure’ (Eagleton 2003: 77); that it 
operated analytically, by being always right (Latour 2004a); that it was not 
philosophical enough (Osborne 2011); that it turned the social sciences and the 
humanities into a politics by other means (Jacoby 2005); that it was too textual, 
denying every other aspect of human existence (Wellek 2005); that it infused the 
humanities with political purchase (Butler et al. 2000); that it killed ‘Man’ and 
‘The Author’ through its various anti-humanisms (Claiborne Park 2005); that it 
was incapable of thinking beyond the presence of Man and its humanity on 
earth (Colebrook 2011, 2014); that the rise of ‘Theory’ was due to the 
incorporation of culture itself into the productive advance of late capitalism 
(Jameson 1990, Eagleton 2003); that it is the capitalist culture of war that now 
literally deploys ‘Theory’ and its concepts (Massumi 2011); that ‘Theory’ is long 
dead; that it ‘has never been more alive and well’ (Wolfe 2011: 34). 
 Part of the reason for ‘Theory’s’ thousand tiny deaths and resurrections, 
surely, has to do with the fact that its historical trajectories differ considerably, 
depending on whether the focus is on the past and future of literary studies, art 
theory, or of, say, sociology. But also, and relatedly, what accounts for the 
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multiplicity of death and (re)birth certificates is that in each of them ‘Theory’ 
tends to mean something slightly different. Although there seems to be some 
loose consensus that ‘Theory’ refers to the influence in anglophone universities 
of a series of authors and works broadly associated with French structuralism 
and poststructuralism such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis Althusser, Jacques 
Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Jean-
François Lyotard, and so on, some commentators also refer to the critical 
traditions ensuing from the Frankfurt School and the social theory of Pierre 
Bourdieu (Boltanski 2011), and yet others include thinkers from very different 
philosophical outlooks such as Richard Rorty (Jacoby 2005), who is also 
presented elsewhere as an exemplary ‘anti-theorist’ (Eagleton 2003).  
 This also applies to the question of what the object and the correct 
language of so-called ‘Theory’ might be. As Ian Hunter (2006: 78) has noted,  
 
[o]ne of the most striking features of recent discussions of 
the moment of theory in the humanities is the lack of even 
approximate agreement about what the object of such 
theory might be and about the language in which it has 
been or should be conducted. For Terry Eagleton the 
object of theory is culture– understood as the dialectical 
moment in which the making of meaning encounters its 
own social determination– and its language is a version of 
Marxian social theory, to which Eagleton has recently 
added some aristotelian ballast. For Robert Pippin, 
though, theory’s object is the conditions of knowledge as 
first posed by Kant and then taken up in other disciplines, 
while the language of theory is that of post-Kantian 
critical philosophy. Other commentators take the object of 
theory to be language or literature or the mode of literary 
production […] and locate theory’s language in the 
discourse of literary criticism, albeit in diverse forms. This 
diversity could be extended without much difficulty. 
 
So how can we approach the question ‘what is ‘Theory’?’ in such a way that it 
might allow us to confront its predicament and to rearticulate a different mode 
of theorising that could become a productive response to the skeptical question 
that gives rise to this chapter? Hunter (2006, 2007) himself offers what I believe 
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to be a helpful approach to this question, one that is akin –indeed from which I 
have taken inspiration– to the definition of ‘contemporary social science’ 
provided in the introduction to the thesis. In trying to lay the grounds for a 
‘history of ‘Theory’’, he argues that rather than associating ‘Theory’ with a 
common object, which it has not, with an epistemic subject, which also varies 
significantly, or with a language, which tends to depend on the other two, one 
might approach it as the emergence of a new, or renewed75 intellectual attitude, 
indeed, a technique of self-problematisation, or an ethics of thought. 
 Such an attitude, which according to Hunter is owed not so much to 
Kant but to Husserl, concerns the cultivation of an intellectual deportment 
characterised by a particular operation which, after Husserl and Derrida, he 
calls the ‘transcendental reduction’ or epochē. ‘The transcendental reduction’, 
Hunter argues, ‘is the act of suspending one’s commitments to all empirical 
views and positivistic formalisms, thereby preparing oneself for the irruptive 
appearance of the noematic transcendental phenomenon‘ (Hunter 2006: 83). In 
other words, the gesture of the epochē which Hunter associates with the moment 
of theory characterises a particular mode of philosophising or theorising, 
indeed which situates the theorist away from the world which she attempts to 
think, forbidding her from asking questions which would presuppose the 
empirical world as a ground for the posing of the question itself. Conversely, it 
invites the theorist to problematise the very grounding, the transcendental or 
archeological conditions, that would make a certain understanding of the world 
possible as a ground for knowledge.  
 The implications of the epochē as an intellectual gesture are thus clear– 
they involve the incessant questioning, through a philosophical or theoretical 
technique performed upon oneself and upon others, of all forms of empirical 
knowledge from the point of view of their transcendental or ‘archeological’ 
conditions. In this sense, it may be said to constitute a radicalised version of the 
ethics of estrangement I have been problematising in previous chapters. As 
Hunter (2007: 9) puts it elsewhere, what configures the persona of the theorist 
and justifies her exercise in this sense is not the realisation that things are never 
                                                
75 Hunter (2006: 98) relates this emergence to a post-phenomenological renewal of seventeenth 
century European university metaphysics, which ‘can be characterised as an academic 
discipline (or culture) whose thematics concern the relation between an infinite, atemporal, self-
active, world-creating intellect and a finite, “duplex” (intellectual-corporeal) worldly being. 
Since the seventeenth century one of this discipline’s central tasks has been to forestall the 
autonomy of positive knowledges by tethering them to philosophical reflection on this relation 
of finite to infinite being.’ 
201 
what they seem. It is rather the interrogation of their non-self-evidence that 
constitutes the very aim of theory: ‘things do not lose their self-evidence; it has 
to be taken away from them’.  
 The relation between theory and experience is thus indeed a critical 
relation, establishing the former as a sounder of that which constitutes the latter 
as self-evident. In other words, if for empiricists direct experience is, as 
Whitehead (1955: 6) put it, ‘infallible’, such that ‘[w]hat you have experienced, 
you have experienced’; if what remains to be interrogated is not what makes 
direct experiences possible but the means whereby direct experience is 
interrogated, transformed into knowledge, or in our case, how the question of 
the degree and manner in which things matter in a situation is negotiated; for 
Theory-as-we-have-come-to-know-it, what is infallible is rather the claim that 
any experience that can be called ‘direct’ is always already indirect. 
  The challenge was then that of interrogating the intellectual, pre-
empirical operations by which experience can be constituted as such.76  Theory’s 
attitude and role in relation to the empirical knowledge-practices of the 
contemporary social sciences and the humanities was thus one of skepticism 
and suspicion, of unveiling the hidden mechanisms –epistemes, intertexualities, 
underlying structures, regimes of truth, plays of signification, unconscious 
processes, systems of signs, power-relations– whereby ‘the empirical’ could 
itself be constituted as an object of scientific knowledge in diverse ways. Once 
taken up by empirical social researchers themselves, this attitude of skepticism 
and critique was, as we have seen, transposed to the experience of their own 
objects of inquiry. 
 For this reason too, theory was seen as a means of producing what we 
could call a ‘critical diagnostics’ of our present. One could perhaps argue that 
what informed its task was a rather limited interpretation of Foucault’s (1997b) 
famous essay on Kant’s What is Enlightenment?, one in which he sought to 
positively describe the philosophical ethos as a ‘critique of what we are saying 
and doing through a historical ontology of ourselves.’ (1997b: 316). If I say that 
                                                
76 This can be said to be the case at least to the extent that one retains ‘theory’ as a somewhat 
abstract characterisation of a mode of self-interrogation that might allow as to articulate a 
different ethics of thought. Like any abstraction from concrete fact, however, Hunter’s 
characterisation omits part of the truth. So does mine, insofar as it takes his as a point of 
departure. Indeed, when one approaches the individual works of some of the authors loosely 
associated with the moment of Theory on the question of experience, as intellectual historian 
Martin Jay (2005) has done with Roland Barthes, Foucault and also Georges Bataille, for 
instance, it becomes clear that these theorists’ relation to experience was less straightforward 
and more ambivalent than here suggested. I will come back to this, concerning Foucault, below 
and in the conclusion of the thesis. 
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Theory’s interpretation of Foucault’s description was or is particularly limited 
is because, if our depiction of Theory’s ethics of thought is correct, then it 
would seem that this ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ was understood exclusively 
in its historical or genealogical dimension. That is, ’as a historical investigation 
into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognise 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.’ (1997b: 316). This 
is probably why in the Critical Inquiry symposium that I mentioned above, for 
instance, feminist theorist Teresa de Lauretis (2004: 365) resisted the very 
invitation to think about the future of theory on the grounds that, in her view, 
‘the time of theory is always the now.’ As she explained: 
 
What this means is, the time of theory, as articulated 
thought, is always the present, though its roots be found 
in the past, reaching across the contingent, material, social, 
sexual, racial, intellectual history of the theorizing subject 
and regardless of its uses and abuses in the undetermined 
future (2004: 365). 
 
But Foucault’s articulation of such a philosophical ethos also contained an 
‘experimental’ dimension, one he connected very intimately to the question of 
freedom and one he would arguably explore in his later writings on sexuality, 
ethics, and truth (on ‘freedom’ in Foucault see most recently Connolly 2014). 
Besides the critical work produced by historical inquiries, Foucault (1997b: 317) 
argued, theory must ‘put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, 
both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to 
determine the precise form this change should take’. In the next section, I will 
argue that speculative reason is singularly attuned to this experimental 
dimension mentioned by Foucault and rarely taken seriously by theorists. As 
we will see, to add experimentation to theory not only complexifies theory’s 
relation to experience, but forces us to consider that the time of speculation 
concerns not simply the present but the mode in which the present slides into a 
possible future. 
 Given theory’s ultimate distrust of empirical knowledges and of the 
question of the possible futures experience might herald, then, it is not entirely 
surprising that, in light of its demise, a powerful set of responses has given way 
to what has been termed a (re)turn to the empirical (Adkins & Lury 2009). To be 
sure, not all of the proposals that are or could be included within this 
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reappraisal of experience have been anti-theoretical. One example of the latter 
concerns the emergence of an interest in questions of affect. Although itself a 
heterogeneous field grouping a number of very different approaches and 
thinkers, affect theorists –as they are commonly called, and not for no reason 
(e.g. Gregg & Seigworth 2010)–, particularly those in the tradition that emerges 
from Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza and Bergson, have arguably sought provide 
theory with an empiricist inflection and a novel attention to pre-individual, pre- 
or sub-conscious, and pre-subjective experiences. It is this interest in the pre-
individual realm that has arguably led some of these theorists to explore and 
attempt to think with the empirical evidence produced by some of the life 
sciences such as Neuroscience and Biology. Sciences which do study ‘the 
human’, but do so from the point of view of the many other pre-social, pre-
cultural modes of existence that feed into the process of its own composition.  
 There has been some controversy as to how such empirical evidence is 
taken up in affect theory, suggesting that in these theoretical works biology and 
neuroscience are endowed with some kind of revelatory capacity that allows 
theorists to ground their more ambitious claims instead of approaching the 
evidence critically (see for example Leys 2011, Papoulias & Callard 2010). This 
might be true in some cases. But what these critiques often miss is that the best 
examples of affect theory involve not only an affirmative theoretical practice 
that seeks to connect empirical evidence of pre-individual experiences to the 
composition of individual, social, and cultural ones –a connection that itself 
requires inventive thinking–, but also, and crucially, a transformation in the 
ethics of thought that drives theoretical activity (e.g. Connolly 2002, Massumi 
2002, Stenner & Greco 2013). Namely, a mode of thought that does not oppose 
culture to biology, or nature, but that seeks to inventively attend to what 
Connolly (2002: 20) would call the interactive ‘layering of culture’– a mode of 
inquiry that invites ‘you to attend to the complex relays joining bodies, brains, 
and culture’ in such a way ‘the hubris invested in tight models of explanation 
and consummate narrative of interpretation becomes vivid’.  
 Other returns to ‘the empirical’ have been less sympathetic to the activity 
of theory and critique. In yet another of the many ‘turns’ that the contemporary 
social sciences and the humanities have for some time repeatedly hastened to 
proclaim, anti-theoretical or anti-critical responses have emerged under the 
umbrella label of a ‘descriptive turn’ (for a history of its early emergence see 
Dosse 1999). Again, these responses, which have emerged more prominently 
within social theory but that have also affected literary theory (e.g. Love 2010), 
204 
are as heterogeneous as what they are responding to (for a critical overview in 
social theory see Savage 2009). Some of them have turned critique and theory 
on their heads, that is, into objects of empirical study, be them sociological 
(Boltanski 2011, Boltanski and Chapiello 2005, Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 
Heilbron 2011) or anthropological (Boland 2013), while not necessarily 
endorsing their demise.  
 Others, as we will see immediately below, have gone one step further, 
attempting to kill off the theoretical or critical ethos77 by replacing it with a 
purely descriptive one. If anything groups them together, however, is perhaps a 
gesture that associates theory and critique –when placed in the hands of 
‘professional’ theorists and critics– with the hubris of monopolising 
interpretation, and regards them as ineffective modes of thinking and practice. 
Theory becomes a strategy that, according to Boltanski and Chapiello’s (2005) 
argument, ends up becoming hunted by its prey, and mobilised by those 
discourses and practices it once sought to problematise. 
 Among those who oppose a descriptive ethos to a theoretical one, a most 
famous example is Latour’s (1993a, 2004a, 2005) declaration that critique has 
run out of steam, that it is redundant, similar to conspiracy theories, 
irredeemably modern, always operating by providing explanations that seek to 
monopolise the definition of a situation by replacing the causal forces at stake. 
Certainly, Latour is very aware of the fact that, first, what we have come to 
associate with theory and critique is to be conceived as a particular ethics of 
thought rather than a stable field with a common object or language; second, 
that one of the gestures that characterises this ethos is a retreat from the 
empirical: 
 
The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe 
that there was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact 
except by moving away from them and directing one’s 
attention toward the conditions that made them possible. 
But this meant accepting much too uncritically what 
matters of fact were. This was remaining too faithful to the 
unfortunate solution inherited from the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. (Latour 2004a: 231-232). 
                                                
77  From the point of view of a characterisation of ‘Theory’ as a technique of self-
problematisation, critiques of ‘critique’ or of ‘Theory’ appear as treating both terms 
interchangeably. 
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As we saw in Chapter One, his return to the empirical, or what he calls the 
‘realist attitude’ (2004a: 232), entailed the proposition that reality is not simply 
composed of matters of fact, but of what he calls matters of concern, whose 
coming into existence always involves the participation of a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous human and nonhuman agencies. The new attitude he proposes, 
then, is one that –through an empiricist, ethnomethodological inflection– would 
concern itself with giving more reality to matters of fact by describing the many 
agencies that feed into the making of things.   
 However, while in 2004 he saw this attitude as a means of transforming 
what we take critique to be, such that he referred to his counterproposal as a 
‘new critical attitude’ (2004a: 245), by the time his proposal became 
operationalised into what reads almost like a new manual for social inquiry 
(Latour 2005), he treats the explanatory attitude that he associates with theory 
and critique as a venereal disease against which description, as the deployment 
of all these agencies, would protect us: “[m]uch like ‘safe sex’, sticking to 
description protects against the transmission of explanations” (2005: 137). 
Description constitutes, according to Latour, ‘the highest and rarest 
achievement’ (2005: 137). It consists precisely in this activity of deploying as 
many actors composing a thing or situation as possible so that ‘the uniquely 
adequate account of a given situation’ (2005: 144) may be provided. In this way, 
description involves the consequence that ‘through the report concluding the 
enquiry the number of actors might be increased; the range of agencies making 
the actors act might be expanded; the number of objects active in stabilizing 
groups and agencies might be multiplied; and the controversies about matters 
of concern might be mapped.’ (2005:138) 
 To the extent that it attempts to modify the ethos of skepticism 
concerning the empirical that I, expanding on Hunter, suggested as a 
characterising feature of what we have come to know as theory and critique, I 
appreciate Latour’s empiricist call to devise a different relationship between 
intellectual practices and experience.78 I am admittedly less sanguine, however, 
about what he proposes instead. 
                                                
78 Although I suspect that a close reading of his proposal might render it slightly problematic. 
Indeed, while he shows a strong disdain for the critical ethos and its explanatory hubris, he also 
suggests that ‘the opposition between description and explanation is another of these false 
dichotomies that should be put to rest’ (Latour 2005: 137). I agree with this point, but in his 
subsequent argument for why this is the case, he writes that “[e]ither the networks that make 
possible a state of affairs are fully deployed–and then adding an explanation will be 
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 First, while I agree with him that when it comes to inventing 
propositions, their  ‘[r]elevance, like everything else, is an achievement’ (Latour 
2005: 138), I hope that my exploration of the question of relevance has made 
evident that the achievement of inventing propositions that matter is not 
necessarily dependent on increasing the number of actors, or on expanding the 
range of agencies. That might be required in some cases, as in Hetherington’s  
(2013) encounter with the Paraguayan farmers and the killer soy beans (see 
Chapter Three), where an object of inquiry –a human, in this case– objects to an 
exceedingly narrow definition of a situation put forth by an anthropologist. But 
the risk belonging to the question of relevance cannot be reduced to the concern 
‘Have I assembled enough?’ (Latour 2005: 136, n. 192). Achieving ‘relevance’ 
through inquiry is not merely about expanding the quantity of actors that 
compose a situation but the event of a successful negotiation of the varying 
manners and degrees in which they matter to it. As I argued, this requires 
inventive encounters involving questions, objections, a prepositional ethico-
politics, and risks. Thus, it might indeed be that ‘description‘ is simply too 
prophylactic an attitude for the mode of inquiry that the question of relevance 
requires.  
 Second –and this concerns more directly the activity of theorising– for all 
of Latour’s laudable efforts to reconstruct a richer and productive radical 
empiricism ‘after theory’, as it were, there is still a crucial element of experience 
that I find missing in his critique of critique. Although he is right to claim that 
additional explanations might not be what is missing, what I struggle to find is 
precisely what I want to associate with Foucault’s ‘experimental’ dimension of 
the activity of theorising. Namely, the relationship between the actuality of facts 
as encountered, observed, described, interrogated, etc., in the present –or more 
accurately, in the immediate past–, and the immanent possibilities inherent in 
those facts, possibilities that exhibit in the present a transition to a future 
(Whitehead 1967a). As I will argue in the next section, the experience of the 
present is not just an experience of things ‘as they are’ but also includes the 
                                                                                                                                          
superfluous– or we ‘add an explanation’ stating that some other actor or factor should be taken 
into account, so that it is the description that should be extended one step further.’ (2005: 137,  
emphasis added. emphasis from original removed) This account raises a series of questions: If 
the networks make possible a state of affairs, does this mean that they are different from the state 
of affairs itself? If so, is this account not creating the very distinction between the messy reality 
he seeks to describe, and the social explanation he is at pains to avoid? If the task of the actor-
network theorist is to describe the heterogeneity and complexity of the network, is she then not 
in fact describing, or indeed, explaining, what makes a state of affairs possible, that is, the very 
‘conditions of possibility’ that Latour despises? 
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experience of things ‘as they could be’. It is this unfinished nature of the present 
or, in other words, this experience of the present as itself exposed to the 
becoming of a future, as a transition between past and future, that is both 
crucial to radical empiricism and that opens up a space for the positive 
characterisation of an experimental, future-oriented mode of thought that I here 
want to associate with the notion of speculation. 
 
To Make Thought Creative of The Future: On Speculative Reason 
 
 What does it mean to say that the present is itself exposed to the 
becoming of a future? Let us briefly go back to the characterisation of events 
that I explored at some length in the last chapter. As I showed, insofar events 
make time rather than happen in time, they are never what is happening, but 
simultaneously what has happened and what is about to happen. This is the 
case both for ordinary and exceptional events. Ordinary events constitute the 
pulse of the real, where the term ‘pulse’ already conveys the sense of a rhythmic 
character to the coming in(to) matter of things. At the pragmatic level, 
exceptional events can only be discerned with respects to a genealogical 
trajectory, or a situation, that contrasts the event in question to other past, 
contemporary and future events. To the extent that the becoming of events 
requires the inheritance of past events and the exposure to the possibility of 
future events, then, the experience of the present is itself a mode of 
transitioning between events. As Whitehead (1967a: 192) put it, ‘[e]ach moment 
of experience confesses itself to be a transition between two worlds, the 
immediate past and the immediate future’.  
 Now, as I argued, the past inheres in the present as completed events 
that demand to be inherited but which do not dictate the terms in which its 
heirs will do so. To the extent that they demand to be inherited, and insofar as 
their inheritance is a requirement for the becoming of a future event, however, 
it follows that a future, or better, the necessity of a future, inheres in the 
demand of past events that contribute to constituting our present.  Events yearn 
for other events. Again, this is neither to say that the past efficiently causes the 
future, nor that the future is already constituted as a determining force in the 
present. Otherwise, there would be no novelty in the world, and thus, no 
events. As SF writer Margaret Atwood (2011: 5) has argued, ‘the future is an 
unknown: from the moment now, an infinite number of roads lead away to “the 
future”, each heading in a different direction.‘  
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 Thus, to say that futures inhere in the present, that the latter is 
fundamentally unfinished by reason of its exposure to a future, is merely to 
assert that the constitution of the present ‘necessitates that there be a future’ 
(Whitehead 1967a: 193). This is why I said in the last chapter that a practice that 
inhabits a world of events is simultaneously situated by an ethics of inheritance 
of the past and an ethics of exposure to possibilities. Because to the extent that 
the experience of the present is situated between events, it ‘arises as an effect 
facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future’ (Whitehead 1967a: 194). In 
this way, the future inheres in the present as the experience of immanent 
possibilities to be actualised. 
 With this characterisation of futures in the present we can begin to 
approach a first definition of speculative reason. For while all practices oriented 
towards events must learn to become exposed to the possibility of a future event, 
speculation designates, in a nutshell, those practices that actively experiment 
with possibilities. By so doing, their aim is that of producing instruments that, 
in leaping into the possibilities of what is to come, may contribute to directing a 
transition from the givenness of the present towards a future that is more than 
the mere conformation to that givenness.  
 In fact, this is precisely what sets speculation, as I am attempting to 
characterise it79, apart from probabilistic forecasting techniques familiar to the 
future-oriented practices of many social scientists, policymakers, financial 
brokers, and insurance companies.  For as historians and philosophers of 
science have crucially demonstrated  (Bergson 2011, Grosz 2004, Hacking 1990, 
Whitehead 1967a), any probabilistic estimation about future events 
                                                
79 The mode of speculation that I am seeking to articulate here differs in various ways from 
what in recent years has acquired the name of ‘Speculative Realism’ (SR) and ‘Object-oriented 
ontology’ (OOO) (e.g., Bryant 2011, Harman 2010, Meillassoux 2008). One of SR’s central claims 
is the rejection of the Kantian and Husserlian gesture that Meillassoux (2008: 5) termed 
‘correlationism’. Namely, ‘the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other’. As Graham Harman (2013: 23) argues, correlationism is thus the adoption of an 
intermediate position between idealism and realism, suggesting that ‘we cannot say that the 
world either exists or fails to exist outside human thought’. This is another way of approaching 
the same skeptical position we have explored above. To that extent, the anti-correlationism of 
SR and the form of speculation I will try to outline in what follows by drawing on Whitehead, 
James, Dewey, Connolly, Serres and Stengers, among others, share a common point of 
departure. The speculative realist project that ensues from this, however, constitutes an attempt 
to both affirm the possibility and explore the implications of a thought of reality that is 
independent from human knowledge. Hence the strong connection between SR and OOO. 
‘Speculative reason’, as I will propose it here, on the other hand, arises from the affirmation that 
human and other-than-human thinking is not a mere correlation to the facts but ‘a factor in the 
fact of experience’ (Whitehead 1958: 80). Thus, it is a practical instrument for the experimental 
actualisation of possible futures. (For an edited compilation of different approaches to 
speculation, see Bryant,et al. 2011; for an in-depth study that compares both traditions see 
Shaviro forthcoming.)  
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presupposes a linear relationship between present and future whereby the 
latter is understood as the mere extension of the former. Indeed, what allows 
for a probabilistic forecast to be understood as providing knowledge of the 
future is the presupposition that the present facts upon which the calculation is 
performed will be conserved in the future state toward which the calculation is 
said to offer insight (Whitehead 1967a: 125-126). As Henri Bergson (2011: 184) 
exemplified it: ‘[t]o say that a certain friend, under certain circumstances, will 
very probably act in a certain way, is not so much to predict the future conduct 
of our friend as to pass judgement on his present character, that is to say, on his 
past.’ 
 In a world of events, however, this conservative relationship between 
present and future cannot be taken for granted. Thus, while the stability of 
temporal patterns presupposed by probabilistic forecasting may occasionally be 
of help for the orientation of action during limited periods of stability, it should 
never be confused, as it often is, with a structural law of regularity (Hacking 
1990). Stability is always an immanent and precarious achievement of a 
succession of ordinary events that conform to each other. And the 
presupposition of continuous stability becomes decreasingly robust and reliable 
in a world characterised by an accelerated pace of events (Connolly 2011, 2013). 
In this sense, it is not that probabilistic forecasting provides us with certainties 
as to the actual becoming of the future. What makes them ‘probable’ rather than 
certain is also not just that the present knowledge upon which the calculation is 
performed is always incomplete. Rather, the methods of probabilistic 
forecasting incorporate in themselves a gamble on the conformation of the future 
to the present. They pass judgement on the present, or the immediate past, and 
bet that the future will conform to the judgement. 
 To the extent that the future does sometimes conform to the present, we 
should not rush into a disqualification of probability tout court, as a recent 
manifesto for ‘affirmative speculation’ has implicitly proposed (Uncertain 
Commons 2013). The question is whether probabilities suffice, and whether it is 
in them that our social, cultural and political theories should invest. Connolly 
(2002: 137-138), for instance, proposes that ‘[c]oncentration on probabilities 
alone can be left to bureaucrats and consultants’, while ‘[p]olitical and cultural 
theory should focus first and foremost on possibilities that speak to pressing 
needs of the time.’ I am of a similar mind. In fact, this is just the sort of proposal 
that speculative reason seeks to take up. For to speculate is to wager on the 
possibility, however implausible or unlikely from the point of view of our 
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present knowledge, that the future might be more than a mere continuation of 
the present. Speculation is not, then, the facile attitude of ascribing 
unwarranted meanings to uncertainties when scientific evidence is lacking (cf. 
Ericson & Doyle 2004), and it is not the same as what is normally called 
‘financial speculation’, which uses the forecasting methods and assumptions of 
probability theories yet recommends an investment in the improbable. As an 
inventive mode of thought, the role of speculation is no other than ‘creating 
possibles, that is of making visible the directives, evidences, and rejections that 
those possibles must question before they themselves can become perceptible‘ 
(Stengers 2010: 12).     
 To be sure, possibilities are not always, in and of themselves, a cause for 
celebration. Some of the possible and perhaps even likely futures to which we 
are exposed may not include the social sciences or the humanities among their 
existents, at least not as we have come to know or identify them. As Claire 
Colebrook (2014) has recently invited us to consider, it may well be that some 
futures do not even include ‘us’, humans, as part of their living inhabitants. 
Indeed, the possibilities to which we become exposed may be tragic (Connolly 
2011). Yet, it is precisely in the face of the uncertain and problematic nature of 
the many possibilities to which we are exposed that the need for speculative 
modes of theorising makes itself felt. As Dewey (2004: 80) has argued, it is just 
the problematic encounter with the perplexing questions that the world poses 
to us that forces us to think: 
 
men (sic) do not, in their natural estate, think when they 
have no troubles to cope with, no difficulties to overcome. 
A life of ease, of success without effort, would be a 
thoughtless life, and so also would a life of ready 
omnipotence. Beings who think are beings whose life is so 
hemmed in and constricted that they cannot directly carry 
through a course of action to victorious consummation. 
 
Not any problem, however, demands to be thought. In fact, for Dewey, 
whenever a problem is ‘completely actual and present, we are overwhelmed. 
We do not think, but give way to depression.’(2004: 82) In contrast, for it to 
demand a speculative mode of thought a problem needs to present itself as an 
‘impending problem’, one that makes felt a present that is unfinished and 
developing, orienting us to what is yet to come. To that extent, ‘“[t]hought’ 
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represents the suggestions of a way of response that is different from that 
which would have been followed if intelligent observation had not effected an 
inference as to the future’ (2004: 83). 
 Thus, in The Function of Reason (1958) Whitehead distinguishes between 
two forms of speculative reason. One of them, which arguably he would 
comprehensively undertake in his magnum opus Process and Reality –not 
accidentally subtitled ‘An Essay in Cosmology’–, constitutes the construction of 
‘a cosmology expressing the general nature of the world as disclosed in human 
interests’ (1958: 85).  Its aim is to ‘frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of 
general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted’ (Whitehead 1978: 3). The other mode of speculation is perhaps 
more modest and practical. And while, for reasons that will become apparent 
below, it is not itself methodic, it constitutes ‘speculative Reason in its closest 
alliance with the methodological Reason’ (1958: 85). This second mode 
speculative theorising, Whitehead suggests, ‘accepts the limitations of a special 
topic, such as a science or a practical methodology. It then seeks speculatively 
to enlarge and recast the categoreal ideas within the limits of that topic’ (1958: 
85).  
 While drawing on James, Whitehead, Deleuze, Serres and recent research 
in Geology and the humanities for the cultivation of a sensibility and an 
awareness to a speculative cosmology, or what in Chapter One I have termed 
the shifting cosmogram in which the proposition of the Anthropocene situates 
us, I have sought throughout the preceding chapters to experiment with the 
second, more modest and practical mode of speculation. Thus, by confronting 
the impending problem of the future of the contemporary social sciences as put 
into question by multiple demands for relevance, I have experimented with a 
speculative proposition that is doubly related to the question of how things 
matter, in what degrees and manners. For in inviting the practices of the social 
sciences to encounter a situation with the question ‘how is it, here, that things 
matter?’ and to inquire into the many ways and degrees in which the elements 
and relations that compose it come (in)to matter, I have simultaneously 
speculated on how such a question might matter to possible modes of social 
inquiry and to the production of social scientific knowledge. This speculative 
question has situated my theoretical exploration itself into the realm of 
adventure, forcing me, as Michel Serres (1995b: 98) would put it, to think 
scienceward, for practices yet to come.  
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 However, because the function of such a form of speculative reason is to 
leap into the possibilities emerging from the present beyond the limitations 
offered by the habits of thought and practice that have become built into the 
theories and methods of the social sciences, it would be a mistake, I would 
argue, to give in to the temptation of turning speculation into a method80. As 
Whitehead (1958: 66) argues, speculative reason questions the methods, 
refusing to let them rest: 
 
The speculative Reason is in its essence untrammelled by 
method. Its function is to pierce into the general reasons 
beyond limited reasons, to understand all methods as 
coordinated in a nature of things only to be grasped by 
transcending all method. This infinite ideal is never to be 
attained by the bounded intelligence of mankind. But 
what distinguishes men (sic) from the animals, some 
humans from other humans, is the inclusion in their 
natures, waveringly and dimly, of a disturbing element, 
which is the flight after the unattainable. This element is 
that touch of infinity which has goaded races onward, 
sometimes to their destruction. It is a tropism to the 
beckoning light– to the sun passing towards the finality of 
things, and to the sun arising from their origin. The 
speculative Reason turns east and west, to the source and 
to the end, alike hidden below in the rim of the world. 
 
Now, to say that speculation is untrammelled by method is neither to suggest 
that it is against method, nor that it functions through guesswork or by means of 
a practice of wild, unconstrained, imagination. Quite the opposite is the case. In 
fact, the kind of speculative reason I am arguing for here might be understood 
as an experimental intellectual practice, where ‘experiment’ connotes the risky 
stakes of highly constrained creativity that Dewey (2008b) has associated with 
the experimental logic of inquiry.  
 As he argues, experimental modes of inquiry exhibit three main 
characteristics. First, they all involve overt doing, ‘the making of definite 
                                                
80 Unless we take method in its ‘inventive’, problem-sensitive version rather than in its 
traditional form (see Lury & Wakeford 2012, and especially Parisi 2012) 
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changes in the environment or in our relation to it’. Second, they are never 
random activities, but are directed by ideas and propositions ‘which have to 
meet the conditions set by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry.’ 
Last but not least, the outcome of experimentation is ‘the construction of a new 
empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another’ 
(Dewey 2008b: 63). Let me approach the implications of the first two 
characteristics first, and I shall come back to the consequences that may or may 
not be expected of speculative theories below.  
 To the extent that speculative reason can be said to be experimental, it 
cannot embrace the ethics of thought advocated by what we have come to 
know as ‘Theory’. In other words, the speculative theorist does not act upon 
herself by distrusting and becoming estranged from experience, by being 
skeptical of the facts that compose the natural and cultural world, or by 
demanding compliance of it. What a speculative ethos requires of her is a 
different intellectual attitude, namely, to think with and for experience, that is, to 
take up the many experiences that constitute the present as a constraint upon 
her thinking. The exercise of speculation involves something akin to what, in 
What is Philosophy?, Deleuze & Guattari (1994) refer to as ‘the empiricist 
conversion’. As they express it:  
 
[i]t may be that believing in this world, in this life, 
becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of 
existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence 
today. This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many 
reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost 
the world, worse than a fiancée or a god). The problem 
has indeed changed.  (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 75) 
 
The implications of the empiricist conversion 81 for a speculative mode of 
theorising involve a practice of thinking that is crucially grounded in both 
                                                
81 We should not be confused by Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term ‘belief‘ in this passage. 
Indeed, to the extent that they are developing a philosophy of becoming thoroughly committed 
to an immanent world that is not just immanent to God, or any other transcendental value, but 
only immanent to itself, the term ‘belief‘ here should not be interpreted in the Christian mode 
that we discussed in Chapter Four. It is not a belief in God, that might concern the 
transcendental existence of the latter, but one that concerns ‘the infinite immanent possibilities 
brought by the one who believes that God exists.‘ (1994: 75). It this commitment to the radical 
immanence of the world –a plane of existence that William James (2003) would call ‘pure 
experience’– that gives meaning to the notion of an ‘empiricist conversion’.  The shift is 
spiritual, for sure, as the term ‘conversion’ provocatively suggests. But it involves not the claim 
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perceptual and conceptual experience– speculations must begin from the real 
possibilities emerging from actual facts and produce intellectual and other 
instruments capable of effecting a different mode of transitioning between 
present and future by providing an alternative path towards a novel empirical 
situation. Thus, speculation begins in experience, and it works with a view 
towards the composition of a new, transformed experience. 
 Beginning in experience, speculative reason is not skeptical of facts but 
encounters them with a docility that does not thereby involve complete 
rendition to them. By virtue of the unfinished or transitional nature of the 
present, the facts of experience are approached as materials for speculation, as 
themselves exhibiting the possibility of an alternative that demands creative 
modes of intellectual experimentation. In so doing, it surveys the variety of 
contemporary experiences, no matter how minor, implausible or rare these may 
be, so as to extract from them possibilities for a different composition to be 
actualised. In other words, the possibilities speculation works with are not, as in 
some cases of science fiction82, pure potentialities divorced from actuality. As 
we have already seen with Stengers (2011b: 313), a ‘speculative possibility does 
not simply fall from the sky of ideas. Speculation originates in unique 
situations, which exhibit the possibility of an approach by the very fact that 
they have already undertaken it’. As my exploration in Chapter Three of three 
very unusual encounters in contemporary social research has, I hope, 
suggested, what becomes material for speculation are real possibilities inherent 
in the present. 
 Showing docility to facts without succumbing to them means that the 
main function of speculative reason is neither simply to describe the facts that 
compose a present situation, nor merely to provide a rational explanation for 
their coming about. Thus, it resists the dogmatic fallacies involved both in 
theories that would revert every event to their own preferred explanatory 
framework, and in those other ‘theories-of-no-theory’ which would confine our 
                                                                                                                                          
that there is a God beyond our immanent world, but the wager of a world that matters, and 
which includes the possibilities of those who believe in the existence of God as their inhabitants. 
Perhaps this is what Whitehead (1926: 49) –who, admittedly, was more of a theist than either 
Deleuze or myself– meant when he proposed that ‘[r]eligion is world-loyalty’. 
82 I am here drawing on the distinction made by Atwood (2011: 6) between science fiction and 
speculative fiction. What she means by ‘science fiction’ is ‘those books that descend from H.G. 
Wells’s The War of he Worlds, which treats of an invasion by tentacled, blood-sucking Martians 
shot to Earth in metal canisters–things that could not possibly happen. ‘Speculative fiction’ by 
contrast, ‘means plots that descend from Jules Verne’s books about submarines and ballon 
travel and such– things that really could happen but just hadn’t completely happened when the 
authors wrote the books.’  
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experience of the world to what is merely ‘observed’. Instead, it takes up the 
stubbornness of facts as a constraint upon its own creative activity.  
 This is where such form of speculation involves ‘overt doing’, seeking to 
make possible changes in our relationship to a situation, to a milieu, to the 
world. Speculative reason attempts to think with facts. It is not skeptical of but 
attempts to think with the sciences. But unlike the scientific reliance on 
methodological reason, hard or soft, speculative reason is characterised by the 
willingness to risk a thought about that which our habits would advise us 
against thinking, to cast off into what we may have not yet thought, to reclaim 
what we may have learned to forget, to venture thinking into what we do not 
yet know how to think. 
  In this way, its ultimate aim is that of producing novel propositions, 
hypotheses, concepts, suggestions, ideas, in sum, intellectual instruments that 
may contribute to the rearrangement of the relationships, the modes of 
togetherness of the facts that compose a situation so that the latter might be 
experienced differently, opening a path to the composition of a different future. 
For this reason, the time of speculation is not the ‘now’  as a horizon, but a 
fugitive now that is always passing too quickly to be held still, immediately 
begging the question of what might come after it83. In this way, the speculative 
attitude involves the gesture of combining the stubborn rigour of actuality with 
the freedom of the possible. Dewey (2008b: 63) emphasises this point when he 
argues that 
 
[t]here is a distinction between hypotheses generated in 
that seclusion from observable fact which renders them 
fantasies, and hypotheses that are projections of the 
possibilities of facts already in existence and capable of 
report. There is a difference between the imaginative 
speculations that recognize no law except their own 
dialectic consistency, and those which rest on an 
observable movement of events, and which foresee these 
events carried to a limit by the force of their own 
                                                
83 To be sure, it may be that what comes after it involves a different form of inheriting the past. 
In this sense, to say that speculation is future-oriented is not to say that it is unconcerned with 
the past. As I have argued, that it takes the existence of the past as a stubborn fact that demands 
to be inherited does not mean that this fact determines ‘how’ it is to be inherited, or what the 
‘right’ account of the past is.  Thus, the future with which speculation is concerned might 
indeed involve the future of the past. 
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movement. There is a difference between support by 
argument from arbitrarily assumed premises, and an 
argument which sets forth the implications of propositions 
resting upon facts already vitally significant.  
 
Marked by the empiricist conversion, then, the intellectual instruments that 
speculative reason seeks to produce can never amount to a new general 
framework that would, once and for all, resolve the problematic character of the 
many experiences that compose the world. To suggest the contrary would 
amount to sustaining that thought bears a structuring relationship to 
experience– that social theory can, by its own means, set limits to the question 
of what a society is capable of. 
  If one is to remain a speculative empiricist who is not therefore 
disdainful of thinking –that is, not by definition an anti-intellectualist–, one has 
to conceive of theories in the concrete, as being  ‘made of the same stuff as 
things are’ (James 2003: 20). They are prompted by experiences and must 
themselves be experienced. As they contribute to forging particular forms of 
sensibilities and to intensifying our sensitivity to possibilities that may allow for 
a different future to come, theories are felt and they involve feeling– they are, in 
Whitehead’s words (1978: 184), lures for feeling. If speculations succeed in 
changing the mode of togetherness of the many facts and relations that 
compose a situation, it is not by inviting us simply to ‘think differently’ about 
that situation, but by adding to it the experience of a thought that connects some 
elements of the present to possibilities to be actualised in the future. That is, the 
power of speculative thinking is compositional– it adds itself to the making of a 
situation and in so doing shifts the intensities with which a future may be felt in 
the fugitive present. It participates in ‘modifying old dispositions and forging 
new habits even as it expresses established habits and dispositions’ (Connolly 
2002: 99). This is arguably why Whitehead (1968: 36), who was always at pains 
to avoid bifurcations of all kinds, once described the experience of thought as ‘a 
tremendous form of excitement. Like a stone thrown into a pond’, he suggested,  
 
it disturbs the whole surface of our being. But this image 
is inadequate. For we should conceive the ripples as 
effective in the creation of the plunge of the stone into the 
water. The ripples release the thought, and the thought 
augments and distorts the ripples. In order to understand 
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the essence of thought, we must study its relation to the 
ripples amid which it emerges. (1968: 36) 
 
As I suggested above, speculation begins in the midst of experience, and it 
seeks to arrive at a novel empirical situation. It risks a thought that proposes 
itself to the world and in so doing affects the patterns by which things might 
come (in)to matter. To be sure, the rippling effect may not always succeed in 
leading us towards better ends. It might not always affect the patterns of 
relevance in such a way that a path towards a future that be more than the mere 
extension of its immediate past can be opened up. In this sense, speculative 
propositions or theories should be taken less in a logical sense –as statements 
containing a subject and a predicate whose primary function is to be judged as 
to their truth or falsehood, in terms of how they correspond to a given state of 
affairs84– and might be better approached in its political sense, that is, as an 
invitation that is put into play in relation to a problematic situation from which 
it extracts its sense and which it seeks to modify. 
  As ‘tales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities’ 
(Whitehead 1978: 256), the putting into play of speculative propositions is 
always doubly risky. Like with other inventions, the milieus to which 
speculative propositions relate constitute themselves a risk, placing the 
question of their efficacy as an unknown that, as I argued above, cannot be 
tamed by the guarantees of a method. But as Judith Schlanger (1983: 255) has 
noted, moreover, with speculative propositions the failure to modify the 
experience of a situation also oftentimes leads to a failure to gain admission into 
a pre-existent standard of rationality. That is, they face the risk of being 
disqualified as nonsense, or as mere theoretical exercises that do not matter to 
anyone, anywhere (Dewey 2008b).   
 To characterise the risks of speculation in this way is to suggest, then, 
that making thought creative of the future is neither a process of unilateral 
‘effectuation’ or ‘performativity’ that simply takes the effect of our intellectual 
efforts for granted, nor a process of probabilistic anticipation that relies too 
firmly on the supposed security of a given method. Rather, it involves the 
wager, but never the promise, that a situation might become responsive to our 
                                                
84 This is not to say that speculative propositions are not to be judged as to their truth or 
falsehood. What this means is that their possible truth is not primary nor inherent in them, but is 
an event that can happen to them. As James (2011: 141. emphasis in original) was at pains to 
argue, ’truth happens to an idea, it becomes true, it is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an 
event, the process namely of verifying itself, its verification.’ 
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thinking. That our propositions launched into the developing edge of the 
present might find a response so that they themselves might become practically 
responsive to the problems that the present poses. Speculative reason affirms 
the world and attempts to make a contribution, however small or modest, to the 
world’s own adventures of ideas. We all know by now that we can never be 
sure where an adventure might take us. 
 
Conclusion: It Matters What Tales We Tell Other Tales With 
 
 In this chapter I have sought to provide a possible, if partial, response to 
the question of why the practice of theory might matter within a framework 
that affirms the priority of experience in all its complexity, such as the one I 
have adopted and sought to work upon throughout this thesis. In so doing, I 
have explored the extent to which, in the contemporary intellectual landscape 
that characterises much of the work done within the contemporary social 
sciences, such a skeptical question alarmingly resonates with a growing sense 
that theory has in fact no future, that it is already dead, that it does not matter 
and that, perhaps, it never has.  
 Given the ethics of thought that has arguably characterised what we 
have come to know as ‘Theory’, moreover, I have argued that the skeptical 
question that opened this chapter also had some intellectual purchase. For 
‘Theory’, as a particular intellectual deportment that since the 1960s traveled to 
and affected the modes of thought and inquiry of many social science and 
humanistic disciplines in the Anglophone world, was crucially characterised by 
a suspicion about experience and all forms of empirical knowledge. After 
exploring such a characterisation and the limitations of some of the attempts to 
invoke a return to empiricism at the expense of theoretical activity, I have 
sought to articulate a conjunctive response that would say ‘yes‘ to the relevance 
and futures of both theory and experience.   
 This response is what, by selectively drawing and working upon the 
seminal propositions of empiricist thinkers such as William James, John Dewey, 
A.N Whitehead, William Connolly, Michel Serres, and Isabelle Stengers, among 
others, I have attempted to associate with a speculative reason. Speculative 
reason, I have argued, constitutes a mode of thought that surveys the variety of 
contemporary facts of experience and experiments with the possibilities that 
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inhere therein by producing propositions that wager upon the becoming of a 
different future.       
 Now, to the extent that it bets on a different mode of transitioning 
between present and future to the one that might obtain without the 
intervention of thought, the experimental mode of speculation that I have 
proposed is not, as I have suggested, the name for what we would normally call 
a method, for to call it a method in that sense would presuppose that all bets are 
off. That it has itself some secure foothold on the becoming of the future. And 
neither does this practical speculation designate a new theory, for although it 
may rely on more abstract speculative cosmologies, the latter have no 
transcendental footholds either– immanently, they seek to articulate worlds, 
thoughts, and thinkers.  
 If speculative propositions are tales that might be told about the world 
and its inhabitants, what thinking speculatively for speculation entails, rather, is 
an attempt to begin to cultivate a different mode of thought, another set of 
intellectual sensibilities, another ethic of theoretical imagination. By affirming 
thinking as both an element and factor in the fact of experience, a speculative 
ethic of theoretical imagination seeks to incorporate and expand Donna 
Haraway’s (2011: 4) lesson85, that 
 
[i]t matters what matters we use to think other matters 
with; it matters what stories we tell to tell other stories 
with; it matters what knots knot knots, what thoughts 
think thoughts, what ties tie ties. It matters what stories 
make worlds, what worlds make stories.  
  
Thus, precisely because the future can only be waged upon, precisely because it 
requires the risking of a thought whose success is never guaranteed but whose 
sheer possibility is a lure for opening a path towards a different experience to 
come, that theory, in this speculative key, matters. It matters what tales we 
might tell other tales with. To make its possibility perceptible, to allow 
speculation to come (in)to matter, is already to engage in it, to propose 
propositions, to experiment with experiments, to think about thinking. 
  
                                                
85 A lesson she herself learned from Marilyn Strathern (1992: 10). 
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Afterword: 
Introducing The Apprentice 
 
 By undertaking a transformed, speculative version of Dewey’s (2004) 
project of reconstruction, in this thesis I have sought to produce a series of 
intellectual instruments that might make possible a different care of knowledge 
in the contemporary social sciences. The speculative task of making possibles 
has here forced me to reconsider the place that the concept of relevance has, 
and may have, in relation to the articulation of a different mode of social 
inquiry. One that rather than understanding itself as an exercise in 
estrangement from the facts of experience, would embark on the adventures 
that are opened up in the transitions between events, a transitional present 
characterised by the double challenge of inheriting a past while becoming 
exposed to the possibilities of a different world to come.  It is such an ethics of 
inquiry, one that might find expression in the situated question of ‘how is it, 
here, that things matter?’ that I have associated with the adventure of relevance 
and which I have attempted throughout the preceding chapters to endow with 
some of the constraints that may enable its possibility to be made perceptible. 
  Some of these constraints have led me to explore and seek to articulate a 
series of propositions concerning the inventive nature of knowledge-practices, 
as requiring a coming to terms with the immanent obligations that objects of 
inquiry may pose; the need to articulate, in practice, the taking of risks in the 
articulation of a manner of encountering objects of inquiry such that the 
encounter might prove fertile; an account of the efficacy of knowledge that does 
not forget the active roles of the many milieus with which the former connects 
and which is attentive to the emergent, circulating and often perplexing modes 
of causality that connections set in motion; a concern for a more-than-human 
world of events that does not disavow our attachments to human experience 
nor the possibility of emergent and always precarious forms of order; as well as 
the possibility of a mode of theorising characterised not by the distrust of 
experience but by the active experimentation with the possibles that 
experiences in the present may herald, such that paths to novel empirical 
situations may be opened up.  
 As I suggested in the introduction to the thesis, the ethical question to be 
entertained here was not the normative, general question of ‘what is the good?’ 
or ‘what is evil?’ but rather the practical, situated question of ‘how is one to 
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live?’. Above all, then, the ethics of inquiry that I have here sought to cultivate 
is one that will find no foothold in stable, universal, anonymous foundations, 
but can only extract its possible sense from the very situations from which it 
seeks to learn, in relation to which it immanently operates, by virtue of which it 
might become alive.  
 In this way, to the extent that the adventure of relevance could be said to 
be a way of responding, or perhaps more accurately, a mode of inheriting and 
entertaining the question ‘how is one to know?’ that I associated with the care 
of knowledge, it does so not by offering a final response which could be said to 
be ‘ethical’, but rather by attempting to make the question resonate with each 
encounter. It thus forces one to come to terms with the fact that the question 
does not tell one how to respond, even though it demands that responses be 
invented. Taking the question of relevance seriously, thus, does not involve the 
acquisition of a piece of knowledge, a procedure, or a faculty that might 
provide contemporary social scientists with ready responses to how they are to 
know. Rather, it attempts to situate those who do take it seriously in a process 
of learning, immanently and without recourse to transcendental principles, how 
to invent responses that matter. Thus, to embark on an adventure of relevance 
is, in effect, to conjoin the challenge of knowing with the challenge of learning 
how to know.  
 I will return to this issue below, but for now it should be noted that this 
double challenge does not only concern a care of knowledge but, 
simultaneously, a care of the self and a care of the world. As I have suggested in 
the introduction to this thesis, if the task of reconstruction is to become more 
than a mere theoretical exercise that, as Dewey (2008b: 39) would say, ‘makes 
no difference anywhere‘, these two dimensions cannot be conceived as 
disentangled. Knowledge-practices are neither just technologies of the self, nor 
simply practices of world-making, but what we might call techniques of 
habitation– habits that inventively articulate a multiplicity of other habits, of 
ways of existing in the world, and of heterogeneous patterns of relevance that 
compose a situation –that is, a habitat– while they themselves become added to, 
and thus alter, the composition of the situation.  
 What might follow from this is that the site of a care of knowledge 
belongs to what Stengers (2005: 997. see also 2011c: 164) has named ‘etho-
ecology’– the conjunction of ‘ethos, the way of behaving peculiar to a being, and 
oikos, the habitat of that being and the way in which that habitat satisfies or 
opposes the demands associated with the ethos or affords opportunities for an 
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original ethos to risk itself.’ To cultivate a care of knowledge, as I have tried to 
articulate it, is to explore the intimate connections between a care of the self and 
care of the world; it is to think in terms of habitation. That is, to conjoin, in one 
and the same problem, the mutation of the habits that animate certain ways of 
response with the constraints and possibilities of transformation that their 
respective habitats may provide. Thinking in terms of habitation is, I believe, 
crucial, for it may help us avoid two distinct but complementary dangers that 
emerge as a consequence of overemphasising, deliberately or not, only one of 
these dimensions at the expense of the other.  
 The first danger was already alluded to in the introduction. It is that 
which emerges from overemphasising the dimension of the care of the self at 
the expense of the care of the wold. The later work of Michel Foucault (1984a, 
1990) on ethics, subjectivity and truth has, for example, been the focus of such a 
reading. Having centred his later work around practices of self-
problematisation and self-formation in the Greco-Roman period as ethical 
‘exercise[s] of self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform 
oneself‘ (Foucault 1997a: 282), a number of readers of Foucault have taken his 
explorations as having a certain culture of the self, that is, an aesthetics of self-
fashioning, as their sole aim.  
 While some authors (e.g. Guillory 2000) have endorsed such a turn, 
arguing that it constitutes a welcome move away from a pervasive habit in the 
humanities of overstating claims as to the political effects of their practices of 
knowledge-making, others have suggested that the turn to the care of the self 
poses the danger of reducing thought to a therapeutics (e.g. Myers 2013: 21-52). 
In this sense, philosopher and classicist Pierre Hadot (1995: 207, see also 
O’Leary 2002) –from whose work Foucault took inspiration to develop his 
inquiry into the techniques of the self of the Greco-Roman period– has argued 
that, when compared to the ancient texts on which such a project is based, 
Foucault’s concerns are ‘precisely focused far too much on the “self,” or at least 
on a specific conception of the self.’: 
 
For the moment, then, let us say that, from an historical 
point of view, it seems difficult to accept that the 
philosophical practice of the Stoics and Platonists was 
nothing but a relationship to one’s self, a culture of the 
self, or a pleasure taken in oneself. The psychic content of 
these exercises seems to me to be something else entirely. 
223 
In my view, the feeling of belonging to a whole is an 
essential element: belonging, that is, both to the whole 
constituted by the human community, and to that 
constituted by the cosmic whole. (Hadot 1995: 208) 
 
This is hardly the place for me to assess how accurate Foucault’s readings on 
the Stoics and the Platonists might be, or whether this overemphasis on the 
culture of the self can in fact be ascribed to his work or not. It seems to me, 
however, that the danger is nevertheless present for anyone who engages the 
question of ethics in these terms86. Beyond the matter of the exegesis of the 
Greeks, what Hadot’s quotation above makes present is that in order to avoid 
turning the care of the self into a therapeutics, into a question of an exercise by 
the self in order to heal oneself, one must conceive of it as simultaneously 
involving a certain care of the world, a practice that is not simply ‘of the self on 
the self’ but of the self and the world, on the self and the world. In other words, 
it is the very distinction between self and world that needs to be problematised 
such that an exercise of transforming one’s own manner of existing in the world 
involves a transformation, however modest, of the world’s own manner of 
existing, and vice versa. 
 Doing so, however, must avoid a second potential danger, which is that 
of grounding a care of the self and a care of knowledge on a pre-established 
definition of what it means to take care of the world– that is, on a fixed 
ontology, cosmology or metaphysics. By this I do not mean to say that in order 
to entertain the question of the care of knowledge one has to avoid any and 
every ontological commitment. I agree with Connolly (1995: 9) that the issue is 
not whether one cultivates certain ontological commitments or not, but whether 
one belongs to those ‘who suppress the “onto” in political interpretation‘ as 
well as in epistemic, ethical and ecological thinking, or to ‘those who diverge 
about how to engage it.‘ The crucial point, however, is to avoid simply 
deducing one’s thinking from those commitments, and instead to seek to 
articulate and cultivate thinking, commitments and sensibilities, together. Thus, 
to suggest that the care of knowledge involves a care of the world does not 
                                                
86 For instance, one of the concerns expressed in the form of a question to be addressed by the 
participants in the Critical Inquiry symposium on the future of theory discussed in Chapter Six 
was precisely this: ‘It has been suggested that theory now has backed off from its earlier 
sociopolitical engagements and its sense of revolutionary possibility and has undergone a 
“therapeutic turn” to concerns with ethics, aesthetics, and care of the self, a turn of which Lacan 
is the major theoretical symptom. True?’ (in Mitchell 2004: 330). Despite the reference to Lacan 
rather than Foucault, the question remains pertinent.  
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mean that the latter precedes and informs the former, but that the two are, 
precisely, involved– entangled, folded with each other. 
 As I have shown in preceding chapters, the particular care of knowledge 
that I have called an ‘ethics of estrangement’ involves the modern metaphysical 
presupposition that Whitehead (2004) termed the ‘bifurcation of nature’– a 
world split into two realms that distribute and organise causes and effects, 
subjects and objects, facts and values, nature and culture, appearance and the 
really real, and so forth. I have suggested that the bifurcation of nature and the 
ethics of estrangement could be seen as having contributed to some of the 
challenges – intellectual, institutional, and ecological– that the contemporary 
social sciences are now confronted with. In order to begin to cultivate a 
different ethics of inquiry, I argued, it was required that we problematise both 
their ethos and their metaphysical assumptions, and entertain the question of 
‘how is one to know’ in way that involved a non-bifurcated, eventful world.  
 My argument, however, has attempted to refrain from suggesting that 
‘we have never’ lived in such a bifurcated world. In contrast, by discussing the 
assumptions underpinning contemporary demands for relevance as well as by 
entertaining the implications that may follow from the proposition of the 
Anthropocene, I have been more interested in the consequences of such 
metaphysical suppositions and of such an ethics of inquiry than in whether or 
not they have ever been ‘true’ or adequate in principle87. They certainly have had 
effects, and it is those effects that matter. It is in relation to them, and not in 
spite of them, that a reconstruction is to be carried out.  
 In order to attempt to resist those effects and to open up the possibility of 
alternative futures –and thus, of alternative consequences– from the outset I 
have sought to produce some of the instruments required to propose a different 
care of knowledge that would directly involve a different care of the world– a 
care for a world characterised by the relevance of existence and the existence of 
relevance, a care for what Whitehead (1968: 111) would otherwise call ‘value 
experience’, the experience that things matter, that ‘[e]verything has some value 
for itself, for others and for the whole‘ such that ‘[e]xistence, in its own nature, 
is the upholding of value intensity.’ (1968: 111).  
                                                
87 Put differently, what has indeed been contested is the upholding of such assumptions as true 
by virtue of a transhistorical, infallible, universal principle. Thus, I can entertain the modern 
ethos and its metaphysical assumptions only to the extent that they are seen as involving weak 
rather than strong ontological assumptions. Namely, assumptions that are fallible, open to 
contestation, and open to historical transformation (on weak ontologies see White 2000). 
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 Thus, if the adventure of relevance cultivates commitments that can be 
associated with a certain reading of James’s or Whitehead’s (1978) process 
metaphysics, it does so only on condition that one does not forget the speculative 
nature of Whitehead’s –and in my reading, of James’s– philosophy. By this I 
mean, of course, that neither my commitments nor theirs need to be accepted as 
incontestable matters of fact. By contrast, as Stengers (2009c: 104) has argued in 
relation to Whitehead’s propositions: ‘[t]hat which decides between their failure 
and success is indeed the transformation of emphasis that they must be able to 
produce with regard to the powerful and pragmatically justified abstractions 
which lure and sometimes dominate our experiences’.  
 As I argued in Chapter Six, speculative propositions do not work by 
making us think differently as if through a Gestalt-switch, thereby confronting 
us with the experience of ‘never having been’, that is, with the experience of 
having been deceived all along. In fact, if that were their effect, then it would be 
quite perplexing indeed, for such an experience seems more adequate to the 
bifurcated world in which experiences only ever yield appearance, whereas the 
relevant aspects of the world lie hidden somewhere else. By contrast, if and 
when speculative propositions work, they work by proposing themselves to a 
situation such that a path to a novel experience, composed by different 
contrasts, by different patterns of relevance, may become available. Whether 
such propositions will be taken up or not by those who might entertain them is 
another matter, one that no argument could here guarantee. 
 Be that as it may, it seems to me that, having dealt with the question of 
the care of the world at some length throughout the preceding chapters, what 
needs to be explored in these remaining pages is the question of who might 
emerge from an adventure, what kind of social scientist –to be cultivated– an 
inquiry into a world of events that matter might involve. Indeed, as I have 
suggested, there is no telling where an adventure might take us. But it can 
happen, Cortázar’s (2011: 57. emphasis added) poem intimates, ‘it can happen 
that we might enter parks in Jaipur or Delhi, or in the heart of Saint-Germain-
des-Prés we might brush against another possible profile of man’. Thus, what I shall 
attempt as a manner of concluding is a positive delineation 88  –just as 
speculative; or perhaps even more than speculative, ‘to be read in the 
                                                
88 I say a ‘positive delineation’ because, throughout the thesis I have already provided a 
‘negative’ one. In Chapter Three, for example, part of this negative characterisation has 
involved distinguishing the possible persona capable of undertaking an adventure from the 
figure of the ‘hero‘ that Susan Sontag (1966) associated with the modern anthropologist-
ethnographer. 
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interrogative’, as Cortázar (1997) would put it elsewhere – of a possible scientific 
persona that such a care of knowledge might involve. 
 I should first make clear that in addressing the question of a persona –
rather than of a ‘self’– I am not attempting to explore the individual experience 
of embarking on an adventure of relevance, of which the encounters discussed 
in Chapter Three might perhaps provide a much better account than I ever 
could, for the concrete form of adventure and thus, of its experience, depends 
on the specificity of the encounter. By contrast, as some historians of science 
have suggested by drawing on the seminal work of Marcel Mauss (see Daston 
& Sibum 2003: 2. see also Daston & Galison 2010; Daston & Lunbeck 2011), the 
persona is an ‘[i]ntermediate between individual biography and the social 
institution […] a cultural identity that simultaneously shapes the individual in 
body and mind and creates a collective with a shared and recognizable 
physiognomy.’ Rather than individual persons, what is at stake then is the 
possibility of a type of scientist.  
 But here another distinction is called for. For in the work of historians, 
the scientific persona, if still conceptual, is actual, emerging from the encounters 
of the biographical, institutional, and public routes of inheritance that bring 
certain scientific figures into existence (for historical studies that focus on 
figures like Charles Darwin or Werner Heisenberg see Browne 2003, Carson 
2003, and others in the same volume). Thus, ‘[p]ersonae are creatures of 
historical circumstance; they emerge and disappear within specific contexts. A 
nascent persona indicates the creation of a new kind of individual, whose 
distinct traits mark a recognized social species.’ (Daston and Sibum 2003: 3). 
They are ‘an ethical and epistemological code imagined as a self.’ (Daston & 
Galison 2010: 204) 
  What Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum (2003) call ‘scientific 
personae’, or ‘scientific self’ (Daston & Galison 2010), are thus akin to what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 67) would call ‘psychosocial types’. Namely, 
empirical types emerging from socio-historical fields, whose discernment may 
teach us something about the movements and forces that characterise such 
fields, or equally, about the collective habits, cultivated epistemic virtues and 
ideals, and the shared fears, dreams and hopes, that identify certain scientific 
and social scientific practices. In this way, by advancing the hypothesis that ‘all 
epistemology begins in fear’, Daston and Galison (2010: 372) show that, 
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[d]epending on which threat to knowledge was perceived 
as most acute at that moment, the scientific self was 
exhorted to take epistemological precautions to redress 
the excesses of both the active and the passive cognition of 
nature, and to practice four-eyed or blind sight. For 
Enlightenment savants, the passivity of the sensationalist 
self was problematic; achieving truth-to-nature required 
that they actively select, sift, and synthesize the sensations 
that flooded the too-perceptive mind. Only neophytes and 
incompetents allowed themselves to be overwhelmed by 
the variety and detail of natural phenomena. […] In 
contrast, the subjective self of nineteenth-century scientists 
was viewed as overactive and prone to impose its 
preconceptions and pet hypotheses on data. Therefore, 
these scientists strove for a self-denying passivity, which 
might be described as the will to willessness. The only 
way for active self to attain the desired receptivity to 
nature was to turn its domineering will inward– to 
practice self-discipline, self-restraint, self-abnegation, self-
annihilation, and a multitude of other techniques of self-
imposed selflessness. (Daston & Galison 2010: 203) 
 
But because psychosocial types depend upon a milieu of socio-historical forces, 
of disciplinary habits and of biographical features, they cannot be entirely 
determined by an exercise in thought. Indeed, to the extent that they constitute 
regulative ideals that operate at given historical and disciplinary moments, to 
propose a ‘new‘ psychosocial type which could be said to correspond to the 
care of knowledge that I have called an adventure would turn the latter into an 
incredibly normative and disciplinary proposition, or indeed into a moral 
injunction for contemporary social scientists to inhabit a predefined mode of 
being. To the extent that I am here experimenting with the possibility of giving 
a provisional, personalised name to this project, my sense that is one should 
think of it in terms closer to what Deleuze & Guattari (1994) would call 
conceptual personae, which, for their part, ‘are irreducible to psychosocial types, 
even if here again there are constant penetrations’ (1994: 76). For, unlike 
psychosocial types, conceptual personae do not emerge out of empirical, 
psychological, and social determinations, but are the sole product of thinking, 
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or perhaps more appropriately, they are those figures that animate certain 
modes of thought and certain possible modes of inquiry such that ‘[a] particular 
conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.’ (1994: 
69) Thus, between conceptual personae and psychosocial types there is 
 
a conjunction, a system of referrals or perpetual relays. 
The features of conceptual personae have relationships 
with the epoch or historical milieu in which they appear 
that only psychosocial types enable to assess. But, 
conversely, the physical and mental movements of 
psychosocial types, their pathological symptoms, their 
relational attitudes, their existential modes, and their legal 
status, become susceptible to a determination purely of 
thinking and of thought that wrests them from both the 
historical state of affairs of a society and the lived 
experience of individuals, in order to turn them into the 
features of conceptual personae, or thought-events on the 
plane laid out by thought or under the concepts it creates. 
Conceptual personae and psychosocial types refer to each 
other and combine without ever merging. (1994: 70) 
 
So who might be said to animate, and be animated by, an adventure? What 
name may we give to that conceptual persona that wanders in the night, 
wondering about how things matter in a given situation, about how to inherit 
an event, asking questions, putting them at risk, becoming exposed, making 
mistakes, inventing errantly towards the possibility that something might be 
learned? Which character, in other words, might be capable of merging the 
challenge of knowing with the challenge of learning how to know?  
 As I have suggested in previous chapters, it is certainly not a hero, but 
someone –or something– whose existence is entirely dependent upon 
encounters. Surely, neither can it be that of the public sociologist as 
characterised by Burawoy and others, for as we saw in Chapter One, this 
character is concerned with the challenge of giving others a voice, rather than 
wondering about how to listen. It is also not, or not yet, a ‘diplomat’, a 
conceptual persona Stengers (2011b) and Latour (2004b, 2014) have proposed in 
relation to their attempt to cultivate a ‘non-modernist’ social science. For the 
diplomat is the one who inhabits the tensions inherent in the problem of 
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translation and the risk of betraying those she represents (Stengers 2011b: 374-
385), but who seems to know how to read that which requires translating. 
While there might be some family resemblances, its name can neither be that of 
the ‘idiot’, a conceptual persona that Deleuze (with and without Guattari), and 
also Stengers (2005) and others (e.g. Michael 2012) have proposed and 
developed. For the idiot is the one responsible for provoking thought, for 
slowing others down, rather than letting his or her thinking be provoked by an 
encounter.  
 My sense is that all of these conceptual personae have crucial affinities 
and may, at specific points, require each other, and work together. So rather 
than replace them, I propose to add to them another character whose name I 
will borrow, again, from Deleuze (1994), but who also sometimes can be seen 
animating the thought of Dewey (1922), Serres (1997) and Cortázar (2011)– this 
is the apprentice. The apprentice is not the one who knows, not even the one who 
learns, but the one whose problem is that of learning, of inquiring, of learning 
how to know. Because she exists only in relation to practical and speculative 
problems that demand inquiry (Deleuze 1994: 164), and ‘[n]o learning can avoid 
the voyage´ (Serres 1997: 8), the apprentice always finds herself in encounters 
with problems she has to invent a way of inheriting, and she wonders about 
how to sense and respond to the patterns of relevance that compose them.  
 She wonders because what she does know about learning –or rather, 
about failing to learn– is that the risk is either to become one with the 
problematic situation, or to force the situation to become one with herself, to 
reduce it by representing it in terms of what she already knows. In contrast, she 
has to inquire, to learn to invent a manner of coming to know a situation, 
bearing in mind that ‘[w]e never know in advance how someone will learn: by 
means of what loves someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make 
them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think’ (Deleuze 1994: 
165), and that there is no telling as to what may bring about the event of 
knowing. Nevertheless, she keeps on trying. Because learning is that which 
occurs only in relation to problematic situations, and it requires becoming with 
them –which is not to say becoming them–, she inquires so as to allow the 
situation to become her teacher– she inquires into it so as to learn, in her own 
manner, how to know about it. As Deleuze (1994: 23) puts it, ‘we learn nothing 
from those who say: ‘Do as I do’. Our only teachers are those who tell us to ‘do 
with me’, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather 
than propose gestures for us to reproduce.’  
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 To be sure, the apprentice has many techniques and methods at her 
disposal, but she is not in possession of a procedure that would lead her safely 
to knowledge. For if that were the case, learning would not be part of her 
problem but simply the means to an end. What she does instead is attempt to 
cultivate, by putting herself at risk in the encounter, by effecting piecemeal, 
practical transitions upon the situation and upon herself, the manner by which 
to learn how to relate to the demands that the situation poses. Thus, she 
cultivates a certain docility to that which demands to be learned, a docility that, 
as Dewey (1922: 97) reminds us, should not be confused with conformity, or 
with submission to the power of education, but with a humble yet inventive 
capacity to ‘re-make old habits, to re-create’: ‘[t]o be truly docile is to be eager to 
learn all the lessons of active, inquiring, expanding experience.’ (Dewey 1922: 
64). The aim of the apprentice is not to provide a solution to the problem that 
identifies a situation, but to risk inventing a manner of understanding how the 
problem may be defined, and how it might be developed. There is no other 
solution. Deleuze (1994: 164-165) illustrates this with the example of a monkey 
in the process of learning: 
 
A well known test in psychology involves a monkey 
who is supposed to find food in boxes of one particular 
colour amidst others of various colours: there comes a 
paradoxical period during which the number of ‘errors’ 
diminishes even though the monkey does not yet 
possess the ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ of a solution in each 
case: propitious moment in which the philosopher-
monkey opens up to truth, himself producing the true, 
but only to the extent that he begins to penetrate the 
coloured thickness of the problem. 
 
Occupying the problem of learning, of learning how to know and of knowing 
how to learn, the apprentice, as in Deleuze’s example, risks propositions, 
attends to the objections that the situation poses, makes mistakes; has to start 
over, alter the questions, try again without guarantees. Exposed to the 
possibility that her efforts might bring about something new, sometimes they 
do contribute to making the encounter fertile, and her inventions become 
successful, allowing for the problem to be experienced differently, in a way that 
matters for those with whom it is concerned. It is this event that she calls 
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‘knowledge’. Events, however, are as much achievements as they are openings, 
and ‘knowing’ does not mark an end but a transition, the beginning of a new 
adventure.  
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